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ABSTRACT 
 
This study addresses the impact of terrorism and political violence on non-
governmental organizations.  The research is divided into two main sections.  The 
first utilizes secondary source material to evaluate the nature and extent of the threat 
of terrorism and political violence to non-governmental organizations.  Acts of 
political violence and terrorism will be categorized into acts upon non-governmental 
organizations and religious groups acting as non-governmental organizations 
depending on the nature and target of the attacks.  The general threat characteristics 
can then be evaluated.  The main source materials used are the Rand/Saint Andrews 
Terrorism Database as well as the Rand/MIPT Terrorism Database, both of which 
have been compiled primarily from news publications worldwide.  Also used as 
secondary sources are the U.S. government reports Political Violence Against 
Americans, Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans, and the 
Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000-2002.  A theoretical framework as to the nature of 
the threat of terrorism and political violence on non-governmental organizations will 
then be presented. 
The second portion of this study will utilize the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints as a case study to determine how it evaluates and deals with the 
threats of political violence and terrorism against its organization, agents, and 
property worldwide.  Further, the theoretical framework developed in the previous 
section will be applied to the case and the framework reinforced.  The appropriateness 
of the framework in an in-depth scenario can be explored.  Policy recommendations 
based on the framework and case will then be made. 
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CHAPTER 1: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
TERRORIST THREAT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do terrorist groups target non-governmental organizations; and what can 
non-governmental organizations do to ameliorate the terrorist threat?  This is an 
important question for a number of reasons.  Certainly recent events in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have emphasized that terrorist groups do plan and carry out attacks 
specifically aimed at non-governmental groups.  This study attempts to create a 
theoretical framework by which the targeting imperatives of terrorist groups can be 
understood.  This is not just an intellectual exercise.  If the targeting imperatives of 
terrorist groups are understood, it will allow non-governmental organizations to take 
action to reduce this threat—and potentially save lives. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are just that: non-governmental.  If 
terrorism is a political phenomenon, and NGOs are non-governmental, then it is 
counter-intuitive that these types of organizations be the target of terrorist groups and 
political violence.  Certainly this statement contains a number of assumptions. The 
first of which is that terrorism is a political phenomenon.  There is also an assumption 
that NGOs are non-governmental.  This assumption should also consider whether 
non-governmental equates to non-political.  Finally, there is the assumption that 
terrorists select their targets solely on political criteria.  All of these assumptions will 
be addressed by this study.  
The importance of this question to the field of political science is threefold.  
First, it addresses the targeting strategies of international/transnational terrorist groups 
who perpetrate violence towards NGOs.  There has been an explosion of research 
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relating to terrorism in the recent past.  Despite this, there has been little research that 
looks at terrorism from the perspective of non-state organizations.  This work can 
help to fill that gap in terrorism literature.  Given the state of international relations 
and current events, this is a worthwhile goal.   
Second, this study looks at the goals and strategies of non-governmental 
organizations.  A review of the goal and strategies of NGOs might shed light as to 
why they are targeted for political violence and terrorism.  This review is also 
necessary to see if the fundamental goals and strategies of NGOs will inevitably bring 
them into conflict with terrorists.  The possibility of adjusting the goals and strategies 
in a way that does not adversely impact the mission of the NGO can then be 
evaluated.  The literature in the field of International Relations is having a hard time 
keeping up with the exponential growth in the number and scope of NGOs operating 
worldwide.  Further, the only literature that has focused on relating terrorism and 
political violence to NGOs has been narrow, security “how to” types of work.  This 
study will take a broader look at this dilemma and address it from a macro, rather 
than a micro/security perspective.  In other words, this study will address the larger, 
strategic reasons that terrorist organizations attack NGOs.  It will also differentiate 
between terrorists and other non-state actors and NGOs.  It will do this by creating a 
theoretical framework which will attempt to explain the targeting priorities which 
bring NGOs into the crosshairs of terrorist groups. 
Finally, policy recommendations for both governments and non-governmental 
organizations with an eye toward threat reduction can be proposed.  This study can 
have a real-world effect on reducing the threats to non-governmental organizations 
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and their agents.  Setting aside the gaps in the literature that this study will attempt to 
fill, perhaps the most important function that this research will perform will be the 
real-world recommendations that could mean the difference in human lives. 
THE CENTRAL QUESTION: TERRORISM AND NGOS COMBINE:  CURRENT 
LITERATURE IN THE FIELD 
 
 In the field of the study of terrorism, there is little that looks at the threat or 
impact of terrorism on non-governmental organizations.  The sole exception seems to 
be literature which includes non-governmental organizations with other “non-official 
Americans” (including tourists and businessmen) and discusses concrete security 
steps which can be done to reduce the risk of attack while in another country.  A good 
example of this type of work is the Prevention of Terrorism: Security Guidelines for 
Businesses and Other Organizations where recommendations such as, “establish no 
patterns as to location or time” and “react properly in case of attack” are given.1  
These recommendations focus on target hardening, or making the attack more 
difficult.   
Aside from these tactical prescriptions, very few scholars have looked at the 
threat strategically.  Perhaps the best of these is work done by RAND, a nonprofit 
institution which focuses on security issues.  Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Vice President for 
External Affairs and Director of RAND’s Washington Office, testified to the House 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations on 
April 3, 2001, commenting that the very fact that tourists, businessmen and NGO 
workers were United States citizens elevated them to target status in the eyes of 
                                                 
1 William Cunningham and Philip J. Gross, Prevention of Terrorism: Security Guidelines for 
Businesses and Other Organizations, (McLean, VA: Hallcrest Press, 1978), also Paul Fuqua and Jerry 
Wilson, Terrorism: The Executive’s Guide to Survival. (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing Company, 
1978). 
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terrorists.  He noted that the United States, and hence its citizens, were the most 
targeted nationality by terrorists.2  This observation is echoed by both the State 
Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.3  Hoffman testified that this might 
be a function of the target-rich environment that American interests provide 
internationally as well as the symbolic and media value that American interests 
provide as targets.4  Hoffman further states that these are attributes that are almost 
impossible to remove from the targeting equation.5  The basic argument is that as the 
U.S. government hardens, or makes more difficult to hit, a target, terrorists will 
change their targeting priorities to less hardened “non official” targets like tourists, 
businessmen and non-governmental organizations.  Indeed, statistics bear this out.  In 
1999, 86 percent of Americans killed in terrorist acts internationally were tourists, 
businesspeople, journalists or other ex-patriates.6 
 Drake illustrated this factor in a non-American example by showing that a 
non-governmental organization can become a target simply due to the fact that they 
represent something which the terrorist groups wish to remove.  He cited the GIA 
(Groupes Islamique Armee) attacks on targets which represented foreign or secular 
influences as a way that the GIA could weaken the heavily in debt Algerian 
government through the intimidation of foreign workers.  Their ultimate target was 
                                                 
2 Bruce Hoffman, “Protecting American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses and Non-
Governmental Organizations.”  Testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans 
Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, April 3, 2001. 
3 Thomas Fingar, Acting Assistant Secretary, Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, 
“Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World,” Testimony to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Congressional Quarterly Abstract, February 7, 2001.  Also George J. 
Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a changing 
world,” Testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/UNCLASWWT_02072001.html.  
4 Hoffman, pp. 5-6. 
5 Hoffman, pp.6. 
6 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, pg. 106. 
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the Algerian government, but instead they focused their attacks on foreigners, in this 
case French visitors to Algeria.  This strategy would limit the expertise and 
investment that foreigners could bring into the country.  The GIA justified their 
actions by calling the attacks on foreigners a way of limiting the colonization of 
Algeria with non-Muslims.  The attacks were effective.  The number of French in 
Algeria dropped from 10,000 to 1,000 in the space of two years.7  
  Even more specifically, Hoffman notes the increase in instances where NGOs 
were specifically targeted.8  Randolph Martin, Senior Director for Operations of the 
International Rescue Committee explains the heightened risk of NGOs due to the fact 
that there are more NGOs going to more conflicts worldwide.  Many of those 
conflicts are civil wars wherein the primary combatants are irregular fighters less 
steeped in the rules of war and equally driven by greed for plunder.  Add to this 
environment an entity which is enticingly “soft” in terms of targetability.  This 
situation is further exacerbated by the increasingly non-neutral nature of many NGOs.  
This equates to an environment where non-governmental organizations become 
attractive targets of terrorist groups.9 
 In the above cited case of the GIA in Algeria, the foreign capital, expertise 
and investment which were brought by foreigners posed a threat to the environment 
the GIA was attempting to construct.  The loss of the outside investment weakened 
the government making them more vulnerable to takeover.  The GIA attacks on 
                                                 
7 Drake, pp. 51-52. 
8 Hoffman, pp. 14. 
9 Randolph Martin, “FMR 4 April 1999: NGO Field Security,” New York International Rescue 
Committee, http://www.irc.org.  
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foreigners were also justified on religious grounds given their belief that non-
Muslims brought influences which polluted the hearts and souls of Algerians.   
Certainly, leaving the country is an option for non-governmental 
organizations.  However, as discussed previously, there is no way for NGOs to 
complete their mission without offering themselves up as targets for terrorist attack.  
In the end, Hoffman can only offer the prescription that NGOs need to be better 
educated as to the security threat posed by terrorist groups and efforts should be made 
to harden these types of groups as targets.10  There is room in the literature for 
research specifically addressing non-governmental organizations and the threat posed 
by terrorist groups. 
Aside from the contribution this research can add to the literature in the field, 
perhaps the greatest impact it can have is in the real life applications that can be 
gleaned from it pages.  Terrorist groups do target non-governmental organizations.  
People die and property is destroyed.  Through the study of those attacks and the 
application of the framework, a better understanding of the targeting priorities can be 
obtained.  Policies can then be implemented that may make the difference in people 
and property. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
The first order of designing a useful model is the stating of the research 
question.  In this case, the research question deals with the targeting strategies of 
terrorist groups and the reasons why NGOs fall within the target subset.  This 
question is derived from the intuitive assumption that since, by definition, NGOs are 
non-governmental and independent of governmental association, they would be free 
                                                 
10 Hoffman, pg.16. 
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from attack from what, again by definition, is a group with a political or ideological 
agenda.  The logical follow up to that question becomes: what can non-governmental 
organizations do to remove themselves from that subset or at least lessen the threat of 
terrorism? 
The research question can be simply stated.  Are NGOs targeted for terrorism 
and political violence?  If so, why?  The follow up question can then be asked: What 
can be done, if anything, by NGOs to reduce the threat of terrorism or political 
violence?   
This study addresses the impact of terrorism and political violence on non-
governmental organizations.  The research is divided into two main sections.  The 
first utilizes secondary source material to evaluate the nature and extent of the threat 
of terrorism and political violence to non-governmental organizations.  Acts of 
political violence and terrorism will be categorized into acts upon non-governmental 
organizations and religious groups acting as non-governmental organizations 
depending on the nature and target of the attacks.  The general threat characteristics 
can then be evaluated.  Upon close scrutiny it is hoped that the targeting strategies of 
the perpetrators of the violence can be divined.  With that information, a theoretical 
framework as to the reasons NGOs are targeted can be constructed.   
METHODOLOGICAL OUTLINE 
 Political science has indeed progressed since its inception.  While it is 
significant that the field has its foundations in classical philosophical thought through 
the discourses of Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides, it has expanded beyond the asking 
of fundamental questions to the answering of those questions.  The foundation is 
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important.  It created a discipline which asks the big questions and attempts to apply 
them to real life answers.  In an article lauding the contribution and significance of 
Robert Putnam, a leading thinker in political science, much of the credit given to him 
is for his ability to ask the big questions and answer them in a rigorous way.  Rochon 
described it as “methodological rigor combined with a refusal to let methodology 
obscure the message.”11 
It is this rigor which has expanded the field in the last century.  V.O. Key, Jr. 
noted, “The work of the new crop is distinctly superior to that of my sample from the 
mid thirties.”12  The various ‘new’ trends which have occasionally flooded the plains 
of the discipline have left behind new theories, techniques and technology which have 
combined to enrich the soil of the discipline.  The establishment of the various 
societies and associations along with their journals has increased the discourse and 
the criticism that has kept the discipline healthy.  Additionally, the technological 
revolution must be credited with the growth of political science.  Computer programs 
and statistical methods have made comparison and modeling possible in situations 
where it was not previously.   
Almond proposed the “separate tables” phenomenon as a way of describing 
the field of political science.  Separate tables are not an obstacle, but an opportunity.  
The pluralistic free exchange of ideas serves to increase the discourse and rigor of the 
field.  Beard pled with the field, “Let us put aside resolutely that great fright, tenderly 
and without malice, daring to be wrong in something important rather than right in 
                                                 
11 Rochon, Thomas R., “Robert D. Putnam: For a Meaningful Political Science,” PS Online, September 
2001, http://www.apsanet.org/PS/sept01/rochon.cfm. 
12 V.O. Key, Jr.,  “Presidential Address,” American Political Science Review, 1958, no. 970. 
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some meticulous banality.”13  This research does ask important questions—all the 
more so since September 11, 2001.  It is hoped that through this research, greater 
understanding of terrorism can be accomplished as well as prescriptions for non-
governmental organizations, which could possibly save lives. 
What is significant is that the great political scientists do not seem to be bound 
by "separate tables."  Indeed, in the case of Putnam, or Ostrum, or Skocpol, it is 
primarily because they had the courage to apply political science theories to important 
questions.  Not only have they asked those questions, but they have also applied 
theory rigorously in a way that indeed expanded the discipline in general.  Again, 
Rochon, in describing Putnam stated, “…it enabled academic specialists in one field 
to communicate with those in other fields about common causes underlying their 
disparate areas of concern.”14  
This discussion about the field of political science is not simply an academic 
foray into the importance (or lack thereof) of the field.  There is genuine discussion as 
to the appropriateness of certain methods compared to others.  In the undertaking of 
this research, an understanding as to the researcher’s disposition on the important 
matter of methodology must be addressed.  To this end, a brief descriptive soliloquy 
is included: 
The other day my car broke down and I had to take it to a mechanic.  
He was a pretty good mechanic and other people in the area thought he 
was competent.  I stood by as he looked at my car and diagnosed the 
problem.  “You have a broken whatsits,” he said most gravely. “It will 
need to be replaced.”  After finding out what it would cost to replace 
my broken whatsits, I gave the mechanic permission to fix my car. 
 
                                                 
13 Beard, “President’s Address,” American Political Science Review, 1927, vol.11. 
14 Rochon, 2001. 
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He pulled out his tools and I could not help but notice that he was 
using metric tools.  Now don’t get me wrong, metric tools are nice, but 
my car requires standard tools.  I asked the mechanic about this and he 
replied that they were the tools he always used, and they would do the 
job.  Well, he is, after all, the professional, so I kept silent as he 
worked on my car.  Pretty soon, the mechanic pulled out a hack saw.  
Alarmed, I asked what that was for.  He replied, “This is my favorite 
tool, and I use it on every car I work on.”  He then proceeded to cut the 
bolts off the whatsits and removed the part.   
  
In the end, the mechanic removed and replaced the whatsits on my car.  
While he performed that operation successfully, I also had to pay for 
new bolts.  Further, the bolts that were installed were partially stripped 
because the mechanic had used metric wrenches on my car.   
  
Now comes the basic question.  Why not just use the right tools for the 
right job?  This seems like a simple question with an answer that fits 
the “interocular traumatic test.”  Sure, the hacksaw was able to 
accomplish the removal of the whatsits, but there was no logic for its 
use.  A hacksaw is a great tool.  But you shouldn’t employ it to every 
case just because you can.  If, to accomplish the desired end, you must 
use both metric and standard tools, then by all means use them both.  
Indeed, the end result will be better for the use of both tools.  Let logic 
determine which tools are best. 
  
Sadly, through stubbornness, arrogance, or ignorance, political 
scientists often insist on using metric tools (quantitative methods if 
you will), when standard tools (qualitative) are the best choice.  Isn’t 
this the ideal we are striving for?  “Use the right tool for the right job.”  
That is what my Dad used to always say. 
 
The right tool for this research may not necessarily be the same tool that others might 
employ.  It is hoped that at least the use of the tool is justified and appropriate. 
 Stephen Van Evera, in his book on methods for political science students, 
described four basic categories of political science dissertations: theory-proposing, 
theory-testing, theory-applying, and literature-assessing. He further notes that seven 
distinct types of dissertations fall into those four groups: theory-proposing, theory-
testing, literature-assessing, policy-evaluation or policy-prescription, historical- 
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explanatory, historical-evaluative, and predictive.  Often, a political science 
dissertation falls within more than one of these seven types.15 
 This research, like many other dissertations, falls within multiple categories.  
The primary emphasis of this research is theory-proposing.  In order to adequately do 
this, there are also significant literature assessment and historical-explanatory aspects 
to the research.  Finally, policy-prescriptions will also be made.   
As theories will not be tested in this research, much of the literature on 
methods does not apply.  While there is a dependent variable, in this case the 
instances of attack upon NGOs by terrorist groups, there are also independent 
variables or those things that affect whether or not the attack will occur.  Tests will 
not be conducted on how the independent variables affect the dependent variable.  As 
has been stated previously, there is a definite lack of theory in the field of terrorism 
research covering terrorism and NGOs.  This research is meant to help fill in some of 
those gaps.  While testing the theories created in this research might be an admirable 
goal, it is way beyond the scope and means of this research. 
It is understood and implied in the previous section, that there is a certain 
segment within the political science field that feels unless a dissertation contains 
theory-testing, it is less significant and relevant.  The problem remains, that theories 
must be created before they can be tested.  Indeed, this is discussed by Van Evera: 
Many dissertations are a blend of type 1 and 2 (theory-proposing and 
theory-testing).  However, a good thesis can focus exclusively on 
proposing theory, or on testing theory, as long as it contributes useful 
knowledge.   
 
                                                 
15 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1997). pp. 89- 95. 
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Dissertations of Type 1 and 2—theory-making and theory-testing—
have the most cachet in political science, but all seven types are 
legitimate if they are well done.16 
      
 A research project which proposes theories typically “…advances new 
hypotheses.  A deductive argument for these hypotheses is advanced.  Examples may 
be offered to illustrate these hypotheses and to demonstrate their plausibility, but 
strong empirical tests are not performed.”17  The literature-testing dissertation 
“summarizes and evaluates existing theoretical and empirical literature on a subject.  
It asks whether existing theories are valuable and existing tests are persuasive and 
complete.”18  Finally, a policy prescriptive dissertation looks at a specific policy 
problem, analyzes the pros and cons of the policy and recommends possible 
prescriptions.19  In the case of this research, there is less analysis of public policy than 
analysis of a lack of policy, both public and private.  In this vacuum, the challenge is 
to recommend prescriptions toward the development of policy which can ameliorate 
the problem of terrorism toward non-governmental organizations.  The historic-
explanatory aspect to this research tries to explain the “causes, pattern, or 
consequences of historical cases. Such works often provide a good deal of description 
but focus on explaining what is described.”20 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS I-VI: RESEARCH AND FINDINGS  
TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER II 
 Chapter 2 looks at the phenomenon of terrorism: its definition, characteristics, 
history and goals.  This in and of itself is a daunting task.  The term terrorism has no 
                                                 
16 Van Evera, 1997, pg. 90. 
17 Ibid, pg. 89.   
18 Ibid, pg. 90. 
19 Ibid, pg. 91. 
20 Van Evera, 1997, pg. 92. 
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accepted definition in either academia or governmental circles.  This research 
establishes terrorism as a phenomenon with four defining aspects.  The first 
definitional aspect of terrorism is the use or threat of violence.  Terrorism is a sub-
classification of political violence.  As such the use or threat of violence is essential to 
an act being terrorism.  This use or threat of violence is the means by which the 
terrorist entities conduct their mission. 
 The next defining aspect flows easily from the last: the purpose of the 
violence.  In terrorism, the violence is for a political purpose.  Terrorism is a 
fundamentally political phenomenon.  Whether you accept the definition of politics as 
the control of state structures, or Laswell’s definition of “who gets what, where, when 
and how;”21 or Easton’s definition of “the authoritative allocation of values within a 
society,”22 terrorists conduct violence in order to affect political processes.  
 The third definitional aspect of terrorism is the use or exploitation of fear.  
The foundations of the word terrorism relates to the primeval emotion and survival 
trait known as fear.  Terrorist groups seek to harness that primeval emotion in order to 
affect or control the actions of others: whether they are a political entity like a 
government or the general population which will, in turn, affect a political entity. 
 The final definitional aspect of terrorism relates to the targets of the terrorist 
groups.  This research considers attacks against non-combatants to be terrorist acts.  
Certainly attacks against combatants outside of the context of formal war fit into the 
definition of political violence.  However, one of the aspects of terrorism that is 
unique to it alone is the fact that the targets which are attacked are not usually the 
                                                 
21 Laswell, Harold. Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936). 
22 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).  
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final targets, or the targets which are intended to be affected.  As a result, those being 
physically attacked are being attacked to send a message to someone else.   
 There are other characteristics of terrorism which are discussed in chapter 2.  
This research differentiates between the act of terrorism and the label terrorist.  
Certainly one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.  An exploration of the 
term ‘terrorism’ as a value statement is next undertaken.  Terrorism as a transnational 
and international phenomenon is also discussed as well as terrorism in terms of non-
conventional warfare and the historical evolution of the term.  The question of 
whether terrorism can be a rational act is also considered.  Finally, this research will 
look at the actors perpetrating the terrorist acts. 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER III 
 Chapter 3 focuses on non-governmental organizations.  The definition, goals, 
actors and strategies of NGOs will be explored.  The first NGOs were religious 
organizations opposed to slavery.  As various social needs began to evolve, people 
understood that the best way to accomplish their interest’s goals were to pool 
resources and create an organization.  In the last part of the 20th century there was a 
dramatic increase in the number and scope of NGOs.   
This increase can be partially explained by the rise in intergovernmental 
organizations like the United Nations.  The United Nations recognized and granted a 
number of NGOs an official place in advising the U.N. in matters of policy.  It has 
been theorized that this recognition was in part due to the fact that NGOs lend a 
legitimizing influence to intergovernmental organizations.  Further, NGOs, due to 
their focused agenda, can amass what in essence is a monopoly of information 
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relating to their specific policy field.  As such, NGOs become an effective way of 
collecting information for both IGOs and state governments.  NGOs are also thought 
to be effective means by which problems are solved due to their ability to focus on 
specific interests without bureaucratic scleroses and government waste. 
 Another reason used to explain the increased role and function of NGOs is the 
withdrawal of the state.  Since the end of the Cold War, the power and influence of 
the state has been retreating.  Social spending is on the wane; spending intended to 
keep a potential ally in place has been eliminated.  Added to this withdrawal has been 
a tighter marketplace.  There has been a rise in ethnic and national violence and 
security within states has diminished.  Non-governmental organizations have moved 
into the vacuum created by the receding state. 
Like terrorism, one of the major difficulties with the study of non-
governmental organizations is the lack of consensus over the definition of what truly 
is a non-governmental organization.  Non-governmental organization is really a 
negative description: a description of what something is not.  As such, the obvious 
assumption would be that non-governmental organizations are not associated with 
governments.  This assumption will be shown to be false.  In fact, many NGOs 
actually exist because of and are clients of states, acting as policy and resource 
clearinghouses.   
The accepted definition of non-governmental organization is a private (non-
state) entity engaged in a policy goal that is not-for-profit in nature.  While this 
exemption eliminates for-profit companies, it leaves many other different types of 
organizations that are not typically considered to fall within the NGO aegis.  Another 
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common attribute of NGOs is a focus on a public good.  While this may be the case in 
general, there are cases where NGOs blur the line between public good and that 
which is decidedly not good.  This will also be explored. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER IV 
While this will be stressed in later sections, it is important to note that it is 
assumed that terrorist groups are acting based on rational thought with tactics and 
goals that fall within rational parameters.  A framework of the targeting imperatives 
of terrorist organizations toward NGOs has been reliably constructed using the above 
stated methods.   
If terrorist rationality is assumed, then a framework that helps to explain 
targeting strategies can be constructed.  After carefully reviewing the database of 
terrorist attacks on non-governmental organizations and further refining the 
hypotheses in later interviews, a theoretical framework outlining the reasons terrorist 
groups might target NGOs has been created.   The reasons terrorists execute an 
operation may be based on tactical or strategic reasoning.  Often, attacks are carried 
out after weighing both tactical and strategic options.23  Chapter 4 introduces and 
explores the theoretical framework which helps to explain the targeting imperatives 
which terrorist groups might consider when designating an NGO for attack.  The 
framework offered by this research consists of both tactical and strategic reasons that 
might bring non-governmental organizations, and even more specifically non-profit 
or humanitarian NGOs, into the crosshairs of a terrorist group. 
The theoretical framework is made up of five targeting imperatives which 
help to explain why terrorists might target non-governmental organizations.  The first 
                                                 
23 CJM Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, (New York: St: Marten’s Press, 1998). 
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reason has to do with perceptions.  Terrorists might perceive that a relationship exists 
between an NGO and a political entity.  When developing a target, the terrorist 
groups look at potential targets and develop a targeting strategy that will accomplish a 
political goal.  Often, political targets are too difficult to attack.  As a result, terrorists 
might target a non-political target that is associated with the political entity that is the 
true target.  This association may simply be a relationship of citizenship, or the 
association may exist due to the fact that an organization is based in a certain place.  
Whatever the connection, as long as the terrorist group can establish an association—
perceived or actual—between a potential target and the entity they wish to attack, the 
terrorists may attack the associated organization or people. 
The next targeting imperative is related to actions in which non-governmental 
organizations engage.  Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon.  As such, 
actions by a non-governmental organization which are political in nature might bring 
them into the targeting equation of terrorist groups.  Non-governmental organizations 
are non-governmental, not necessarily non-political.  Some NGOs engage in political 
activities, from endorsing and fostering political structures to opposing other political 
entities or programs.  If the activities of the NGOs are politically different than those 
of a terrorist group, that group might attack the NGO to eliminate possible opposition. 
NGOs could avoid overt political activities that they might be engaged in to 
attract terrorist attention.  However, they could be engaged in strictly non-political 
operations and still attract terrorist attention.  This is due to the fact that to a 
terrorist’s eye, nothing is non-political.  Some of the activities common to NGOs are 
humanitarian aid work and stability operations.  These activities are often completely 
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non-political in nature.  Everyone is fed, regardless of political views.  However, such 
activities may be counterproductive to terrorist organizations.  Terrorist organizations 
thrive on chaos and lawlessness.  Such conditions may be advantageous to insurgent 
terrorist groups due to the de-legitimizing effect lawlessness has on a government in 
power.  Chaos might also be advantageous to terrorist groups because such chaos 
provides the terrorist groups ample supply of recruits and safe haven.  As a result, 
they may attack NGOs engaged in non-political activities due to the political 
ramifications of their work. 
Terrorist groups might attack NGOs based on what they feel are the polluting 
influences to the terrorist groups desired social, cultural or religious world-views.  
NGOs are often the carriers of outside values that are anathema to the terrorist 
groups.  One of the main goals of terrorist groups is the desire to control the values—
whether social, cultural or religious—of a given population.  NGOs, either overtly or 
unconsciously, often are a vehicle by which new values are introduced.  Terrorists 
might target NGOs as a means of reducing outside influence and maintaining control 
of a population’s values. 
The fourth targeting imperative relates to the fact that terrorist groups are 
engaged in activities in an environment of scarce resources.  The world has become 
an increasingly difficult place for terrorist groups to obtain resources.  Countries 
which were once willing to support terrorist groups are no longer able to provide that 
needed support.  Further, countries are coming together to eliminate the financing and 
support pipeline that once existed.  As such, some of the terrorist group’s activities 
must be directed toward the securing of logistical support: both financing and 
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supplies.  Terrorist groups may target NGOs due to the fact that NGOs may have 
access to the resources the terrorist groups need. 
The final reason that terrorist groups might target NGOs is related to the 
relative “hardness” of targets in the current world environment.  Due to terrorist 
attacks in the past, traditional targets have been hardened (made difficult to attack).  
The fact exists, however, that the world is a target rich environment.  One of the 
classic problems that face counter-terrorist operations is the conundrum that when 
you harden one target, the terrorists simply shift to a less hardened target.  Not every 
target can be hardened, due to either financial or mission conflicts.  NGOs, by their 
natures, are fairly soft targets.  Terrorists may simply target NGOs because they are 
easy to attack. 
A possible criticism which could be directed toward this research is the use of 
secondary data sources rather than using primary data sources.  This is less of a 
concern when the available data is reviewed.  Theda Skocpol, in her work on 
comparative revolutions, justified her use of secondary sources: 
The comparativist has neither the time nor (all of) the appropriate 
skills to do the primary research that necessarily constitutes, in large 
amounts, the foundation upon which comparative studies are built.  
Instead, the comparativist must concentrate upon searching out and 
systematically surveying specialists’ publications that deal with the 
issues defined as important by theoretical considerations and by the 
logic of comparative analysis…the challenges I have faced…have 
been challenges of surveying huge historical literatures and 
appropriately weighing and using the contributions of specialists.24  
 
Certainly, this research is less a comparative historical analysis than an 
analysis of a specific phenomenon over time.  The justification continues to ring true.  
                                                 
24 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979.  
pp. xiz-xv. 
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Therefore, this work uses the work of specialists’ primary data for the initial section 
while focusing on applying the appropriate “theoretical considerations” and logic. 
WEIGHING THE CASE: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 5 
METHODS USED IN CHAPTER 5 
Chapter 5 utilizes the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as a case 
study to determine how they evaluate and deal with the threats of political violence 
and terrorism against its organization, agents, and property worldwide.  Beyond the 
specifics of operations that this worldwide non-profit group might engage in to 
ameliorate its exposure to terrorism, this in-depth analysis of the LDS Church also 
bolsters the theoretical framework as to why NGOs are targeted and whether actions 
an NGO might take would make any difference to the terrorist threat.  It is hoped that 
by looking at both a hypothetical framework as to why terrorists might engage in 
operations against NGOs as well as a specific NGO that has been targeted by terrorist 
groups, a more generalizable picture will emerge describing the phenomenon. 
 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints was chosen as the primary 
case due to its history in Latin America.  The LDS Church is a Salt Lake City, Utah 
based international church which has more members outside of the United States than 
within.  Despite this fact, it is widely recognized as an “American church.”  The LDS 
Church is appropriate as a case due to its active proselytizing and mission program.  
At any given time, the LDS Church has approximately 65,000 voluntary missionaries 
engaged in health and welfare activities, infrastructure building, and proselytizing.  
As such, LDS missionaries are a common sight in much of the world.  Perhaps the 
best reason to choose the LDS Church as the primary case relates to its history as a 
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target of political violence and terrorism.  In the two decades making up the 1980s 
and the 1990s, the LDS was the target of political violence or terrorism 142 times.  
This equates to almost one-third of all attacks on NGOs and religious organizations 
during the same time period.  This fact alone makes the LDS Church and its reactions 
in light of those attacks appropriate for study.  Additional justification will also be 
provided in a later section. 
Herein lays an additional potential problem with regard to model deficiencies 
in this project.  Case selection is one of the most important, and most 
methodologically dangerous steps in research.  The selection of cases that fit the 
researcher’s hypothesis can, in the short term, reinforce a hypothesis at the cost of 
true methodological rigor and true validity in the long term.  In this case, selection 
was made for many different reasons, most important of which was the 
appropriateness of the subject. 
It is important to point out that the case was also selected in some part due to 
the fact that the researcher is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints and served as a voluntary representative on a two-year mission.  As such, the 
researcher is intimately familiar with the church and its policies.  The membership 
status further provides access which is an absolute necessity to this type of research.  
This poses an additional danger.  As a member of the organization being observed, 
can the researcher be truly independent and unbiased?   
Certainly, a danger exists for the researcher to be too familiar with the 
research subject and thus losing objectivity.  This is a phenomenon that Fenno 
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addressed in his seminal work, Home Style.25  While Home Style seems to be a “how 
to” on participant observation, there is much in this book which may be more 
important than the mechanics of the observational qualitative research method.  
Specifically, much of the beginning of the book focuses on the ethics and 
responsibilities of political scientists.  Fenno is refreshing in his candor about the 
shortcomings of his research and his acceptance of the fact that much of what he said 
was normative in nature.  This does not, in his opinion, breach the ethics of good 
political science research. 
The first two chapters become an excellent comparative case study of the 
ethics of observers.  In the first chapter, Fenno explains the steps he takes to ensure 
objectivity and the reliability of collected data.  He also admits that he ignored his 
rules in one case and stood by his rules, despite acute mental anguish, in another.  In 
the case of Barber Conable, Fenno admits that he moved beyond the role of objective 
observer.  Admittedly, Fenno’s reasons were good:  protection of a research source.  
However, after Conable emerged from the campaign victorious, Fenno discovered 
that he had lost Conable as a source due to the familiarity and friendship that was 
developed through their interaction. 
In the case of Dan Quayle, Fenno was again thrust into ethical limbo.  Fenno had 
material that could, quite possibly, have affected the campaign.  Indeed, he admitted 
he wanted to use that material when he observed a less than objective treatment of 
                                                 
25 Fenno, Richard F., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, New York, New York: Longman 
Publishers, 2003. 
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Quayle in the press.  However, in this case, Fenno was able to restrain himself and 
follow the research through to its objective end with it being published in CQ Press.26   
Given the difficulties described above, the application of the theoretical 
framework will only be applied to the single case.  This is not necessarily a negative 
to the research.  It is hoped that by using both a large n aspect as well as the 
application of the findings of that aspect to a small n case study the advantages of 
both methodological approaches can be employed.  This application of the theory to a 
single case, albeit with many observations, is an attempt to tap into the thick 
description that Fenno and Scott so successfully employed.  This type of description 
provides the context whereby observers can understand the actions of those being 
observed. 
Another possible criticism of the methods employed is the use of a single case 
study by which conclusions are drawn.  Certainly, single case studies have 
methodological weaknesses.  But they have their adherents.  James Scott, in Seeing 
Like a State, attacks the more accepted quantitative method.  Clearly, much of his 
book is dedicated to the richness of culture and individualism that quantitative 
methods must ignore.  Scott’s thesis argues that the simplification of complex entities 
for the purpose of counting is disastrous.  Scott discusses the quantitative method 
explicitly by stating: “Providing one understands the heroic assumptions required to 
achieve this precision and the questions it cannot answer, the single metric is an 
invaluable tool.  Problems arise only when it becomes hegemonic.  It is hoped that the 
                                                 
26 Fenno, 2003.   
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employment of the single case study will provide the richness and context that 
quantitative method alone cannot hope to achieve.”27   
Another advantage to the single case study was the knowledge of the 
theoretical framework derived in chapter 4.  Specifically, using the theoretical 
framework, questions were crafted which were then submitted to the case in the 
second portion of the research.  While there is but a single case, the multiple 
observations on the single case allowed the researchers to develop theories in 
confidence.  This is the prescription asserted by King, Keohane and Verba for 
eliminating problems with small n case studies.28  The myriad of experiences of the 
case can allow for generalization to other non-governmental organizations.29  Also 
importantly, by applying the framework developed in the first section to the second 
section, refinements were made to the framework to make it more reliable and 
generalizable. 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 5 
Chapter 4 introduces and explores the theoretical framework that helps to 
explain the targeting imperatives by which NGOs are attacked.  Chapter 5 seeks to 
look in depth at a religious NGO, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
and see how it has approached the threat of terrorism.  The organizational structure of 
the LDS Church will be introduced as the structure might affect the way the church 
perceives and deals with the threat of political violence and terrorism.  The LDS 
Church was the most attacked religious NGO in Latin America during the time period 
                                                 
27 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1998. 
28 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
29 Van Evera, pg. 26. 
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between the 1970s through the 1990s with 143 documented attacks.30  These attacks 
included both attacks on property and personnel.   
Chapter 5 looks at policies the LDS Church has implemented which 
ameliorate the threat of terrorism.  These policies will also be studied from the 
perspective of the street-level volunteers.  Many of the policies are actually shown to 
represent an unconscious acceptance or understanding of the targeting imperatives 
that make the LDS Church a target to terrorists.   
CONCLUSION: AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER VI 
As discussed in the previous section, the purpose of this research is to 
determine the terrorist threat to non-governmental organizations.  In creating a 
theoretical framework which describes imperatives that terrorist groups use to select 
non-governmental organizations as targets, prescriptive suggestions as to the 
amelioration of the threat were made.  These then, were measured against the real 
world experiences of the case study.   
Because this is a non-experimental design dealing with subjective data, it is 
difficult to couch the research in terms of dependent and independent variables.  
However, in this design, the dependent variable or object being changed by outside 
stimulus (or independent variables), is the occurrence of an attack on a non-
governmental organization.  The dependent variable should be able to measure 
whether an attack was affected by the actions to avoid it.  While this is a difficult 
task, a careful review of that data in light of the theoretical framework can determine 
the targeting imperatives used in planning terrorist attacks.  Theory then can guide the 
actions taken by non-governmental organizations to evaluate their success in avoiding 
                                                 
30 Database 
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attacks.  While it is similar to proving why something didn’t happen, methodological 
tools can be employed to assist in the creation and application of theory.   
In this case, counterfactuals are an important tool in arriving at a workable 
thesis.  Stephen Van Evera explains the use of counterfactuals in inductive theory 
building: 
Counterfactual analysis can aid in inductive theorizing.  The analyst 
examines history, trying to ‘predict’ how events would have unfolded 
had a few elements of the story been changed, with a focus on varying 
conditions that seem important and/or manipulable… 
 
When analysts discover counterfactual analyses they find persuasive, 
they have found theories they find persuasive, since all counterfactual 
predictions rest on theories.  (Without theories the analyst could not 
predict how changed conditions would have changed events.)  If others 
doubt the analysis (but cannot expose the fatal flaws in it), all the 
better: the theory may be new, hence a real discovery.  At this point 
the analyst has only to frame the theory in a general manner so that 
predictions can be inferred from it and tested.  The analyst should ask, 
“What general causal laws are the dynamics I assert examples of?” 
The answer is a theory. 
  
Counterfactual analysis helps us recognize theories, not make them.  
Theories uncovered by counterfactual analysis must exist in the 
theorist’s subconscious before the analysis; otherwise the theorist 
could not construct the counterfactual scenario.  Most people believe 
in more theory than they know.  The hard part is to bring these theories 
to the surface and express them in general terms.  Counterfactual 
analysis aids this process.31 
 
 A good research design will also limit extraneous variables which could affect 
the outcome of the study.  Therefore, the research design should either incorporate a 
large number of cases, thus limiting the influence of extraneous variables, or select 
cases where those extraneous variables are controlled.  Another option is to select 
cases wherein there is a high measure of homogeneity, thereby holding the extraneous 
                                                 
31 Stephen Van Evera, 1997, pp. 25-26. 
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variables constant.  The large number of like cases in the first section is intended to 
fulfill this role.   
As this research rests on theoretical grounds, the hypothesis will not actually 
be tested.  While this may be considered problematic, it allows for meaningful study 
without becoming such a Herculean task so as to be unfinishable.  It must also be 
noted that there may be many immeasurable extraneous factors which may affect the 
dependent variable or an attack on a non-governmental organization.  Again, as no 
statistical test is being employed, this is less of a concern. 
 The subject of this research—attacks on non-governmental organizations—are 
usually discreet events.  These events may or may not have indicators harbingering 
their coming.  Non-governmental organizations therefore may be unable to make 
decisions which will affect the impact of these attacks on their organizations.  
Another difficulty may arise, as ameliorative steps may be counterproductive to the 
NGOs stated goal.  Thus, even given the ability to divine a possible threat, the only 
recourse of a given NGO would be to cease in its primary mission, thus allowing 
threats to win without the application of resources. 
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CHAPTER 2:  TERRORISM: ITS GOALS, TARGETS, AND STRATEGIES 
 There are two major difficulties which face researchers working in the field of 
terrorism.  First is a definitional problem.  Second, is the fact that the literature in the 
field of terrorism seems to be a regurgitation of the same information.  Once early 
pioneers in the field published their seminal works, very little new research has 
replaced it.  That is not to say there is not interesting and exciting research being done 
in this field.  Research into the “new terrorism” or terrorism conducted by 
fundamental groups is necessary as well as timely.  However, due to recent events, 
anyone feeling they had anything to say relating to terrorism was able to publish a 
supposedly ‘definitive’ work on terrorism.  This study cites the original research 
rather than the later iterations.   
Intrinsic to this study is the concept of terrorism itself.  One of the difficulties 
facing researchers in the field is the fact that there is considerable disagreement as to 
the very definition of terrorism.  A quick review of the literature shows that there is 
no accepted definition in government or in academia.  Kushner notes, “There are as 
many definitions for the word terrorism as there are methods of executing it; the term 
means different things to different people, and trying to define or classify terrorism to 
everyone’s satisfaction proves impossible.”32  The U.S. government itself has ten 
different definitions of terrorism.33  This leads to confusion and misuse which only 
makes the study of the phenomenon more difficult.  Louise Richardson noted: 
The widespread usage of the term terrorism, in many contexts, has 
rendered the word almost meaningless.  Today, it’s only universally 
                                                 
32 Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, (London, U.K.: Sage Publications, 2003), pg. xxiii. 
33 Alex P. Schmidt and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 
Appendix B. 
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understood connotation is so pejorative that even terrorists don’t admit 
to being terrorists any more.  A glance at the current usage reveals 
child abuse, racism, and gang warfare all incorrectly described as 
terrorism.34 
 
Given this confusing state, it is not surprising that the study of terrorism has struggled 
over the very definitional aspect of the central topic of research.   
A clear definition of terrorism is essential to this study for many reasons.  
First, in any systematic study of a phenomenon, it is necessary to have discreet 
definitions of the items being studied in order to ensure consistent and valid 
conclusions.  It is especially important to have a concrete definition when there is no 
clear consensus as to what is or is not terrorism.  To that end, the definition used in 
this study focuses on what distinguishes terrorism from other phenomenon.  Each 
aspect of terrorism, then, is accompanied with a related aspect of other; similar 
phenomenon and the distinguishing or differentiating traits are explicated.  The result 
is a clarification of what is and is not terrorism as it relates to this study.    
SCOPE OF DEFINITION 
For the purposes of this study, terrorism is defined as the threat or use of 
violence on non-combatant populations or property with the express goal of creating 
or exploiting fear in a larger audience for political or ideological reasons.  This 
definition consists of four primary points.  First is the threat or use of violence.  
Second is the use of that violence on non-combatant targets.  Third is the creation or 
exploitation of fear in a larger audience than the specific target group.  And last is the 
political or ideological reason for which this violence is being committed.  To better 
                                                 
34 Louise Richardson, “Global Rebels: Terrorist Organizations as Trans-National Actors”, Terrorism 
and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, (Guilford, Connecticut: 
McGraw Hill, 2003). 
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explicate this definition, each aspect of the definition will be treated separately.  The 
reasoning for including each of the definitional characteristics will also be explained.  
Additional characteristics of terrorism will also be explicated and explored. 
DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION OF TERRORISM: 
DEFINITION 
USE OF VIOLENCE 
 First and foremost, terrorism is a sub-classification of political violence, 
which in turn is a sub-classification of violence.  This relationship is illustrated by 
Figure 2.1.  Political violence can be defined as the use or threat of violence for 
political purposes.  As such, terrorism and political violence have two common 
defining characteristics.  Terrorism and political violence are different in the choice 
of targets and the creation and exploitation of fear.  While all terrorism is political 
violence, not all political violence is terrorism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Concentric Violence 
 
The use or threat of violence is integral to the definition of terrorism.  The 
threat of violence is all that is necessary for an act to be terrorism.  For example, a 
threatened bombing which is done to create fear in non-combatants for political 
reasons need never explode for the act to be considered terrorism.  In a similar vein, 
Terrorism 
Political Violence 
Violence 
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the initial violent act need not be successful for the strategic goal to be accomplished 
and terrorism to have occurred.  In other words, if the September 11 planes had all 
crashed into Pennsylvania fields, the acts would have been successful due to the 
threat that hijackings posed on the security of the United States as well as the safety 
of the transportation system.  This aspect will be further explored in a later section. 
If the defining point of terrorism were the creation or exploitation of fear 
alone, then Stephen King would be a terrorist.  Hoffman notes this in his criticism of 
the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of terrorism, “While accurately 
communicating the fear-inducing quality of terrorism, the definition is still so broad 
as to apply to almost any action that scares (‘terrorizes’) us.35  The carefully 
orchestrated and directed use of force is more than just the vehicle by which people 
are terrorized.  It is the means by which the terrorists demonstrate the powerlessness 
of governments to keep order.  In other words, since governments cannot keep 
violence from the citizenry, they lose credibility and legitimacy.  The violence against 
citizens further destabilizes the social fabric of society; furthering the basic goals of 
terrorist groups.   
The use or threat of violence is also important as a defining characteristic due 
to the heavy reliance of terrorism on bringing the act before the world stage.36  The 
use of violence and the press coverage that it garners become integral to the terrorist 
act.  Indeed, recent work seems to indicate a ratcheting up of the level of violence in 
order to capture the media attention.  The goal is to shock and provoke, thus calling 
attention to the cause of the perpetrators.  This then differs from other political dissent 
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by literally becoming ‘propaganda of the deed’.  This aspect of terrorism will be 
further explored in the target section of this work. 
Certainly, the threat or use of force does not, a priori, constitute terrorism.  As 
Weber noted, a state is the entity with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.37  
Government power, then, is the exclusive threat or use of force on its own citizens.  
While governments may engage in terrorism against their own population or other 
state’s citizens, clearly, the use or threat of force alone does not constitute terrorism. 
The threat or use of force can also be used to define a criminal act.  
Threatening force in order to gain money is the hallmark for such criminal activities 
as armed robbery or extortion.  While these activities may threaten force and even 
terrorize the victims, they do not reach the critical definitional aspects of terrorism.  
Clearly, something else is needed to reach that benchmark. 
TARGETS OF TERRORISM 
The target of the terrorist act is also an important distinction in creating the 
definition of terrorism used in this research.  This definition states that the target must 
be people or property that are non-combatant.  At the heart of this distinction is the 
central aspect of terrorism—creating or exploiting fear through violence in a 
population greater than that specifically targeted by the act.  If the target of the attack 
were only combatant personnel or property, then it would limit the scope of violence 
and inhibit the generation of fear in the general population.  An astute student put it 
this way, “there are no innocents to a terrorist.”  If a French tourist happens to die in a 
mass attack bombing of a bus in a public square in Jerusalem, it is justified by the 
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terrorists that the tourist was equally as “guilty” because he or she was supporting the 
Israelis by visiting.  Certainly the perpetrators of the terrorism consider those they 
attack to be legitimate targets.  Common acceptance, however, does not.  
The non-combatant distinction is important when faced by the ever-present 
statement in terrorism: one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.  Many 
definitions of terrorism would include all involved in guerrilla warfare or insurrection 
as terrorists.  Indeed, using that definition, the Americans fighting the British in the 
Revolutionary War would have been terrorists.  This seems too expansive.  Therefore, 
the definition utilized in this work will exclude those actors who are carrying out 
violence against government combatants as in revolution and civil disobedience.   
The question still remains, what about those people who carry out violence on 
combatant personnel or property, but also hurt civilians in the process?  Timothy 
McVeigh targeted a government building full of government employees.  Whether the 
occupants of the building consisted of combatants is the central question.  Despite this 
problem, the acceptance of collateral damage casualties may constitute terrorism.  To 
McVeigh, the civilian casualties, including the children in the daycare, were an 
unfortunate byproduct or collateral damage.38  While the primary target may have 
been government property, the willingness of McVeigh to create the sheer amount of 
collateral damage which then created an environment of fear in the general public 
moves the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building from a guerilla act of revolt to an 
act of terrorism.  Further, while the Murrah Federal Building was owned by the 
government of the United States housing arguably combatant personnel, it was not 
                                                 
38 Timothy MacVeigh, “An Essay on Hypocrisy,” (Media Bypass, 1998). 
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just a government building.  The building housed a credit union as well as the much-
publicized childcare center. 
Brian Jenkins noted, that the act of terrorism is similar to a play acted out on a 
stage.39  People may be watching the action from different perspectives including 
those on the stage itself.  However, the primary message is for those who are indeed 
in the audience rather than those whom the actors are interacting with physically.  
This relationship is illustrated by Figure 2.2.  Drake pointed out that in the course of a 
terrorist attack, there may be many targets of attack: the physical target and perhaps 
many other psychological targets.40  Indeed, the definitional characteristic of 
terrorism for Drake is that “the succession of attacks is meant to create a 
psychological reaction in a person or group of people—the psychological target or 
targets—to make them act in a way that the attacker desires.”41  Certainly both state 
and non-state actors may wish to create and exploit fear in non-combatant 
populations.  When doing these acts, both would be engaged in terrorism.  The fact 
that a government commits a terrorist act does not remove the labeling of the act.  
Stalin was a master of creating and exploiting fear in the agrarian population of 
Russia.  His acts were most certainly terrorism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Brian Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, P-6563, (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Corporation, June 1981). 
40 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorist’ Target Selection, (New York: St: Marten’s Press, 1998). 
41 Drake, 1998, pg. 2 
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Figure 2.2: Physical and Psychological Targets 
When state actors engage in war, they may elect to try to create fear in the 
non-combatant populations of their adversaries.  The central question of motivation 
now becomes important.  In most cases, states engage in this type of exercise in order 
to gain economic or military advantage.  The goal is not necessarily the creation and 
exploitation of fear, but of military or economic advantage.  This type of activity 
could be labeled terrorism.  While non-state actors may also engage in this type of 
behavior, the motivation in the target selection and attack becomes defining in terms 
of labeling an act terrorism.  Thus, both states and non-state actors can engage in 
terrorism.  This concept will be explored later. 
If the war of ideas is centrally important to the perpetrators of terrorism, then 
the selection of targets becomes paramount.  Too much violence and wanton 
destruction could, in fact, erode support for the cause, while too little may not garner 
the necessary publicity to carry the act before the larger stage and create fear in the 
larger population.42  Targets are selected carefully for symbolic or ideological effect.  
It is important to note that the rationale for selecting a certain target need not make 
sense to the general public.  The rationale need only make sense to the members.  The 
rationality of terrorist acts will be addressed later. 
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C.J.M. Drake notes that there may be many types of targets for terrorists.  In 
other words, people or property may be targeted for a number of different goals.  The 
types of targets in Drake’s targeting typology are distinguished by purpose of the 
attack.  The typology includes symbolic targets which are meant to trigger a 
psychological reaction in the greater audience.  Also included are functional targets; 
the existence of which constitutes a threat to the organization.  Drake next includes 
logistical targets which protect or provide logistical assets to the terrorists’ 
movement. Drake’s final target type is an expressive target which is an emotional 
response to events rather than a planned strategy.43  An act selected to accomplish one 
goal may also accomplish other goals at the same time.  An example could be the 
kidnapping of American businessmen in Colombia by FARC insurgents.  While the 
immediate goal might be logistical (fundraising), this kidnapping could also 
accomplish other acts such as discrediting the Columbian government and their 
ability to keep order as well as dissuading American businessmen from coming to 
Columbia (symbolic and expressive targets). 
Drake’s targeting typology is most helpful in research such as this.  However, 
it is relatively new in the literature.  Martha Crenshaw also created a targeting 
typology based on the psychological response the act is hoping to evoke in a larger, 
secondary target population.  Until recently, that has been a benchmark in targeting 
literature.  Drake classifies his typology in terms of strategic targeting.  Crenshaw’s 
first category in her typology is the elimination of threats which is analogous to 
Drake’s functional targets.  The second is compliance or the attempt to force a target 
population to act in a certain way.  Next is disorientation which is aimed at 
                                                 
43 Drake, 1998, pp. 8-15. 
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eliminating the stability of everyday life through the removal of stabilizing 
institutions.   Also included in the typology are attrition attacks or the removal of 
targets with a psychological value in order to wear down the will of the target 
population.  Provocation is also a targeting imperative that attempts to make the 
psychological target act in a way that alienates the target from sympathizers.  
Advertisement is attempted by groups who wish to call attention to their movement 
through the act itself.  Finally, the endorsement imperative is the attempt to garner 
support from potential sympathizers through the action.44 
Terrorist organizations are also constrained by the tactical environment within 
which they are operating.  The relative danger of carrying out the attack in terms of 
the threat the attack poses for the perpetrators certainly affects the target selection.  
Also, the relative ease in terms of cost, resources, and target hardening helps to 
determine who or what is targeted.45 
In the end, the final target selection is made through a series of constraints 
forced upon the terrorists by their ideology, strategy, and tactics.46  If those 
constraints force an attack on non-combatants for ideological reasons, then the attack 
reaches the benchmark for terrorism.  As was discussed previously, terrorism and 
political violence share the use or threat of violence for a political or ideological 
purpose as defining attributes.  One of the aspects of terrorism that separates terrorism 
from the larger grouping of political violence is the choice of targets.  Political 
violence can be perpetrated against any target—combatant or non-combatant alike.  
                                                 
44 Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria 1954-1962, (Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 41-85. 
45 Drake, 1998, pp. 175-182. 
46 Ibid. 
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However, terrorism can only be committed on non-combatants.  This concept will be 
enormously helpful in creating a definition of terrorism that is discreet and testable.   
USE/EXPLOITATION OF FEAR 
Another important aspect of defining terrorism is the creation or exploitation 
of fear.  This becomes an additional differentiating factor between terrorism and 
political violence.  Terrorism is the use or threat of violence on non-combatant 
populations to create and exploit fear in a larger population for political or ideological 
reasons.  However, political violence is the use or threat of violence on any target for 
political or ideological reasons.  Certainly both are conducted by groups for 
ideological or political reasons.  The distinction emerges when considering the targets 
and the methods.  The target aspect was considered above.  The more problematical 
of the defining aspects of terrorism will now be considered. 
The distinction between terrorism and political violence is in the methods 
employed by the perpetrators.  Specifically, terrorists conduct their violence or threat 
of violence in order to create and exploit fear in a larger population than the specific 
target groups.  However, political violence has no such requirement.  The secondary 
and psychological targets that are created and exploited in a terrorist act have been 
discussed in previous sections.  The difficulty lies in determining the motivation of 
the perpetrators.  It is extremely difficult to know if the goal of the violence is the 
creation and exploitation of terror on a larger audience.  Because of these difficulties, 
this study will treat all violence on civilian targets by groups for a political or 
ideological reason the same as terrorism.  While it is true that terrorist groups often 
claim responsibility for the act of terrorism, thus reinforcing their ideological message 
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and heightening media exposure, it is not always the case.  The difficulties inherent in 
assigning motive to actors was explained by Fowler: 
One major difficulty in creating a rigorous and consistent operational 
definition of terrorist acts is the necessity of attributing certain motives 
to violent acts.  What distinguishes a political bombing from a 
bombing by, say, someone who is simply criminally insane is the 
motivation of the bomber.47 
 
IDEOLOGY 
One of the difficulties of defining terrorism is determining whether the act 
was terrorism, spurred by an ideological strategy, or an act of violence, perpetrated by 
simple criminals, for other causes.  It is for this reason that ideology plays such an 
important role in the definition.  Terrorism is intrinsically linked with politics.  While 
there are many definitions of politics, each definition captures an aspect of terrorism.  
Often politics is described by the control of state structures.  Insurgent terrorists may 
be engaged in terrorism in order to gain control of those state structures.  Another 
definition is that of Laswell: “who gets what, where, when, and how.”48  Terrorists 
may strive for control of the allocation of resources.  A third definition of terrorism is 
Easton’s: “the authoritative allocations of values within a society.”49  Terrorists may 
be engaged in the struggle to control the social, cultural or religious values of a 
population. 
The random attacks by snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, 
except for the lack of ideological foundations, could be labeled terrorism.  However, 
                                                 
47 Fowler, William Warner, “Terrorism Data Bases: A Comparison of Missions, Methods and 
Systems.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND publication, 1981), pg. 12; also Brian Jenkins and Janera 
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48 Laswell, Harold. Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936). 
49 Easton, David, A Framework for Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).  
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without the ideological roots, the shootings were simply the criminal acts carried out 
by two criminal outcasts of society.  Laqueur again notes that this definitional 
problem has existed throughout the history of terrorism in his explanation of the 
sicarii, “Josephus doubted their idealistic motivation and claimed that they were 
listai, robbers, out for personal gain and manipulated by outside forces, with 
patriotism and the demand for freedom a mere ideological cloak.”50  While the 
terrorist act is, a priori, a criminal act, both governments and scholars have struggled 
over whether terrorism should be treated as a criminal act or as an act of war. 
Certainly, groups that have engaged in terrorist acts have also engaged in 
criminal acts for gain and tried to justify the acts through ideology.  Recent 
kidnappings by FARC and Abu Sayyef may have crossed the line from terrorism and 
have become criminal acts for gain.  These groups have been financing their 
insurrections through the proceeds of ransoming hostages.  It is certainly up to debate 
whether this, then, crosses the line into terrorism.  However, when the acts of 
violence are perpetrated solely for the purpose of getting money, the ideological 
underpinnings of the movement are eroded.  The war of ideas is central to most 
terrorist movements.   
Money itself may also be important to the ideological movement.  A terrorist 
campaign requires logistical support.  As such, terrorist groups may engage in 
activities designed solely to obtain money.  Johan Most noted that money was a more 
potent and essential weapon than dynamite.51  As discussed previously, there can be 
many goals of a single terrorist act.  The act may not only secure logistical support 
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but also erode a financial system’s stability.  The difficulty is once again determining 
the goals of the act itself.  As a result, violence perpetrated on non-combatants as a 
means of gaining logistical support such as money for ideological reasons, may be 
characterized as terrorism. 
Essentially, terrorism is the means by which some organizations pursue a 
political or ideological end.  The end is important enough to justify means that would 
typically be taboo to groups within society.  Thus the murder of innocent children 
could be justified as the only means of accomplishing a political end for groups that 
may not have the resources to accomplish the end in any other way. 
TERROR FOR HIRE 
 In a similar but subtly different vein, some groups have engaged in what may 
be termed, “terror for hire”.  As was previously discussed, one of the classes of the 
targeting priorities for terrorist groups are those targets which will provide logistical 
support to the terrorist organization.  The funding of an ideological movement 
through criminal acts for hire may attain the definitional criteria of terrorism.  
Terrorist groups have commonly funded their violent activities through extortion, 
kidnappings and bank robberies. 
 The difficulty arises when the line between funding an ideological movement 
and funding the individual actors gets blurred.  As mentioned previously, the 
activities of the Abu Sayyef Group in the Philippines may have gotten muddied to the 
point that they exist as an organized crime syndicate.  The Japanese Red Army may 
have become a mercenary group, willing to carry out terrorist attacks for whomever, 
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regardless of ideology.  Kirk actually creates a whole separate type of terrorism for 
those who conduct it for economic profit.52 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM: 
TERRORISM OR TERRORIST  
An additional aspect of terrorism that is related to the target of the violence is 
the pitfall of defining the act by the perpetrators.  Terrorism is defined by the act 
itself.  Laqueur notes, “Terrorism is no more than one of several strategies, and 
usually a subordinate one.”53  Brian Jenkins argued, “Terrorism should be defined by 
the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.”54  In other 
words, terrorism is “a kind of weapons-system.”55  While a group which engages in 
terrorism may be labeled terrorists, any group can engage in terrorism.  Conversely, 
all actions engaged in by groups or organizations that are labeled as terrorists may not 
necessarily be terrorism.  A good example of this may be the terrorist group Hamas.   
Hamas may engage in acts of political violence on non-combatants with the express 
goal of creating fear in a general populace for political purposes.  These acts would, 
according to the definition used in this research, be terrorist acts.  However, Hamas 
engages in more than terrorist acts.  The organization known as Hamas also provides 
food and monetary relief supplies to the poor.  While critics of Hamas might classify 
this type of behavior recruiting for later terrorist engagements, an argument can be 
made that Hamas is simply trying to serve the humanitarian needs of a people that has 
no other protector.  
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 Further explanation is necessary.  Entities that primarily are tasked with non-
terrorist types of behavior, such as governments, may engage in terrorism if they 
commit violence on non-combatant populations with the express purpose of creating 
fear for political goals.  Indeed, much of the terrorism committed in the history of 
conflict has been state sponsored.  The term terrorism is derived from the systems of 
intimidation engaged in by the French government led by Robespierre during the time 
following the French revolution.  “The system or regime de la terreur of 1793-4—
from which the English word came—was adopted as means to establish order during 
the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 
1789…It was designed to consolidate the new government’s power by intimidating 
counter-revolutionaries, subversives and all other dissidents whom the new regime 
regarded as ‘enemies of the people’”.56  Hoffman also notes that by including this 
aspect into the definition of terrorism, it becomes difficult to distinguish the acts of 
terrorism and the acts of governments while fighting wars.  He equates the “allied fire 
bombing of Dresden and Tokyo, and the atomic bombs dropped by the United States 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War, and indeed the 
countervalue strategy of the post-war superpowers’ strategic nuclear policy, which 
deliberately targeted the enemy’s civilian population—with the violence committed 
by substate entities labeled ‘terrorists’ since both involve the infliction of death and 
injury on non-combatants”.57 
The violence or threat of violence, further, need not be overt.  Regimes such 
as that of Stalin quickly learned the effectiveness of famine and starvation as a means 
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of establishing political control through fear.  H.E. Vanden documented this 
phenomenon with regards to Central and South America, “The culture of violence is 
not new to Central America.  The masses have been brutalized since the time of the 
conquest, if not long before.  Violence, if not terror, became a means of ensuring the 
domination—or at least the acquiescence—of the common people…it is employed by 
governments and guerillas alike, but not always to the same degree.”58   
Because the term terrorist has become such a value laden term which has far 
reaching connotations for the success of both state and non-state actors, it is important 
that care be taken to separate the actor from the act.  Both state and non-state actors 
can engage in terrorism.  However, it seems that only non-state actors receive the 
terrorist label.  Care must be taken to separate terrorists from acts of terror.  The 
value-laden aspect of the word terrorism will be addressed in the next section. 
USE OF THE TERM TERRORISM: VALUE STATEMENT. 
Another definitional problem is the fact that terrorism has become a pejorative 
word which has been used by various groups to win ideological cachet through its 
use.  Vanden addresses this point.  “Terrorism lends itself to subjective definition.  It 
can be ‘used entirely as a pejorative term to refer to the actions of some opposing 
organization,’ or it can be used as a means of identifying certain types of action 
irregardless (sic) of who is committing them.”59  Thus labeling or mislabeling an act 
as terrorism may afford governments tremendous political capital.   
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This is an important aspect to the study of terrorism as the communicative 
properties of a word can lend or erode the legitimacy of that phenomenon.60  Indeed 
this is most certainly a case of whoever controls the discourse gains an enormous 
advantage.  This can impact a group’s ability to recruit, obtain logistic resources, and 
usher in a political change.  Further, when part of the purpose of the terrorist act is the 
gaining of notoriety or publicity, it could be said the act itself is a struggle for the 
control in the discourse.61   
TRANSNATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
This study focuses almost totally on international and transnational terrorism.  
As this research seeks to gauge the interaction between terrorism and primarily 
international non-governmental organizations, the international or transnational 
aspect to terrorism will be stressed.  That is not to say that terrorism is only 
transnational.  Certainly, the Oklahoma City bombing was terrorism, and the fact that 
it was carried out domestically or without international or transnational influence, 
does not reduce its impact as terrorism.  Terrorism can exist anywhere in any number 
of contexts.  In order to clarify this study, the characteristics of international and 
transnational terrorism as opposed to internal terrorism will be elucidated. 
For the purposes of this research, and to simplify the terms used, both 
transnational and international terrorism will be referred to as international terrorism.  
Certainly there are differences in the two terms.  Strictly speaking, transnational 
terrorism is terrorism that is perpetrated against targets that are not of the same 
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nationality of the perpetrators.62  Actual physical crossing of borders is not necessary.  
The acts can be committed against ex-patriates within the borders of a state as well as 
attacks by foreign groups on citizens of a different state all fall within this category.   
Transnational terrorism can also be terrorism that has its causes or 
consequences based in another country.  The aggressors or victims need not 
necessarily be from different states.  However, there must be an extra-national 
component.  Attacks on people of the same nationality due to an extra-national 
association e.g. employees of a foreign owned company, would also be transnational 
terrorism. 
Technically, international terrorism is terrorism that requires a state actor.63 
Typically it is perpetrated by one state upon the citizens of another.  The act itself is 
typically not carried out by the state, but by non-state surrogates.  International 
terrorism can also be more indirect.  Funding or providing resources from 
international sources may also make terrorism international.64  Like the term 
terrorism, itself, what really constitutes international, and what constitutes 
transnational terrorism is up to some debate.65 
 For the purposes of this research, international terrorism can occur in any state 
or system for any of a multitude of goals.  International terrorism can be 
differentiated from other types of terrorism by the addition of any international 
aspect.  For example, if the immediate, physical target is a citizen of another country, 
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then the terrorism becomes international.  Similarly, if the perpetrators or secondary 
psychological targets of the terrorism were from a different country then that too 
would become international.  An attack “carried out across international frontiers” 
would also be considered international terrorism”.66   
 It is important to note that this study does not eliminate cases based on the 
domestic aspect of an act.  Indeed, some of the central data used in this research have 
been acts of domestic terror.  However, it must also be conceded that the databases 
used primarily for this research are databases containing information on international 
terrorist attacks.  As such, the results may be skewed toward groups which act 
internationally. 
NON-CONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Another typical aspect of terrorism seems to be the willingness of terrorists to 
ignore the established rules of warfare.  Certainly, if the terrorist group had the 
weapons, resources, and or people able to meet its foes on an even ground in open 
warfare, they probably would.  However, most often, terrorism is typically carried out 
by groups that have no hope of winning a conventional engagement.  This is why 
terrorist groups often engage in asymmetric warfare.  Asymmetric warfare has also 
been known as unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict.  If a continuum 
exists with conventional war on one side and peace on the other, asymmetric warfare 
exists somewhere in between.  This concept is illustrated by Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Continuum of Violence 
This is a concept that has deep historical roots.  Sun Tsu noted the worth of 
what would later become known as guerrilla warfare.67  Wilkinson noted the non-
conventional methods utilized by terrorists as a defining aspect of terrorism, “Political 
terror can be differentiated from other forms of violence, agitation, intimidation and 
coercion by virtue of its extreme and ruthlessly destructive methods.”68  This study 
disagrees with Wilkinson.  The method does not make the terrorism. 
Many of the terrorist groups go beyond unconventional warfare and are 
willing to ignore the recent conventions of warfare.  Indeed, the definitional aspect of 
terrorism, the targeting of non-combatant populations, goes against the modern 
conventions of war.  The psychological implications of an enemy that is willing to 
ignore the rules of war help to put terrorist acts on the public stage as well as 
heightening the creation and exploitation of fear.  It is important to note, however, 
that the ignoring of the “rules of war” alone does not necessarily constitute terrorism.   
It is also important to understand that states can and do engage in 
unconventional warfare.  States may be hesitant to openly engage in conventional war 
and thus use unconventional means.  The use of unconventional warfare is a 
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characteristic of terrorism, not a defining aspect.  Thus the fact that unconventional 
methods are used alone does not constitute terrorism.  Terrorism requires all of the 
definitional aspects in order to reach that benchmark. 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TERM 
Part of the difficulty in defining terrorism may stem from the fact that the 
nature of terrorism has changed through time.  Walter Laqueur, in his seminal work 
on the history of terrorism notes that writing a comprehensive history or a general 
theory of terrorism is all but impossible.69  Indeed, as discussed previously, one of the 
central problems to the study of terrorism is the fact that the term terrorism has meant 
so many different things.  Lacquer noted, “the term terrorism…has been used in so 
many different senses as to become almost meaningless, covering almost any, and not 
necessary political, act of violence.”70   
The definition which is used in this study has some important distinctions 
from those used by previous authors.  The distinction requiring the violence be 
perpetrated on non-combatant targets or property has historically not been included in 
many definitions.  Indeed, the first group typically labeled with the term terrorist, the 
sicarrii, often targeted Roman soldiers as well as civilians.  This definition would 
label those attacks against civilians as terrorism, but the attacks on soldiers as 
warfare, albeit unconventional.   
The Hindu cult known as the Thugee is often referred to as an historical 
terrorist group.71  While it is true that the Thugee did use and threaten violence on 
non-combatant populations, it was not done for political reasons or for a larger 
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audience (aside from Kali herself).  Granted, the worship of Kali, the goddess of 
death, may have been an ideological motivation, but that ideology was inward based, 
rather than outward based.  Further, taking the discussion of means and ends 
described previously, the strangling deaths of innocents was essentially a sacrament 
for the Thugee; the end rather than the means for accomplishing their religious goal.  
Using the definition put forth in this work, the lack of a political ideology meant for a 
greater audience relegates the Thugee as a non-terrorist entity.   
RATIONALITY 
It may seem that terrorism, or the use or threat of violence on civilians for 
ideological reasons with the goal of creating and exploiting fear is, a priori, 
irrational.72  Indeed, some have studied the phenomenon of terrorism from the 
perspective that terrorism is a psychological or sociological pathology.73  However, 
this work echoes Martha Crenshaw’s 1998 article which treats terrorism and terrorist 
justification as a rational phenomenon utilizing a strategic choice model.74  
Specifically, this work assumes that terrorists resort to terrorism as a product of 
“willful choice made by an organization for political and strategic reasons, rather than 
as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors”.75  The assumption of 
rationality is also important when investigation of the goals and objectives of 
terrorists as the terrorists’ pursuit of strategic goals is, in essence, a rational process.  
Indeed, historical analysis of terrorist action “reveals similarities in calculations of 
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ends and means.”76  Hoffman noted in his definition of terrorism that, “it is a planned, 
calculated, and indeed systematic act.”77 
Indeed, the early terrorists attempted to justify their actions based on rational 
arguments.  Laqueur used Hassan Sibai, the first leader of the Assassins, to illustrate 
this point, “Hassan Sibai seems to have realized early on that his group was too small 
to confront the enemy in open battle but that a planned, systematic, long-term 
campaign of terror carried out by a small, disciplined force could be a most effective 
political weapon”.78  In this case, terrorism is non-conventional warfare, or low 
intensity conflict that allows the terrorist group to fight a war with an opponent 
against whom it has no hope of winning if the engagements are fought utilizing open, 
traditional methods.  This concept is further illustrated by Sun Tzu in the The Art of 
War, “If you are equal, then fight if you are able.  If you are fewer, then keep away if 
you are able.  If you are not as good, then flee if you are able.”79  Certainly this is a 
rational concept.  Hoffman also described this concept,  
Terrorists further argue that, because of their numerical inferiority, far 
more limited firepower and paucity of resources compared with an 
established nation-state’s massive defense and national security 
apparatus, they have no choice but to operate clandestinely, emerging 
from the shadows to carry out dramatic (in other words, bloody and 
destructive) acts of hit-and-run violence in order to attract attention to, 
and attract publicity for, themselves and their cause.  The bomb-in-the-
rubbish-bin, in their view, is merely a circumstantially imposed ‘poor 
man’s air force’: the only means with which the terrorist can 
challenge—and get the attention of—the more powerful state.  ‘How 
else can we bring pressure to bear on the world?’ one of Arafat’s 
political aides once enquired. ‘The deaths are regrettable, but they are 
a fact of war in which innocents have been involved.  They are no 
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more innocent than the women and children killed by the Israelis and 
we are ready to carry the war all over the world.’80 
 
This concept of strategic choice is again demonstrated by Sun Tzu, “kill one, 
frighten ten thousand.”81  This form of conflict is rational for those that lack the 
resources to fight a war conventionally or who wish to control large populations of 
people without a leadership mandate.  The concept of terror as taken from the French 
Revolution was a way to control populations through the exploitation of fear. “The 
word ‘terrorism’ derives from the era of French Revolution and the Jacobin 
dictatorship which used terror as an instrument of political repression and social 
control.”82  Stalin also used this concept of control masterfully.  This use of terror in 
Central America actually became institutionalized as the method of controlling the 
peasant population in rural areas.83 
Showing rationality is also important for the terrorists themselves, expressly 
for the reason that ideology is a definitional aspect of terrorism.  As a result, 
justification of the reasons for violence becomes essential.  Narodnaya Volya was 
very careful to publish the justification for its use of violence.  They claimed that the 
acts of the tyrant justified their use of violence.  Romanenko, described this when he 
explained, “It was wrong to regard systematic terror as immoral, since everything that 
contributed to the liberating revolution was a priori moral.”84  In the end, while the 
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logic may be suspicious, the perpetrators of terrorism justify their actions by 
displacing the responsibility to the entity they are trying to attack.  Timothy 
McVeigh’s attempt to justify the killing of children in the Murrah Federal Building as 
“collateral damage” and his further attempt to blame the government for their deaths 
by saying it was “family convenience” that led the government employees to put their 
children so close to a legitimate target is an example of this kind of displacement.85  
Most explained that it was the fault of the civilian women and children when they 
were hurt by terrorist attacks. “Some ‘innocents’ were bound to get hurt but this did 
not bother him unduly, it was not their business to be in places where a bomb was 
likely to explode.”86 
Finally, the fact that terrorism entails violent or criminal behavior alone does 
not necessarily equate it with irrationality.  Sandler et al created an economic method 
of studying terrorism based on rational choices made by the terrorists.  They conclude 
that a rational, economic model provides valuable insights into the way terrorists 
operate.  They note that the willingness of terrorists to put their lives at risk does not 
prove, a priori, irrationality, “Policemen and firefighters, to name but two groups, are 
willing to face an increased probability of death, provided that their remuneration 
compensates them for the added risks that employment entails.”87  Sociologists have 
further concluded that criminal behavior can be rational.88  In the end, the justification 
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used to show that a fundamentally violent act is rational, relates primarily to the 
justification that the means adopted to achieve an end are acceptable. 
SYSTEMATIC vs. ONE TIME ACTS 
 Many of the definitions of terrorism include systematic violence as one of the 
definitional aspects of terrorism.  This research does not.  While systematic violence 
may be a facet of some terrorism, a one-time act should be considered also.  The 
Murrah Federal Building bombing of April 19, 1995 in Oklahoma City most certainly 
attains the criteria of terrorism.  While the Oklahoma City bombing was an isolated 
act (even considering the criminal acts that went into the preparation of the bombing), 
it meets all of the other criteria for a terrorist act and should be treated as such.   
CONCLUSION 
For the purposes of this research it has been established that terrorism is a 
political phenomenon by which attackers threaten or use violence on non-combatants 
with the intent of creating and exploiting fear.  It is not a new phenomenon and has 
been practiced since antiquity.  It is carried out as if on a stage, the targets in actuality 
not being the physical victims of the terrorists but rather the audience.  The 
perpetrators can be either state or non-state entities and there may be any of a number 
of goals, from state control to the authoritative distribution of values to deciding who 
gets what, where, when, and how.  The act of terrorism can be seen to be rational 
given the goals and objectives of the groups engaged in it.  Terrorism is usually 
perpetrated by groups utilizing non-conventional warfare, due to the fact that they are 
unable to gain advantage while using conventional methods.  This research is careful 
to distinguish between the act of terrorism and the perpetrator of the act itself due to 
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the value-laden meaning attached to the term.  While terrorism may occur within a 
nation-state, it is also waged between national lines and boundaries.  
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CHAPTER 3: NON-GOVERMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THEIR GOALS, 
TARGETS, AND STRATEGIES 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: AN HISTORIC BACKGROUND 
AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 The first non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were established by 
religious groups and people of conscience who wanted to abolish the practice of 
slavery.  They believed that the best way to achieve their goal of abolition was to 
form groups of like-minded people in order to gather the resources to accomplish it.89  
Similarly, groups met together to combat suffering brought about by wars, hunger and 
famine. 
 The largest change in the scope and number of non-governmental 
organizations has occurred in the 20th century.90  Korten explained that within three 
time periods in the 20th century, there were specific events which have shaped non-
governmental organizations: before World War II, the 20 years after World War II, 
and from 1980 to the present.91  NGOs before WWII were primarily charitable relief 
organizations.  Often these organizations were religious in nature and related to 
missionary activities.  After World War II, secular organizations began to spring up to 
bring aid to war ravaged Europe.  Lindenberg and Bryant, however, credit 
globalization with the increased role and scope of NGOs.92   
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Increasingly, these organizations began to be associated with the development 
of countries.  To pursue the goal of development, the focus of NGOs had to change 
their focus away from individual relief to a more state-centric view.93  This was done 
primarily to attack the root causes of third world poverty. 
 There has been an almost exponential increase in the number and scope of 
NGOs in the latter part of the 20th century.  This may be traced to a variety of factors.  
Table 3.1 illustrates the growth in the NGO sector of the United States.  This growth 
has been mirrored by that of NGOs in the rest of the world.   
Year NGOs† Revenues‡ U.S. Giving 
1970 52 $.614 $23.4 
1994 419 $6.839 $129.8 
† USAID, Annual Reports on US Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs, Washington D.C., 1985 
‡ American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel and the AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy 
 
Table 3.1: Growth of development NGOs in the United States 1970-1994 
($ in U.S. billions) 
 
The United Nations has become more engaged in “humanitarian imperatives” 
which has led to an increased role for NGOs in what had been considered in the past 
to be sovereign domestic issues.94  This aspect of NGO expansion of scope became 
widely publicized in UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for 
Peace which described the duty of the international community, including NGOs, to 
become involved in, what in the past were, sovereign issues when matters of human 
                                                 
93 Korten, 1987. 
94 Thomas G. Weiss, “Nongovernment Organizations and Internal Conflict,” The International 
Dimensions of Conflict, Michael E. Brown, ed. No. 10 (MIT Press, 1996). 
 58
rights or humanitarian interests are at stake.95  Another reason for the growth of the 
scope of NGOs may be the increased influence of globalization.  This has been 
accompanied by an increase in world actors.  Among those actors are non-
governmentals.96 
Based on the work that NGOs are undertaking, they have increasingly 
demanded a place at the table of international policy creation and execution.  Further, 
the global community as well as sovereign governments have seemed willing to allow 
them that place.97  Currently, NGOs have obtained consultative status on the Security 
Council of the United Nations through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
based on article 71, which grants ECOSOC the right to “make suitable arrangements 
for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence.”98  In this capacity, qualifying NGOs are granted the 
right to propose ECOSOC agenda items as well as the right to supply information in 
conferences and committee hearings.99  The interaction between NGOs and the UN 
plays a prominent role in international relations literature.100 
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The question must be asked, why the increase in the scope and size of NGOs?  
The answer lies more in the accepted assumptions that as private, non-state entities, 
which must compete for resources, NGOs are more efficient and effective than 
government programs.  In addition, NGOs typically spotlight on one specific sector of 
policy, which allows them to focus on and amass greater information and expertise 
than governments, with budget constraints and bureaucratic sclerosis, would be able 
to accomplish.  The reliance of governments and IGOs on expertise lent them by 
NGOs creates other problems, as NGOs might be biased in their collection and advice 
on policy specifics.   
As stated previously, Lindenberg and Bryant point to global reasons for the 
increase of NGOs.  Specifically, they point to the economic collapse and restructuring 
that have occurred since the end of the Cold War.  At the end of the Cold War, Soviet 
client states were destabilized and Western client states received less money.  At the 
same time, the number of failed states was on the rise.  There was an increase in 
anarchy and social conflict.  There was also more space for civil society based on an 
increase in democratic regimes.  The influence of the state was also diminishing due 
to less social spending and an increase in privatization.  During this time, NGOs were 
able to fill the vacuum left by the diminished state due to an increase in giving to 
NGOs as well as incentives created by intergovernmental organizations.101 
Weiss and Gordenker also note that the increased influence of NGOs can also 
be traced to a ‘representative’ function that they provide to governments and IGOs.  It 
is thought that governments and IGOs obtain their legitimacy not only from the 
democratic governments that participate in their organizations, but also through the 
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participation of NGOs which represent another form of citizenship.102  “In sum, the 
direct participation of private organizations lends a democratic quality to the 
management of intergovernmental organizations and is, therefore, an indispensable 
contribution to global politics.”103 
 This creates an interesting problem for non-governmental organizations.  Part 
of what allows them to accomplish their mission is the fact that they are non-state 
actors.  Increasingly, in order to compete for resources in the world market, NGOs 
have had to create relationships with governmental or intergovernmental entities.  
Much of the recent literature on NGOs has focused on whether NGOs really are 
independent, as well as their accountability to their benefactors.104  Doctors Without 
Borders, a humanitarian aid organization which values its independence from 
government sources, prides itself on only receiving 81% of its funding from 
government sources.105  Indeed, according to Edwards and Hume, NGOs have begun 
to be known as agents for specific governments or policy positions.  Not only are they 
seen as agents, but as the preferred method by which states can provide services to 
other countries due to the common belief that NGOs are more efficient than states can 
be.106  While this belief is not universal, the explosion in the number and scope of 
NGOs cannot be disputed. 
 Often, the NGOs are private organizations that are created and controlled by 
individuals or groups with specific interests.  As such, NGOs create their own rules 
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and guidelines and finance their own activities, making them responsible to their 
stakeholders.  However, NGOs sometimes struggle for recognition and resources 
from state entities.  This can create problems of ‘mission creep’ and may indeed 
affect the operations of an NGO.  Alexander Cooley and James Ron also postulate 
that NGOs come into competition in their scramble for resources.  They argue that 
due to market forces, NGOs may not necessarily act in accordance with their stated 
mandate.  Indeed, many NGOs become inefficient and self-serving as they compete 
for resources in an increasingly saturated marketplace.107  This competition is 
acknowledged by Ronit and Schneider, “These (NGOs) typically have few resources, 
engage in specific policy fields, and often struggle for recognition by public 
authority.”108  It can be seen that the competition for resources among terrorist groups 
might bring them into conflict with competing NGOs. 
There are additional difficulties for the operation of an NGO’s goals: that of 
keeping on mission and being responsible to stakeholders, while attempting to be 
relevant in the world environment.  Schmitter and Streeck describe that NGOs must 
balance between the “logic of membership” and the interests of their constituency and 
the “logic of influence” which is the influence exerted on an NGO by the political 
environment.109  In some cases, the message of the group might become compromised 
by the necessity of presenting that message in a manner that will be acceptable to the 
world stage. 
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 NGOs do not necessarily exist only at the behest of the state.  And it may not 
be the case that NGOs have increased in order to fill the vacuum left by a receding 
state.  Indeed, Susan Strange theorizes that the power of the state is being eroded due 
to the influence of non-state actors.110  Keck and Sikkink note that NGOs are helping 
to create international civil society.  They do this by creating advocacy networks that 
define new issues and control international dialogue.  After the issues are defined and 
promoted on the world stage, NGOs interact with state and intergovernmental 
organizations to adopt action that addresses the newly defined issues.  Finally, NGOs 
monitor the success of the implementation of the policies designed to address those 
issues.  In other words, non-state actors help to create civil society in a world where 
the power of the state is diminishing by helping to create, advertise and enforce 
international norms.111    
NGOs have come to be seen as a vehicle not only of development, but also as 
a vehicle of social and political change.112  Increasingly, a larger portion of official 
aid is being channeled through non-governmental organizations.  Indeed, a new 
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subset of NGO has been created: the QUANGOs or quasi-nongovernmental 
organizations.  These are non-governmental organizations that “receive the bulk of 
their resources from public (or state) coffers.”113  Further, states as well as interstate 
organizations have begun to rely on NGOs for their problem solving ability as well as 
their ability to advise and consult with state structures in areas where the NGO holds 
informational expertise. This begs the important question: Are non-governmental 
organizations really non-governmental?  This basic question is one that that will be 
addressed in chapter 4.   
There is a growing literature that looks at the growth and impact of NGOs in 
the international system due to their increasing significance as players on the world 
stage.114  They are taking upon themselves roles that were, in the past, solely in the 
purview of state entities.115  Further, NGOs with similar foci are coming together and 
pooling information and resources, which allows for much effective goal attainment.  
Keck and Sikkink label these NGO networks “transnational advocacy networks.”116  
These TANs combine NGOs’, individuals’, and state entities’ resources and creates 
informational linkages in order to accomplish common goals and solve collective 
problems.117  This is significant when looked at in the light of NGO associations that 
will be discussed in chapter 4.   
The study of international NGOs accompanied the increase in the numbers of 
NGOs that began in the 19th century.  International organizations began to be studied 
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as a sub-discipline at the start of the 20th century.118  White pioneered the focus on 
non-profit international organizations in 1933.  He looked specifically at both 
economic and non-economic private organizations as groups with political 
interests.119  With the creation of the United Nations and the recognition that the U.N. 
granted NGOs, the definition of NGOs as non-economic groups became more 
accepted.  The role of NGOs as a partner with intergovernmental organizations 
became established and the study of NGOs in that context began to dominate the 
field.120 
 Currently, literature on non-government relations reflects the difficulties 
endemic to the study of international political phenomenon.  There have been myriads 
of ways to look at various phenomenon based on the perspective from which the 
researcher has wished to approach them.  The study of NGOs is no different.  The 
way NGOs have been studied varies based on the traditions of the discipline of those 
doing the studies.  This has helped to make defining NGOs a difficult proposition.  
Ronit and Schneider note, “It is not surprising that private organizations are given 
various labels within studies on international relations, international political 
economy and transnational relations.”121 
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In international relations, where dominant theories in the field have been state-
centric, “little room is left for other actors.”122  In fact, non-state actors have been 
minimized as less significant than other inputs. 
The existence of private organizations is not denied, but they are, a 
priori, considered of minor importance and, accordingly, solid 
investigations are hardly worth the effort.  However, even from a 
strong state-centric perspective, it makes sense to study private 
organizations to demonstrate how states influence the formation of 
private actors, or how they instrumentalize them in their rivalries with 
other states.123 
 
That is not to say that there have not been those that study non-state entities from a 
state-centric perspective.  Certainly some have looked at phenomenon as varied as 
terrorist groups to environmental and human rights organizations.  Usually, they are 
studied from the perspective of the non-governmentals acting as a linking institution 
between foreign policy and domestic policy.124   
There have been contributions to the literature of non-governmental 
organizations in terms of the study of non-state actors.125  These non-state actors 
include traditional non-governmental organizations.  However, the category also 
includes supra-state organizations that include intergovernmental organizations as 
well as sub-state actors such as “…multinational enterprises, cartels, and criminal, 
religious and ethnic networks.”126  These studies have helped to move the study of 
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international relations away from a dedicated state centric view and opened the 
horizons to include these supra-state and sub-state actors. 
 International political economy, with its emphasis on states and markets, has 
often ignored the role of non-governmentals.  However, studies, which stress the roles 
of unions, private banking institutions, and for-profit companies in helping to regulate 
the market, have also contributed to the literature in international political economy.  
Indeed, some studies looking at the corporatist models of state economies give non-
profits an equal share with the state in regulating market forces.  Much of this 
emphasis is limited to multi-national corporations, cartels, and trade regimes.127  As a 
result, “non-economic players generally fall outside the paradigms of international 
political economy.”128  Most often, these actors are profit seeking, and as such usually 
exempted from the typical definition of NGO.  
 The transnational or civil society approach looks at the role of non-
governmental groups in creating structures of society beyond the state and the market.  
This approach emphasizes the connections and structures created by society to solve 
the problems of society.  As such, the role of non-governmental groups, especially 
those engaged in creating civil society, is emphasized in both high and low politics.129  
Much of the literature on NGOs focuses on specific interests such as the environment, 
women’s issues, and human rights.130  For the study of non-governmental 
organizations, the transnational or civil society approach seems the most appropriate.   
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NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:  A DEFINITION 
A similar difficulty arises when addressing non-governmental organizations as 
when addressing terrorism: namely there is no universally accepted definition.  
Strictly speaking, any organization that is not an official state entity could be 
considered an NGO.  Indeed, many multinational corporations (MNCs) and religious 
organizations that cross state boundaries could qualify as NGOs.  Ronit and 
Schneider describe the dilemma:  
The field does not employ a consistent vocabulary and a range of 
concepts are employed to describe different private organizations.  
Studies of non-governmental organizations encompass a very broad 
group of actors, and a huge glossary of acronyms has been created to 
account for the variety in the organization of private interests.131 
 
This difficulty in defining non-governmental organizations relates to the term itself.  
Non-governmental only defines what it is not.  Therefore, it can be determined that 
NGOs are precisely that, not part of government.  Accordingly, any organization, 
such as a quilting bee, that is not governmental, would fit into this category.   
This ‘non-definition’ can also be broadly expanded to differentiate NGOs 
from intergovernmental organizations as well.  Much of the international relations 
literature that deals with NGOs focuses on the interaction between NGOs and IGOs.  
Weiss notes the importance of this relationship in the international relations literature.  
“Much of the literature is legalistic and focuses on the formal relationships of those 
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one thousand or so NGOs that have official UN consultative status.”132  This does not, 
however, further distinguish NGOs from the myriad of organizations that exist in the 
world. 
The current trend in non-governmental organizations research suggests that 
part of the definitional aspect of NGOs is the role that they play.  Ronit and Schneider 
expand on this: 
Multinational and transnational corporations are treated as global, 
profit seeking organizations and therefore usually excluded from the 
group of non-governmental organizations mainly described as non-
profit organizations.  The same applies to various international 
federations of political parties, which are associated with governments 
because they seek political office and, consequently, are not of a 
genuine private character.  In a similar vein, national liberation 
movements aspiring to political power fall outside the concept of non-
governmental organizations.  Consequently, political and ideological 
movements, such as workers’ internationals or the Zionist 
movement…cannot be treated properly within the existing framework 
of non-governmental organizations.133 
 
Uphoff argues that most NGOs belong in a sub-sector of the private sector.  
According to him, the distinguishing characteristic of an NGO is its not-for-profit 
nature.134  While this differentiates NGOs from MNCs, there remains considerable 
fuzziness to what constitutes a non-governmental organization.  This fuzziness is 
described by Thomas Weiss:  “Confusion persists about the precise definition of a 
‘nongovernmental organization.’ Theoretical explorations are few in number and 
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specialized by sector, traditionally for economic and social development and more 
recently for the environment.”135   
Korten focuses on the characteristics of an organization as the definitional 
factor: An NGO is “an independent, nonpolitical private agency.”136  This definition 
is especially interesting given the political roles that many NGOs have accepted.  For 
the purposes of this research, an entity will be considered an NGO when it is a private 
organization that is non-profit in nature.  
 In order to better quantify between the different organizations that can be 
included in the larger definition of non-governmental organization, a host of 
acronyms have evolved.  A complete listing of the different sub-types of NGOs is 
beyond the scope and necessity of this research.  However, some of the main sub-
types will be explained.  Certainly the INGO or international non-governmental 
organization is important to this research and will be addresses later, as will the 
religious non-governmental organization (RINGO).   
Korten differentiates NGOs based on accountability.  This is especially 
pertinent when understanding the motivation for action of NGOs.  Governmental non-
governmental organizations (a contradiction in terms) or (GONGO), are NGOs “that 
are the creations of government and serve as instruments of government policy.”137  
Voluntary Organizations (VO) are organizations that “pursue a social mission driven 
by a commitment to shared values.”138  Public Service Contractors (PSC) are 
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“market-oriented non-profit businesses serving public purposes.”139  According to 
Korten, these PSCs, while nominally non-profit in nature, seem to function in the 
market for the purpose of exploiting the need for contractors in the service market.140  
Finally, peoples’ organizations (PO) are organizations that “represent their member’s 
interests, have member accountable leadership, and are substantially self-reliant.”141  
Weiss and Gordenker introduce the donor organized non-governmental organization 
(GONGO).  This type of organization is created by donors (either governmental or 
non-governmental) for a specific purpose or policy need.142  Examples of this type of 
organization are the various UN NGOs created for specific needs. 
INTERNATIONAL NGOs (INGO) 
 NGOs need not be transnational or international in nature.  Indeed, the 
majority of NGOs are grassroots or domestic—containing people from one country 
working in their own country for the benefit of that country or locality.  The 
transnational/international nature of this research biases the scope of the definition of 
NGOs used, and as such, the primary focus is on organizations which are 
transnational in nature.     
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TREATED AS NGOS (RINGO) 
 The question remains as to whether religious organizations should be 
considered NGOs.  As mentioned previously, the first NGOs were religious groups.  
Most religious groups are not-for-profit in nature.  In the colonial era in Africa, 
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churches were the primary mechanism for education and healthcare.143  NGOs have 
traditionally engaged in charitable relief.  However, NGOs have also been involved in 
the creation of civil society or environmental causes.  While religious organizations 
have traditionally been neglected in NGO literature, there is no sound explanation as 
to why.144  Clearly churches cannot be removed from the category of non-
governmental organizations.   For the purpose of this research, religious organizations 
have been included within the umbrella of non-governmental organizations. 
 One additional factor must be addressed, that of intrinsic characteristics of 
NGOs that make them especially attractive targets for terrorist attack.  Chapter 1 
introduced the basic targeting imperatives which terrorist use to select targets and 
chapter 4 will explore and expand on them.  These imperatives include general 
ideological as well as strategic and tactical reasons.  The terrorist groups are engaged 
in the use of violence in order to create and exploit fear in a larger audience for a 
political reason.  NGOs may be associated with an outside political entity.  An attack 
on the NGO will be seen as an attack on the larger audience.  Thus, an attack on a 
Jordanian truck driver in Iraq is perceived as an attack on the American company that 
he worked for.  This associative attack is not exclusive to NGOs.  As the attack is 
meant to create fear in a larger population, however, and as NGOs are at least 
perceived to be altruistic and “innocent” by the larger audience, the horrific attack on 
an NGO might actually garner more attention than one on a more traditional target.  
Thus the goal is better served through an attack on an NGO.   
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NGOs may also be especially vulnerable to terrorist attack due to the nature of 
the operations in which they are engaged.  Randolph Martin described why this may 
be the case:   
The overall increase over the past decade in the number and duration 
of conflicts in which aid workers are employed; a general absence of 
rules of war or rules of conduct among the belligerents themselves, 
many of whom are irregular fighters and may also include criminals 
and bandits interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a 
particular political agenda; and the general rush to arrive on the scene 
of conflicts or humanitarian crises most needing help without adequate 
prior security preparation or thought.145 
 
All of these factors combine to make the operations of many NGOs especially 
dangerous.  Martin also describes another reason that NGOs make good targets: they 
are generally ‘softer’ than other targets.   
(There is) a prevailing perception of aid organizations as particularly 
‘soft’ targets (that) leads terrorists and other malefactors to conclude 
that such organizations and especially their employees can be 
‘attacked with impunity.’  (There is also) a conspicuous lack of 
security among many NGO workers combined with a skeptical, if not 
averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective 
measures.146 
 
TERRORIST GROUPS AND NGOS 
The question might rightly be asked if terrorist groups should also be included 
within the rubric of non-governmental organizations.  Certainly, as discussed above, 
they are non-state actors.  While fundamentally political in nature, does that fact 
remove them from the NGO equation?  If so, then many traditional NGOs must also 
be removed.  For example, Amnesty International is an internationally recognized 
human rights NGO.  They are fundamentally engaged in political action.  Similarly, 
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Greenpeace, an established environmental NGO, is also engaged in political 
processes.    
Perhaps terrorist groups separate themselves from their non-state NGO 
brothers by their fundamentally malignant message and methods.  This also is a 
dangerous distinction.  Who is to say what message or methods are acceptable.  Is the 
fact that Greenpeace often resorts to action that borders on the violent enough to 
remove them as an NGO and put them into the terrorist category?  Certainly the ELF 
(Environmental Liberation Front), which engages in bombings and arson to further 
the environmental cause, should be categorized as a terrorist group.  But where is the 
line between Greenpeace and the ELF?  Is the fact that Hamas engages in violence 
and terror negate the fact that they also carry out education and human rights work?  
How can such distinctions be made?   
The fact that terrorist groups are, indeed, non-governmental organizations 
must be acceded to.  However, in the same way that non-governmental organization 
is a large umbrella for many disparate types of organizations (for-profit businesses, 
non-for-profit groups, church organizations, etc.), terrorist groups are treated the same 
way MNCs are treated.  Thus, terrorist groups are not addressed as NGOs for the 
purposes of this research.  That is not to say that terrorist groups do not use NGOs as 
funding mechanisms or mechanisms of support.  The use of charitable NGOs as 
funding mechanisms for Al Qaeda has been the subject of much attention since the 
September 11 attacks.  Similar NGOs existed to support terrorist activities in 
Northern Ireland and the Far East.  While some NGOs might have been wholly 
engaged as a front for terrorist groups that has not necessarily been the case for all of 
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the NGOs with ties to terrorists.  Some groups may have been unwitting dupes to the 
funneling of resources to terrorist organizations.  Others may have legitimate agendas 
and only divert portions of their resources to such groups. 
However, the classification of terrorist groups as NGOs is especially salient in 
this discussion of terrorism and NGOs.  While the definition of NGOs used in this 
research specifically exempts terrorist groups, they are, unequivocally, non-state 
actors.  If the power of the state is eroding and non-state groups are competing to 
control the dialogue on the world stage, then terrorist groups may certainly come into 
conflict with other state and non-state actors in this endeavor.  Indeed, this seems to 
be an explanatory factor in the rise of terrorism.  This conflict for the control of the 
dialogue on the world stage will be expanded on later in this research. 
INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS—A CAVEAT 
 Non-government organizations need not be international in nature.  Indeed, 
most NGOs are domestic groups of varying form and function.  This research does 
not ignore these groups.  However, due to constraints forced by the nature of the data 
used in this research, it does focus primarily on international groups.  As stated 
previously, if there is one weakness of this research, it is the fact that it is biased 
towards acts of international terrorism.  It must be noted that the selection of an NGO 
case for the second portion of this study follows in this bias.  This was done for many 
reasons, not the least of which were for research design and accessibility purposes.  
These reasons will be more fully explored in chapter 5.  Constraints also forced a 
limitation on the focus of NGOs.  As this chapter has just pointed out, there are 
countless types of NGOs and each has its own emphasis in a specific policy or 
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geographic area.  This research was unable to fully explore the different types and 
extent of NGOs in this format. 
CONCLUSION 
 Non-governmental organizations have increased in numbers and in scope.  It 
has been theorized that this increase is due to the rise in intergovernmental 
organizations and their need for representational legitimacy as well as the need for 
efficient information and distribution of services.  Another reason cited for the 
increase in NGOs is the retreat of the state.  It is thought that as states’ roles have 
decreased, non-governmental organizations have stepped up to fill the gap, creating 
civil society. 
 NGOs are decreasingly engaged alone in their fight for their policy goals.  
They are combining resources and expertise to form networks by which more can be 
accomplished.  NGOs are also considered an efficient way for states to pursue 
policies without overt action.  As a result, an increasing number of NGOs are 
associated with states, becoming clearinghouses for government money.  It can be 
seen that as the number of NGOs has increased, they have had to compete for 
resources in a scarce marketplace.  NGOs may have to change their goals in order to 
obtain necessary resources.  As a result, questions have arisen about the 
accountability of NGOs to stakeholders. 
 Like terrorism, the study of non-governmental organizations has been difficult 
due to the lack of a consensus with regard to an accepted definition of what is actually 
a non-governmental organization.  The common definitions of NGOs as private, non-
political organizations that are not-for-profit in nature and working for a public good 
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may be lacking.  Many NGOs are associated with governments.  Furthermore, not-
for-profit organizations may, in actuality, be in the business of making a profit.  
Finally, public good certainly does not have an agreed upon definition.  For the 
purposes of this research, much of the conventional definition of a non-governmental 
organization is accepted: a non-state, privately created and directed, not-for-profit 
organization.  Religious organizations are also included within the NGO umbrella.  
However, while terrorist groups are definitely non-state entities, they do not meet the 
rubric of a non-governmental organization.
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CHAPTER 4: TERRORISM AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS COLLIDE 
 If the notion that terrorism is a rational action pursued by rational individuals, 
then there must be a reason that terrorist groups might use to justify the targeting of 
non-governmental organizations.  As stated previously, Hoffman noted that NGOs 
were targeted because of tactical reasons: specifically that the nature and operations 
of NGOs make them easy targets.  However, if terrorist groups are rational, one must 
go beyond just the relative ease of carrying out an attack on a given target.  As stated 
before, there must be a rationale. 
INTRODUCTION TO/REVIEW OF THE DATABASE 
 This chapter will create and justify the framework as to why terrorist groups 
might target non-governmental organizations.  In other words, it establishes the 
terrorist’s targeting rationale.  In order to institute this framework, a comprehensive 
study of attacks on NGOs was carried out.  For the purposes of this study, various 
databases that contained records of these types of attacks were consulted.  After 
consulting the various databases, the central data for this research was compiled.  It 
contains approximately 500 cases of terrorist attacks on NGOs and religious groups 
from 1970 to 2000. 
 Determining the actual process by which targets were chosen is a task fraught 
with intellectual pitfalls.  Obviously, it is impossible to know exactly what the 
terrorist groups were thinking or what emphasis they placed on which targeting 
parameters to finally arrive at the selected target.  However, after careful study of the 
databases, various patterns emerged.  The purpose of this study was not to create 
 78
empirically testable statistics.  This is a preliminary study in the field of target 
selection which focuses on NGOs in particular.  While a database is typically used to 
statistically test hypotheses, the database compiled for this study has a primary 
purpose of providing a large pool of like phenomena through which patterns could be 
divined.  As such, readers should not be disappointed when statistical testing is not 
conducted for each of the framework parameters.   
The main source materials used are the RAND/Saint Andrews Terrorism 
Database as well as the RAND/MIPT Terrorism Database, both of which have been 
compiled primarily from news publications worldwide.  These databases include 
information as to number of deaths; number of injuries; the nationality(s) of the 
target; the alleged perpetrator(s); the incident date; the tactics used; the country that 
the attack occurred in; the source of the information; and finally a brief summary of 
the attack.  These databases “…were compiled by the RAND Corporation, of which 
the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database records international terrorist incidents 
occurred between 1968 and 1997, while the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident 
Database records domestic and international terrorist incidents occurred from 1998 to 
present.”147  Information used as secondary sources include the U.S. government 
reports Political Violence Against Americans, Significant Incidents of Political 
Violence Against Americans, and the Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000-2002, which 
are government reports of violence against Americans.  All of these sources are in the 
public domain and readily obtainable by the general public.   
RAND is a non-profit think tank originally set up by the Air Force to 
undertake contract research.  This research is often conducted for the U.S. 
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Government but not necessarily so.148  The Rand database contains over 8,000 cases 
detailing acts of international terrorism in general, and since 1998, it has detailed 
incidents of domestic terrorism as well.  From this database, approximately 500 cases 
of terrorist acts on NGOs and religious organizations since 1978 have been 
chronicled.   
This database is important in that it provides large numbers of data which can 
be compared and examined to see if similarities and differences exist between attacks.  
In other words, the data set can be examined for correlations between the variables, 
which could then be hypothesized as “cause-effect relationships.”149  Again, while 
theory testing will not be executed, this database analysis will be conducted as a 
controlled comparison.150 
One of the benefits of the data retrieved from the RAND/St. Andrews and the 
RAND/MIPT databases is the fact that much of the data was retrieved from 
journalistic sources.  As a result, much of the information is “thick” in nature.  In 
other words, the database contains descriptive information rather than just names and 
dates.  This is especially helpful in the task of creating the theoretical framework.  
Specific details as to the actions of the victims, the tactics of the attackers, as well as 
other relevant information is contained within the database. 
The sourced available databases have received both positive and negative 
reviews.  On the positive side, Edward S. Herman describes the RAND database as “a 
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relatively large and scholarly operation for the terrorism field.”151  Work testing the 
internal validity and correlation of available databases found all to be highly 
correlated and internally valid.152 
On the negative side, Herman comments on how the disparate definitions 
serve to create a weakness in the database: 
(It) exhibits a fundamental bias that fits and supports the Western 
model of terrorism.  It focuses on terrorist incidents of ‘violence 
waged outside presently accepted rules and procedures of international 
diplomacy and war…designed to attract worldwide attention to the 
terrorists and to inspire fear.’  Incidents are included only if 
information is ‘publicly available.’  As government acts of violence 
very often are not designed to ‘attract worldwide attention and inspire 
fear,’ but only to inspire fear (and decimate an opposition), the RAND 
principle of selection excludes a large part of wholesale terror from the 
start.  Furthermore, government violence very often does not yield 
‘publicly available information’ (e.g., the work of death squads and 
government torturers), and is claimed (often falsely) by the terrorist 
states to be within the ‘presently accepted rules’ of warfare.153 
 
Thus instances of state terrorism against their own citizens are excluded based on the 
definition of terrorism used by RAND.154  Similarly, instances of “terrorist events 
taking place on the frontiers of neighboring states at war are excluded.”155  Another 
criticism of the RAND database is the fact that it ignores the greater number of 
domestic terrorism acts.156  RAND itself concedes to these weaknesses.  In a RAND 
Note dated March 1981, William Warner Fowler stated: “The major problems in the 
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collection of terrorism data are the definition of terrorism itself and the determination 
of the scope and content of the data.”157  Fowler also admits that the RAND database 
might also have the weakness of a “lack of rigor in incident sampling.”158  Neither 
would justify using other available databases to rectify the problem.  The RAND 
database, similar to other terrorism databases, is a chronological database.  Most of 
the other databases are also chronological.  Fowler notes: 
For the most part, data-gathering efforts are centered on the 
development of chronologies of recent terrorist activities.  This means 
that there is an overlap in the information content of the currently 
available data bases (sic).  It has been estimated that there would be 90 
percent agreement among the chronologies containing data on any 
given sample of incidents.159   
 
Another weakness relates to the difficulties in assessing motivation to 
perpetuate violent acts.  Brian Jenkins explained, “The borderline separating political 
motives from highly personal motives and purely criminal motives is not always 
clear.  Where all of the details of an incident were not known, it was included if it had 
the earmarks of an international terrorist incident.”160  Jenkins allows that some 
incidents might not necessarily be terrorist acts.  Conversely, there may be instances 
where acts were not included: 
Terrorist data bases (sic) are more like census data bases (sic) (which 
attempt to collect data on every person) and less like public opinion 
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polls (which generally select a specially defined ‘sample’ of 
individuals that represent a larger universe).  This means that sampling 
methods have not been used and missing incidents have been 
inadvertently omitted.  Detailed data-selection criteria are not usually 
publicly available, so precise estimates of omission rates can not (sic) 
be calculated.161 
 
The RAND database also suffers from limitations in data collection.  As a 
non-governmental database intended to be available to the general public, classified 
information available only to government sources is missing from the database.  
Furthermore, the primary data sources were journalistic news sources.  As such, there 
might be an emphasis on incidents that are “newsworthy.”162 
There are also difficulties with the RAND database inherent in all databases.  
When using secondary data, mistakes made by the data collectors are passed on to the 
researcher.  This weakness was noted by Ballard, “…such analysis extends any faulty 
methodology originally done by the data collection agencies and compounds these 
mistakes.”163 
That is not to say that the RAND and other similar databases should be 
abandoned.   Weimann and Winn minimize the RAND weaknesses: 
No database can ever be fully above question.  It is fair conjecture to 
wonder if the RAND data might overrepresent slightly incidents 
involving U.S. victims and/or interests as a result of the unintentional 
omission of incidents not involving U.S. Nationals or interests.  The 
dataset is exceptionally large.  For this reason, any omissions are apt to 
be proportionally very small in number.  However, nonrandom or 
skewed they might be, any conjectured omissions are therefore 
unlikely to exercise a trifling impact, if any, on overall conclusions.164 
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Certainly there are problems with the RAND and other databases.  However, 
the advantages such tools provide, justify their use, warts and all. 
JUSTIFICATION OF CASES IN THE DATABASE 
 The use of secondary information available in the RAND/St. Andrews and 
RAND/MIPT databases for the purpose of this research is invaluable.  However, it 
must be conceded that these databases were not created for the explicit use in this 
research.  Data was initially gathered for a purpose other than the specific research 
that is being conducted herein.  As such, the weaknesses described above relating to 
definitions of terrorism and the inclusion of incidents within the research database 
may perhaps be exacerbated.  Fowler concedes that an inherent bias enters data when 
being collected due to the “organizational mission for which the data are 
collected…the availability of sources of information and budgetary constraints.”165  
As a result, there are undoubtedly incidents that were included in the original 
databases that do not fit the definition of terrorist acts used in this research.  Further, 
there must also be incidents that were not included in the original databases that 
would have been included in this research had that data been available.  So as to be 
clear, the following explanation of the definitional criteria has been included: 
Terrorism: For the purposes of this database, terrorism is defined by 
the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the 
nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, 
calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are 
designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise 
undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist 
acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a 
state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally 
directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are 
political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that 
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will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists 
often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to 
produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, 
having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target 
audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause 
people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance 
of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage 
dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with 
their demands.  
Terrorist Group: A terrorist group is defined as a collection of 
individuals belonging to an autonomous non-state or sub-national 
revolutionary or anti-governmental movement who are dedicated to 
the use of violence to achieve their objectives. Such an entity is seen as 
having at least some structural and command and control apparatus 
that, no matter how loose or flexible, nonetheless provides an overall 
organizational framework and general strategic direction. This 
definition is meant to include contemporary religion-motivated and 
apocalyptic groups and other movements that seek theological 
justification or divine sanction for their acts of violence. 
International Terrorism: Incidents in which terrorists go abroad to 
strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign 
state, or create an international incident by attacking airline 
passengers, personnel or equipment.  
Domestic Terrorism: Incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a 
purely domestic target.166 
The following is also included with the RAND/St. Andrews/MIPT databases to 
clarify what is and what is not considered to be a terrorist act: 
1) A member of a known terrorist organization (e.g., the Hamas) 
bombs a mall, a bus stop, a grocery store, etc. (i.e. any privately owned 
property not associated with the government). This would be 
considered a terrorist act against private citizens and/or property and 
the weapon involved would be explosives. These types of acts are 
usually intended to cause fear among the population, or to impel them 
to take actions they would not ordinarily take. 
2) A member of the Hamas attaches a bomb to himself and detonates it 
in a mall, a bus stop, a library, etc. (i.e. any public or privately owned 
property not associated with the government). This would also be a 
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terrorist act against private citizens and/or property, but the weapon 
would be classified as a “suicide bombing” in order to delineate the 
fact that the bomber also killed himself.  
3) A member of the Hamas bombs the house, office or property of a 
government official. This would be considered a terrorist act against 
the government, with the intention of causing fear among the 
government and/or the general population.  
4) A bomb is accidentally detonated in the basement of a home. It is 
later learned that the owner of the home was a known member of the 
Hamas, and was planning to use the bomb to destroy a public or 
private place. This would not be considered a terrorist event, because 
the incident never actually occurred. 
5) A member of the Hamas opens fire in a crowd of innocent people 
(in a restaurant, in the street, etc.) This would be considered a terrorist 
act against private citizens and/or property and the weapon would be 
considered an assault rifle. The act would be intended to cause fear 
among the population.  
6) A member of the Hamas shoots a government official, even if there 
is no apparent motive for the killing. This would be considered an act 
of terrorism against the government, it is usually intended to cause fear 
among government officials and the general population.  
7) The Hamas attacks military or police forces in order to make a 
political statement. This would be considered a terrorist act against the 
military or police for it is intended to coerce the 
police/military/government to take actions they would not otherwise 
take.  
8) The Hamas attacks a livestock farm, infecting the animals with a 
biological agent designed to kill them or designed to pass the agent 
onto humans when they are consumed. This would be considered a 
terrorist act for it creates fear among the population and holds the 
possibility of affecting the economy.  
9) The Hamas kills a journalist who has been tracking the 
organization's movements and writing about them in a daily paper, or a 
journal. This would be considered a terrorist act against a journalist or 
against the media for it is intended to send a message to the media 
world in general.  
10) A gunfight between the Hamas and another terrorist organization 
erupts, killing members of the Hamas. This would not be considered a 
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terrorist incident because there is no intent to cause fear among the 
general population nor is it designed to coerce the general population 
and/or government into actions.  
11) The Hamas breaks into a prison, with the intention of freeing some 
of their imprisoned members and inciting riots in the prison. This 
would be considered a terrorist event, especially if it carried a broader 
political message.  
12) Members of the Hamas are found to be distributing drugs, gaining 
illegal proceeds through some other manner. This would not be 
considered a terrorist event because these events merely support the 
terrorist group itself.167 
THE FRAMEWORK: WHY NGOS BECOME THE TARGETS OF TERRORISTS 
 As was introduced in chapter 1, this research assumes that terrorist groups are 
rationally constructing targeting imperatives for both strategic or ideological reasons 
as well as tactical reasons.  Drake creates a targeting funnel with the total available 
targeting options at the top or widest point of the funnel.  A hypothetical group would 
have options ranging from mass attacks on the general public to specific attacks on 
government or symbolic targets.  The targeting options are first refined based on 
ideology.168  The ideology “…sets out the range of people and things which it is 
legitimate for the terrorists to attack.”169  Let us suppose the hypothetical group is a 
French ethnic separatist group operating in Quebec.  Their basic ideology is based on 
creating a Quebec independent from the rest of Canada.  They would refine their 
targeting options based on their ideology.  They might assume that an attack on a 
massed civilian population might be counterproductive to their cause, as French 
Canadians might becomes casualties.  This might alienate the general populace of 
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Quebec and slow the creation of an independent Quebec, thus being 
counterproductive to the group’s cause.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Targeting Constraints170 
A religious fundamentalist group, which considers all who are not members of 
the group to be infidels and hence, fair game, might be more willing to inflict mass 
casualties as it is not concerned with alienating a large, external population.  A good 
example of this type of group is the Aum Shinrikyo, which carried out the Sarin Gas 
attack in the subway system of Tokyo.  The Aum sect’s main goal was the bringing 
about of Armageddon, or the end of the world.  This nihilism and desire to inflict 
mass casualties opened options that might be taboo for other political terrorist groups.  
As a result, the Aum carried out attacks on the general population with weapons of 
mass destruction hoping for indiscriminate and mass casualties. 
The targeting selection is next refined based on the strategy of the group.  In 
other words, what attack would bring about a reaction that would be beneficial to the 
group’s cause?  Drake noted, “A terrorist group’s strategy can be quite crude and 
simple.  However, by determining what the terrorists wish to achieve by their use of 
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violence, it provides a further refinement to the framework for target selection set by 
the group’s ideology.”171  The strategy of a group can be determined based on the 
group’s internal dynamics as well as the role of external opinion in accomplishing 
their goals.172   
After the targeting parameters have been delineated by the group’s strategy, 
the targeting selection would be further restricted based on tactical reasons.  These 
reasons might include the group’s capabilities; the security environment, and the 
protective measures used by potential targets.  The manufacture and deployment of 
Sarin as a means of inflicting mass casualties is, thankfully, beyond the capabilities of 
most terrorist groups.  Indeed, it was beyond the capabilities of the Aum sect, despite 
their own judgment of their capabilities.  Certainly the ability of a group to hijack a 
plane and fly it into a skyscraper became much more difficult after the security 
measures put into place following the attacks of September 11th.  That is not to say 
that a hijacking and suicide collision is impossible, just that the security environment 
changes the relative difficulty of successfully carrying out a given attack.  The 
protective measures taken by potential targets must also be taken into account.  If a 
government building campus is designed to make a truck bomb attack impossible 
(through use of barriers and parking lot placement), a terrorist group which has 
decided to use the truck bomb tactic must find a target that is less hardened.  All of 
these refinements affect the final target selection.  It is also understood that the attack 
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itself will bring a reaction which will then bring about a change in the targeting 
criterion for the next attack.173   
The framework advanced by this research expands on Drake’s targeting 
process due to the fact that it contains ideological, strategic and tactical reasons that 
terrorist groups might target non-governmental organizations.  It is an expansion on 
Drake’s targeting refinement process in that it identifies 5 terrorist targeting 
imperatives relating to non-governmental organizations specifically.  These 
imperatives are first, that terrorist groups perceive a real or imagined association 
between the non-governmental organization and a political entity (whether state or 
non-state); second, that the NGO, or its agents, engage in political activities that bring 
them into conflict with the terrorist group; third, that the non-governmental 
organization either actively or solely by virtue of being what it is represents a threat 
to the social, cultural, or religious environment considered important to the terrorist 
organization; fourth, that NGOs become competitors for resources that the terrorists 
desire; and fifth, that NGOs are relatively soft in terms of ease of attack, and as such, 
desirable targets. 
ASSOCIATION 
The first targeting imperative that might explain why terrorists target non-
governmental organizations is that terrorist organizations may perceive that an NGO 
has an association with a political entity.  It is important to point out that this 
association need not necessarily exist in real life, only that the terrorist group 
perceives that it exists.  A terrorist group may target an American business based on 
the fact that it is American and as such has political ties to the United States.  It may 
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not matter that the business is multinational as long as the terrorists associate the 
business with the United States.  This association may be even more tenuous when 
looking at religious or humanitarian NGOs.  The fact that the NGO may be based in 
the United States creates a relationship to the United States.  American students 
traveling outside the United States have understood this association for years.  
Occasionally, American students will sew a Canadian flag onto a backpack in order to 
avoid ill will that may be associated with Americans.  Hoffman noted this kind of 
terrorist threat: “Clearly, then, a variety of American citizens traveling, living and 
working overseas—but who have no ostensible or official connection with the U.S. 
government—are indeed already firmly in the terrorists’ cross-hairs.”174 
Shaffert captured this targeting imperative when he noted that a terrorist 
victim is, “representative of a target group that is strategically involved in the 
terrorist’s political goals.”175  Shaffert cited the 1985 murder of a U.S, Serviceman on 
TWA’s flight 847.  He noted that the target was not necessarily the serviceman, but 
“the American public who observed the atrocity through the international media.”176  
As long as an association can be established linking the immediate target with the 
larger audience, then the targeting selection is justified in the mind of the terrorists.  
Indeed, perhaps the more “innocent” the better as an innocent victim might garner 
more of the attention of the larger target audience. 
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  In order to demonstrate this associational parameter, cases contained in the 
database will be introduced.  Specifically, terrorist attacks on the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Latin America will be studied.  Latin America during 
the 1980’s was rife with terrorism and political violence.  During that time and in that 
area, there were 211 attacks against NGOs or religious organizations recorded in the 
database.  By far the majority of the attacks (66.8% or 143) targeted the people or 
property of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.  The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints is an international church based in Salt Lake City, Utah in 
the United States.  The church is expressly apolitical, going to great lengths to 
proclaim itself politically neutral.  Indeed, instruction to general authorities of the 
church as well as local leadership expressly emphasizes that political activities for or 
against any given issue by church officers in their official church capacity will not be 
tolerated, nor will the church take a political stand on political issues except in cases 
of moral questions such as the abortion issue or legalization of gambling.  If this is 
the case, then the question must be asked as to why the majority of the terrorist 
attacks in Latin America targeted the LDS Church.  This research theorizes that the 
LDS Church was targeted due to the perceived association by terrorists groups 
between the church and the United States rather than for political activities engaged 
in by the church or its officers.   
The database helps to explain some of the attacks on the LDS Church.  
Twenty-six percent of the attacks on the LDS Church were accompanied by either 
literature in the form of pamphlets or slogans painted on buildings proclaiming the 
attack as an attack not necessarily on the church but one on the United States.  
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Interviews of church officials who were present after some of the attacks confirm that 
in most of the cases, anti-US literature or slogans were left at the sites.   
Examples of this type of attack include 1983 attacks executed by the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) of Columbia.  In those attacks, the ELN conducted dynamite 
attacks on entities associated with the United States in Bacaramanga.  The entities 
were the Columbo-American Cultural Institute, the International Bank of Columbia 
(an affiliate of Citibank), and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.177  A 
series of incendiary attacks in 1985 in Chile had pamphlets left at the scene 
proclaiming, “Yankees get out of Easter Island”.178  A slogan painted on a wall after a 
1987 molotov cocktail attack in Santiago, Chile stated, “Out of the common people’s 
territories Yankee invaders.”179  A 1989 attack conducted by the Tupac Amaru group 
warned “Mormons and DEA agents” to leave the upper Huallaga Valley.180  The 
terrorist groups associated the LDS Church with the United States and launched 
attacks on that basis alone. 
Indeed, attacks seem to increase based on United States foreign policy.  If the 
attacks on the LDS Church in Latin America are studied, it can be seen that attacks 
increased after significant US foreign policy action.  This is described by Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Terrorist Attacks on the LDS Church in Latin America 
Terrorist attacks on the LDS Church prior to 1983 are relatively rare.  However, after 
1983, attacks on the LDS Church significantly increase.  It can be theorized that the 
US invasion of Grenada as well as US activities with the Contras in Nicaragua were 
behind the increased attacks which occurred in 1984-89.  Similarly, attacks on the 
LDS Church increased significantly after the US invasion of Panama.  The graphical 
illustration also shows that the attacks diminish three to four years after the foreign 
policy action. 
Statistical analysis of the database tends to confirm that the terrorists 
increased attacks on the LDS Church after the Panama invasion.  Prior to the Panama 
invasion, attacks on the LDS Church made up 54.8 percent of all terrorist attacks in 
Latin America.  After the Panama invasion, attacks on the LDS Church made up 74.4 
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percent of all terrorist attacks in Latin America.  The LDS Church engaged in no 
significant changes in policy or doctrine during that period of time.  It can be 
theorized that the increase was due to some other reason. 
To help derive causation for the increased attacks, the evidence of the attacks 
themselves must be studied.  In the two years following the US invasion of Panama in 
1989, 26.5 percent of the LDS Church attack sites in Latin America had evidence left 
by the attackers which contained references to the recent US invasion.181  In these 
cases, the terrorists gave voice to why the attacks were occurring.  In their own 
words, the attacks were meant as a means of conveying a message to the US 
government, “US out of Panama.”182   
Examples of this type of attack include the 1989 assassination of two LDS 
missionaries.  In that attack, the Zarate Wilka Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), 
sent a letter to the local newspaper denouncing, “Yankee invaders and their lackeys.”  
The attack coincided with the arrival of U.S. military personnel in Potosi who would 
be constructing a new airport. 183  Six attacks on LDS buildings following the U.S. 
invasion of Panama claimed the attacks were in retaliation for the invasion.184  
Similar attacks were conducted against LDS buildings following the attendance of 
President Bush at the Cartagena Drug Summit in 1990, the first Gulf War, the 
invasion of Haiti, and the deployment of U.S. Army Engineers to Columbia in 
1994.185  
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Certainly, recent events in Iraq seem to bolster the theory that at times, 
terrorists select targets simply based on the nationality of the victim and that the 
victim’s actual connection to the government of his or her home nation irrelevant.  If, 
in fact Jenkins supposition is correct, that terrorists are conducting activities for a 
larger audience in an attempt to use the media attention garnered by the act to 
influence the larger population, then the more “innocent” the victim(s), the better.186  
The graphic representations of an “innocent” journalist or truck driver being 
beheaded to the cries of “God is great,” make much more of an impact on a watching 
audience than the execution of a captured soldier or government official. 
This associational danger seems to be acknowledged by the U.S. government.  
After the September 11th attacks, embassy officials told one U.S. expatriate “to refrain 
from doing anything that would label him American.”187  Missionaries are having to 
be careful to avoid ‘looking American.’  This is especially true since September 11th 
and the call to attack Americans wherever they are located. 
An association need not be solely be with a government entity.  Indeed, if an 
NGO is associated with a non-state entity such as the United Nations, any 
assumptions made about the general organization may be transferred to the NGO 
associated with that organization.  Eighty four percent of all attacks on NGOs 
associated with the United Nations or the Red Cross occurred in the time period 
following the US and coalition invasion of Iraq in the First Gulf War.  Before that 
time, attacks on NGOs associated with the UN or Red Cross made up 3.8 percent of 
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all terrorist attacks.  After the Gulf War, attacks on UN or Red Cross NGOs made up 
17.9 percent of all terrorist attacks.  Certainly, by their own propaganda, many 
fundamentalist terrorist groups have begun to associate the Red Cross and the United 
Nations Security Council with Western domination.   
Some NGOs rely on the real association that exists with government entities.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, many NGOs rely on government funding in order to 
accomplish their goals.  Clearly, as Edwards and Hume documented, many NGOs are 
beholden to governments for their existence.  The question must then be raised, “can 
an NGO really be non-governmental if a government is a stakeholder in the NGO?”  
As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, beyond association due to the need for 
resources, some NGOs rely on governments for security as well.  Additionally, 
governments provide NGOs with legitimacy and ideological capital with which to 
carry out missions.  In these cases, an NGO may reap positive benefits from a 
government association, but the negative aspects cannot be ignored. 
As stated at the beginning of this research, it would not be the purpose of the 
database to construct statistical tests with which to measure the ability of the 
framework to predict the targeting priorities of terrorist groups.  However, 15.38 
percent or 68 incidents had explicit statements by the terrorist groups that the attacks 
were committed on targets associated with a political entity.  Additionally, incidents 
where details allow the inference of the targeting strategies allow the researcher to 
determine that an additional 196 attacks or 59.7 percent of terrorist attacks have an 
associational component.  
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It can be seen that NGOs have been targeted based on perceived associations 
with states, supra-state organizations and sub-state entities.  There is other important 
information that can be gleaned from the data.  Of the 211 separate terrorist incidents 
against the LDS Church in Latin America, only 2 or less than one percent of the 
attacks involved attacks where church members or officers were killed.  This is 
astounding when compared to the total rate of fatal terrorist attacks of 23.5 percent.  
Clearly this deserves further attention. 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
 It must be noted that terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon.  As 
such, political motives must help guide a terrorist group in selecting targets.  Hence, 
the second way that NGOs might be brought into the crosshairs of terrorist groups 
relates to activities that an NGO might be engaged in that are in conflict politically 
with the terrorist group.  The difficulty arises in actually defining what political 
activity is.  Some definitions focus on the mechanisms of government—the apparatus 
of state.  As such, terrorists might target NGOs in order to gain control of the 
mechanisms of government. 
While many NGOs are apolitical in the way they organize and carry out their 
various missions, many are not.  A group engaged in political struggle might be 
moved into the “legitimate” target category.  It is important to note that political 
activity might bring about terrorist attacks by both traditional non-state terrorists as 
well as state sponsored terrorism.   
 The general political activity category can be divided into two general sub-
types.  The first is traditional political activity, which might be considered work for or 
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against governments or programs by an NGO.  The second type is much more 
nebulous.  This political activity is any activity, which may not be political in nature, 
but one that subverts the terrorists program for control.  Put another way, the first 
type is traditional political activity that goes against the terrorist group’s ideological 
or strategic plans.  The second type is any activity that goes against the terrorist 
group’s strategic or tactical plans.  The first type is at the top of the funnel; the second 
is farther down. 
 Overt political activities will be considered first.  NGOs may engage in the 
traditional political process.  This may put them at political odds with terrorists.  For 
example, an NGO, which chooses to promote a free market, democratic form of 
government, may find itself afoul of a Marxist terrorist group.  Once again, the 
database is illustrative for this concept.  7.6 percent or 34 terrorist incidents out of all 
terrorist attacks were on targets engaged in overt political activities.188  Certainly the 
definition of overt political activity is open to interpretation.  This study defines overt 
political activity as an NGO working for or against one political entity that is engaged 
in political struggle.  For example, an NGO working in a country engaged in civil 
war, which chooses to support, either by material or endorsement, one of the 
combatant sides would be considered to be engaged in overt political activity.  This 
type of situation was cited by Randolph Martin when describing the threats to NGOs.  
Adding to the threat level is “the erosion of the accepted neutrality of aid groups, who 
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are seen by some belligerents as partisan, interventionist and generally an undesirable 
presence.”189 
Perhaps a good example of this type of activity is another religious 
organization, the Roman Catholic Church.  Compared to the first example, the 
Catholic Church is vastly larger in terms of total membership as well as demographic 
proportion of the population.  This is especially true in Latin America where much of 
the terrorist activity took place until the mid-1990s.  By virtue of its population and 
history in Latin America, the Catholic Church has become part of the Latin culture 
and society.   However, of the total number of terrorist attacks in Latin America, 11.4 
percent were against the agents or property of the Catholic Church.  All told, 78.2 
percent of all terrorist attacks against NGOs in Latin America were against the LDS 
and Catholic Churches.  One of the factors, which sets the Catholic Church apart from 
the LDS Church, is the fact that the Catholic Church and or its agents have been 
willing to engage in political struggle. 
In order to understand the justification that terrorists might use to bring the 
Catholic Church into the crosshairs, it is important to understand the history and 
policies pursued by those of the Catholic Church.  Initially, the Catholic Church was 
seen as a bastion of conservativism, oftentimes providing legitimacy to governments.  
Anciently, the Church was the means by which kings could claim divine right, and 
thus, justify any action; good or bad.  Claiber notes that, “the church legitimated the 
colonial order.”190  He goes on to point out that, “The church was the only colonial 
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corporation that could confer religious legitimacy on persons and institutions, and that 
legitimacy in turn gave those persons a privileged status.”191  In modernity, the 
support of the church provided similar legitimacy.   
Berryman recognizes that political leaders in Latin America were sometime 
seen as “holy men,” granting legitimacy beyond politics.192  A recent news article by 
Kevin G. Hall, a Knight Ridder correspondent, reinforces this concept.  In his story 
dated August 21, 2004 titled “Sites of Che’s Death Now a Tourist Draw,” he 
discusses the transformation of Che Guevara from revolutionary to Saint.   
Revolutionary Ernesto (Che) Guevara, an atheist, has almost been 
reborn a saint in the desolate Bolivian village where he was captured 
and executed nearly 37 years ago…Today his handsome mug appears 
on the walls of homes and in market stalls in remote La Higuera, 
where he died, and in Vallegrande, where he was secretly buried.  In 
many homes, his face competes for wall space with Jesus, the Virgin 
Mary and a host of Catholic saints. ‘They say he brings miracles,’ said 
Susana Osinaga, 70, who was a young nurse on Oct. 9, 1967, when she 
washed the blood off Guevara's corpse in Vallegrande's small 
hospital…‘It's like he is alive and with us, like a friend. He is kind of 
like a Virgin for us.’ We say, 'Che, help us with our work or with this 
planting,' and it always goes well,’ said Manuel Cortez, a poor La 
Higuera farmer who lived next door to the schoolhouse where Guevara 
was executed.193   
 In recognizing the legitimizing power of the church, terrorist groups seek to 
harness that power for themselves and against those they are fighting.  In 1977, two 
French nuns were kidnapped in Buenos Aires, and communiqués by the Montonero 
guerrillas demanded that the Catholic Church repudiate the military government of 
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Argentina.194  Clearly, the terrorists felt that the support given by the Catholic Church 
to the military government was integral to legitimizing the government in the eyes of 
the general population.  The kidnapping was meant as a means of forcing the church 
to withdrawal support for the government, thus reducing the government’s power.  
 A brief discussion of legitimacy is appropriate.  Weber discusses legitimacy 
and authority in Economy and Society:  An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.  He first 
defines authority as legitimate domination, or domination where the subordinates 
accept the domination of those exercising power.  Weber outlines three types of 
legitimate authority: traditional, charismatic and rational or legal.   
Traditional authority is where authority is vested in traditionally dominant or 
powerful groups or individuals.  These groups gain their legitimacy through the 
consent of the subordinates over time.  The acceptance by the subordinates and the 
exercise of authority by the dominants over time creates the legitimacy.  Often, these 
types of legitimacy are bound together with sacred or religious entities, tribal or clan 
structure, or established culture.  In addition, the legitimate authority is exercised by 
patriarchs, clan leaders or priests.  As Weber noted, the authority “rests upon a belief 
in the sanctity of everyday routines.”195   
The second form of legitimate authority is charismatic authority.  Charismatic 
authority is where the authority of those exercising power is derived from 
extraordinary gifts, talents, sanctity or nature of a specific person.  Weber stated: 
The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving 
his strength in life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform 
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miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic deeds. 
Above all, however, his divine mission must 'prove' itself in that those 
who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do not fare well, 
he is obviously not the master sent by the gods.  
The subjects may extend a more active or passive 'recognition; to the 
personal mission of the charismatic master. His power rests upon this 
purely factual recognition and springs from faithful devotion. It is 
devotion to the extraordinary and unheard-of, to what is strange to all 
rule and tradition and which therefore is viewed as divine.196 
The third form of legitimate authority is rational or legal authority.  In rational 
or legal authority, those accepting the authority believe in the rationality of following 
and obeying a structure of laws or rules.  As Weber stated, this type of authority was 
derived from “rational grounds – resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules 
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issues commands.”197  
In all of these cases, legitimacy lies with those being governed or those that are being 
dominated.  Thus, if those being governed refuse to accept the authority of those 
governing, there is no legitimacy. 
In the case of Latin America, the Catholic Church exercised traditional 
authority.  Over time, they had exercised power, and therefore were looked to as a 
legitimizing influence.  For example, the Catholic Church played a legitimizing role 
with rightist governments.  Tan notes that the Catholic Church was willing to support 
rightist governments in order to protect its preeminent religious position within the 
state.198  Indeed, he cites the willingness of the Catholic Church to condone the 
actions of the Marcos government in the Philippines to protect its tax-exempt status.  
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There also seemed to be an ideological conflict between the Catholic Church and 
leftist governments.  Marxist governments stressed the concepts of solidarity and 
class struggle over religion.  Indeed, Marx’s labeling of religion as the “opiate of the 
masses” was seen as a direct attack on the power of the church.199  As a result, many 
leftist groups and governments found themselves at opposition to the church. 
Finally, the Catholic Church provided means by which the powerful, 
conservative, upper classes could remain in power over those in the lower classes.  
This is the argument proposed by Phillip Berryman.  He states, “The war in Central 
America is a religious and theological war, a struggle between gods situated on both 
sides of the conflict.”200  It is between the “powerful (who) seek to prevent God's 
realm from arriving...(and) the poor (who) have discovered that ‘the God of Western 
Christian Society was not the God of Jesus, but rather an idol of the Empire.’”201  
That is not to say that the church remained the central legitimizing influence.  
Indeed, as the concepts of democracy and human rights began to flourish and the 
church did not respond, it began to lose this divine legitimizing authority.202  Indeed, 
“the church came seriously close to finding itself marginalized in the wake of these 
great changes, which were sweeping over Latin America.”203   
In order to bring the church back to the center of its people’s lives and avoid 
marginalization, the church changed.  “It ceased to be a bulwark of the established 
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order and turned into a force for social change.”204  This change did not occur 
quickly.  However, by 1968, and through such conventions at the Second Vatican 
Council and the Episcopal Conference in Medellin, the Catholic Church had 
transformed itself into an organization which championed democracy, social and 
human rights.205  Indeed, this change has come to be known as “liberation theology.”  
In a Doctrinal Note released by the Vatican, the Catholic Church explains the 
implications of Vatican II and Medellin: 
Democracy must be based on the true and solid foundation of non-
negotiable ethical principles, which are the underpinning of life in 
society. As the Second Vatican Council teaches, the protection of ‘the 
rights of the person is, indeed, a necessary condition for citizens, 
individually and collectively, to play an active part in public life and 
administration’. In addition, there is the right to . . . the development of 
an economy that is at the service of the human person and of the 
common good, with respect for social justice, the principles of human 
solidarity and subsidiarity, according to which ‘the rights of all 
individuals, families, and organizations and their practical 
implementation must be acknowledged.’206   
 
In this way, the Catholic Church moved from conservative to liberal, which was to 
have a profound affect on its status as a terrorist target.  The Catholic Church changed 
the traditional stance where it had lent its legitimizing power to rightist governments 
and began to legitimize leftist or democratic governments. 
 Under the system that saw the Catholic Church as the conservator of upper 
class power and right-leaning dictatorships, it is not inconceivable that revolutionary 
terrorist groups might have targeted the Catholics as a way of attacking the legitimacy 
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of the regime they were trying to undermine.  Marxist groups might have targeted the 
church for ideological reasons.  But in the end, it was the church after Medellin that 
entered the gun sights of terrorists.  The Catholic Church changed the traditional 
stance where it had lent its legitimizing power to rightist government and began to 
legitimize leftist or democratic governments.  This change on the political spectrum 
was significant in that revolutionary terrorist who had previously looked at the 
Catholic Church as an enemy now saw it as a potential ally.  However, regimes, 
which had seen the church as an ally, now saw a potent tool for building legitimacy 
now eroding it. 
 Attacks on Catholic personnel in general did come about.  However, attacks 
on specific agents who took the counsel of Medellin to heart and who became 
activists for human rights and social change now found themselves in danger.  In 
1998, Bishop Juan Gerardi was, “beaten to death two days after presenting, as 
coordinator of the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office, a report on human rights 
violations and crimes committed during the 36 year domestic conflict that concluded 
in 1996.”207 
In some cases, the political activity is the actual advocacy of one side or 
another in a political struggle.  In 1997, A Canadian priest was killed while officiating 
in a Mass, apparently in retaliation for helping Tutsis escape the massacres in 1994.208  
Father Timothy Majic was sent a letter bomb after contributing to a Croatian 
language newspaper, which advocated a free Croatia in 1979.  In 1987, Father Guido 
Peeters, a parish priest of the worker’s district of La Legua, one of the poorer slums in 
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Santiago, was kidnapped, stripped naked, beaten, threatened and photographed.  His 
parish has been the site of frequent demonstrations against Pinochet’s government.  
Father Peeters’ parish was also fired upon in 1985.  Father Stanley Rother was 
executed by people dressed in the uniform of the Guatemalan Army after sending 
letters to the government documenting atrocities conducted by the army on people in 
the village in which he worked.  Father Rother, in an interview with the Los Angeles 
Times, stated that he was on a list of people that would be killed.  The choosing of 
one side in a civil war (or even a genocide), led these priests to be targeted by the 
other side.   
 The political action need not be so clear.  Neither need the choosing of sides 
be involved.  In some cases, the political action could be involvement as an 
intermediary.  In 2000, the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) kidnapped 
soon-to-be ordained Jesuit priest, Alejandro Matos Castro as he was trying to 
negotiate the release of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
captives.209  The Ecuadorian Bishops Conference was letter-bombed in 1998 after 
they took on the task of preparing the census, which, in turn, would determine who 
got subsidies.  In 2002, the parish priest of Nuestra Senora de la Asuncion was killed.  
He had been the President of Florencia’s Peace Board and had “helped with efforts to 
release hostages and to avoid killings by both guerrillas and paramilitary groups.”210  
Also in 2002, the home of Caracas Archbishop Ignacio Velasco, who was advocating 
talks between the Chavez government and the opposition, was bombed.  In these 
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cases, involvement in nonpartisan political endeavors brought agents of the Catholic 
Church into the gun-sights of terrorists.  
 The second type of political targeting is the result of activities which may not 
seem be political in nature.  However, a return to the competing definitions of politics 
may be useful.  Harold Laswell’s definition of politics being “who gets what, where, 
when, and how,” 211 describes activities that are much less traditionally “political” in 
nature.  Indeed, NGOs may be engaged in activities, which may seem expressly non-
political, such as humanitarian aid or human rights promotion.  However, those 
activities may bring an NGO into political conflict nonetheless.  An explication of 
this principle may be helpful.  Certainly much of what a terrorist group is concerned 
with is political power.  Indeed, it is one of the definitional characteristics of a 
terrorist group.  Terrorist groups attempt to change power dynamics through the 
threat of violence.  Any other phenomenon that has the ability to change the power 
dynamics, or even reinforce the old dynamic, can bring itself into conflict with a 
terrorist organization which is trying to do the same in an opposite direction. 
One of the methods that insurrectionist terrorists use to gain political power is 
the subversion of governmental power.  One of the chief means by which 
governments maintain power, especially in difficult times, is through legitimacy.212  
This aspect of political legitimacy goes directly to the heart of terrorist goals.  If the 
terrorist group can convince the general population that the current regime type is not 
able to handle the current situation, or that it is not the, “most appropriate or proper 
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ones for the society,”213 then it has seriously weakened the government.  A terrorist 
group might reduce government power by reducing the legitimacy the citizenry feel 
the government possesses.  If a terrorist group can make the citizenry feel that the 
government cannot maintain order or basic rights, then this can help to reduce the 
legitimacy of the government.  An NGO working to establish peace and prosperity 
thus might work against the aims of a terrorist group bent on de-legitimizing 
government.  Hence, the NGO becomes a target for the terrorist group. 
Political power can also be put in terms of influence.  It can be theorized that 
terrorist groups might target NGOs that threaten the terrorists’ influence with a group 
of people.  It can be seen that NGOs have also been targeted because of a struggle for 
influence over non-state ethnic entities.  The power of an ethnic group or subgroup to 
influence its members cannot be overstated. Thus, when NGOs work with ethnic 
groups, tribes and other sub-state actors, they place themselves at risk due to 
competition for the influence of that group.  For example, in 1999, the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) kidnapped and later killed three Americans who 
had been working for an NGO dedicated to working with the U’wa, a tribal 
community that had resisted outside interference or development.214  Similar attacks 
by FARC have targeted the NGO Maya Foundation as well as other groups working 
with indigenous peoples.  The terrorist group Tupac Amaru has attacked groups in 
Peru working with Amazon tribes as well as indigenous peoples of the Andes.215 
NGOs could put themselves at risk if they become the agent of stability.  
Starvation, famine and terror have been used effectively by dictators in order to keep 
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control of potentially restive populations.  This concept is captured in the historical 
foundations of terrorism.  As mentioned previously, the very word terrorism is 
derived from the French state sponsored program of inducing fear among the 
population in order to control it.216  Stalin’s programs against the peasant populations 
of Russia are another good example of this concept.  Controlling the food supply or 
mechanisms for basic sustenance guarantees the ability to control the population that 
depends on it to survive.  Thus, NGOs dedicated to humanitarian aid and simply 
feeding starving people may find themselves at odds with governments willing to 
engage in terrorism. 
NGOs engaged in non-political efforts such as humanitarian aid or human 
rights promotion, may find themselves targeted by terrorists because they become a 
threat to the strategies or tactics used by the terrorist group.  If the goal of terrorists is 
to promote a chaotic environment, then those that are engaged in stabilization 
operations become targets.  197 terrorist incidents or 44.6 percent of NGOs targeted 
by terrorists were involved in stability operations.    While examples of this type of 
target selection are legion, a few examples may help to understand this targeting 
imperative.  Three nuns and an American lay volunteer were kidnapped, raped and 
shot to death in 1980 in El Salvador.  They had been working to help feed the poor in 
the countryside.  The brutal rapes and executions could not but send a message to any 
considering helping the poor in the area to cease and desist.217  In 1991, Sendero 
Luminoso guerrillas killed an Italian priest who had been running social programs in 
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Northern Peru.218   The sole “crime” of this Catholic Priest was providing poor 
Peruvians with access to job training, clean water and limited access to healthcare.  
Perhaps the best illustrations of this targeting imperative in action are those 
attacks that only disrupt the humanitarian activities of NGOs rather than attacking the 
personnel or property of the NGO specifically.  These attacks are especially 
illustrative in that the attacks were directed at the relief supplies themselves rather 
than at the workers or their organization.  In 1993, the United Revolutionary Front 
attacked a Red Cross convoy and burned the trucks carrying aid.219  Similar attacks in 
Iraq in December of 1992 destroyed 8 U.N. aid trucks, and implanted bombs were 
discovered planted in several more.220  Again, attacks in Ethiopia in 1985 specifically 
targeted the trucks carrying food supplies, and in one attack, 24 trucks carrying 
almost 450 tons of food were burned.221   
This tactic is often successful.  Attacks on aid agencies or humanitarian 
groups have led to well known and well respected groups such as the Red Cross, 
various U.N. humanitarian agencies, and Action Aid to completely suspend 
operations and withdraw personnel from the regions or countries in question.  In fact, 
this type of withdrawal due to terrorist attacks occurred 7 times in the 10-year period 
from 1985 to 1995.  In one case in 1996, attacks against UNICEF in Afghanistan 
caused a halt to a vaccination campaign.222   
Clearly, there was some strategic or tactical reason the terrorists targeted the 
food supply as well as other humanitarian projects.  In these cases, it is hypothesized 
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the terrorists were trying to capitalize on the chaos caused by the lack of basic 
necessities.  It can be theorized that the terrorists hoped that this chaos would evolve 
into either decreased legitimacy for those in power or an increase in power for those 
who would be able to control the access to food and basic humanitarian needs.  
Finally, terrorists may find some actions carried out by NGOs politically 
unacceptable.  Once again, the fictitious Marxist group could find entrepreneurial 
infrastructure building activities politically objectionable, and as such may target 
NGOs engaged in such activities.  This type of targeting can be illustrated by the 
1988 incident in Peru, where the Sendero Luminoso took control of an isolated 
village in the Andes.  The Sendero Luminoso then arrested “lackeys of imperialism 
and enemies of the revolution” which included a young French man and woman who 
where working in the village with the Committee for the Development of Agriculture.  
The young French workers were then executed along with three other villagers by 
having their throats cut.223  Another attack occurred in 1991 where the Sendero 
Luminoso attacked a Canadian-financed alpaca-breeding project’s vehicles and killed 
8 people.224  The Sendero Luminoso, a Marxist group opposed to private enterprise, 
foreign aid and investment, targeted foreign NGOs promoting those things.   
Similar attacks have also been carried out by other terrorist organizations.  In 
one case, a Mexican National attached to the International Labor Organization of the 
U.N. was kidnapped, beaten and left to die on a roadway in the Guatemalan 
countryside.  This young lady had been previously threatened due to her work with a 
group that marketed local crafts.  Another Maoist group attacked the Asian 
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Development Bank in Kerala, India in 1992, destroying computers and files.225  In 
these cases, NGOs were attacked for activities which were politically contrary to 
those of the terrorist group.  However, in a 1978 attack in which Zimbabwe African 
Nationalist Union (ZANU) Guerillas shot and killed a German Jesuit Priest for not 
providing a higher education to locals, almost a case of damned if you do, damned if 
you do not.226 
STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES 
 Returning to the definition of politics, some activities may bring an NGO into 
the targeting crosshairs based on a third definition of politics: conflict over scarce 
resources.  While this is related to the other definitions of politics, and as such, 
aspects of terrorist targeting strategies, there are some subtle but important 
differences.  This targeting imperative draws more on the work of Cooley and Ron, 
which describes the conflict that has emerged among NGOs as they strive for 
resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace.227  Cooley and Ron argue that due to 
the constraints forced on NGOs by a scarce resource marketplace, NGOs may act in 
ways that are in conflict with their stated mission.228 
 Granted, terrorist organizations are not typical non-governmental 
organizations.  However, as discussed in chapter 3, there are certainly characteristics 
of terrorist groups that allow for that characterization.  Drawing on the work of 
Cooley and Ron, it can be theorized then, that terrorist groups must also compete for 
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resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace.  The marketplace for resources for 
terrorist groups must be scarce indeed, as countries combine to limit the resources 
terrorist groups can access.  In the post September 11 world, the major powers have 
combined to target and remove the financing pipelines that terrorists counted on for 
support.  Further, countries that supported terrorism in the past have frozen that 
support due to outside pressure.  It can thus be theorized that as the scarcity increases, 
attacks for resources will also increase.  The very struggle for resources may lead 
terrorist groups into conducting attacks in which they might not typically engage. 
 The targeting imperative that causes terrorists to conduct attacks for the 
purpose of gaining resources may be analogous to Drake’s logistical strategy.  Indeed, 
Drake defines logistical targets as: “Those which are attacked in order to provide or 
safeguard the group’s resources.”229  Resources can be defined in many different 
ways.  In order for a terrorist group to be successful, it requires many things.  Most 
important are money and weapons.  However, like most things, if you have the 
money, you can get anything else you need.   
In chapter one, painstaking steps were taken to differentiate between terrorists 
and organized criminals.  However, conducting a terrorist campaign can be costly.  
Further, money is definitely a scarce resource.  While an attack solely for the purpose 
of garnering money is not a political act, and as such, not terrorism, combining an 
attack in a way that allows a terrorist organization to further one or more of its 
political goals while still obtaining resources is simple multitasking.  The purity of the 
“politicalness” may be in doubt, but it fits the definition on those grounds.  The 
domestic terror event perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh began with criminal activities 
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intended to procure financing and supplies.230  Without the supplies, the actual attack 
meant for the broader stage could never have occurred.  Again, while many 
operations meant to obtain financing for an actual attack are not terrorism, some of 
them may be.  
 If terrorist groups may select targets based on the ability of the attack on that 
target to obtain resources, then it stands to reason that terrorist might target NGOs on 
the basis that the NGO has access to resources that the terrorists want.  Kidnappings 
by the militant Muslim Abu Sayyef Group (ASG) in the Philippines have targeted 
competing religious groups, driving away heretical or infidel influences.  However, 
they have also tapped into the monetary resources that those religions or the adherents 
of the religion can access.  That these types of attacks also have an associative and 
political result is icing on the cake.  To the victim, the differentiation of groups 
between terrorist and criminal is purely academic; the result is the same.  As far as the 
ASG is concerned, the majority of their attacks entailed kidnapping for ransom.  
Indeed, 27 attacks or 6.1 percent of all attacks on NGOs were accompanied by 
demands for ransom.   
 Financing for executing operations is not the only resource needed by terrorist 
groups.  For an organization to be successful, groups need safe havens and access to 
recruits.  Often, NGOs are targeted because they put terrorist’s access to these 
resources at risk.  How NGOs engaged in humanitarian work might incur the wrath of 
terrorist groups has been previously described.  Cragin and Chalk, in their work on 
how social and economic development can reduce support for terrorists describe 
another aspect of terrorist resource scarcity.  Terrorist groups thrive in an 
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environment of chaos, lawlessness and poverty.  Poor, hopeless, starving people 
might feel less inclined to support those in power.  They, in fact, might be inclined to 
support terrorists in their attempts at overthrowing the status quo.  As a result, 
terrorists rely on these types of populations for recruits, safe houses (concealment), 
and other resources.231  Takeyh and Gvosdev document the recent movement away 
from terrorists’ reliance on strong state support towards failed states precisely for 
those reasons.232  If NGOs are working to eliminate this kind of environment, 
terrorists might target the NGO in order to protect its lines of supply. 
 There is evidence that terrorists conduct some operations precisely due to their 
need for recruits.  Alcides Jimenez, a parish priest is Columbia, was killed while 
saying mass.  He had advocated neutrality to his parishioners in the Columbian civil 
war.233  In this case, the advocacy of neutrality, or Jimenez telling his people not to 
support either side, could reduce the likelihood for those parishioners to support the 
terrorists.  Another example is perhaps more illustrative.  In 1977, 3 Jesuit Priests and 
4 Dominican nuns at the Masumi Catholic Mission in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were 
killed when gunmen attacked the mission seeking recruits.  The mission was a 
boarding house for four hundred students.  The terrorists took three hundred of the 
students across the border to Botswana after the attack.234  Thus it can been seen that 
if NGOs put resource supply lines at risk, threatening finances, safe havens, or 
recruitment, those NGOs could find themselves in the crosshairs. 
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SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, OR CULTURAL CONFLICT 
 Another strategy, which helps to explain why terrorists might target NGOs, 
relates to Easton’s definition of politics, “the authoritative allocation of values for a 
society.”235  While Easton’s definition used values to denote goods and services of 
value to a society, this research will expand the use of the term value to include 
personal world-view and structure of belief.  In this case, the terrorist groups desire to 
control the “authoritative allocation of values” for a given population.  In other 
words, the terrorist groups desire to set the agenda for what a population thinks, what 
they should believe, and how they should live.  This type of targeting could be 
described as the cultural/social/religious imperative.   
Cultural/social/religious targeting is especially good at explaining the actions 
of fundamental terrorist groups.  Many of the fundamentalist groups are promoting a 
value system, and they will brook no dissent or argument when it comes to those 
values.  In the case of fundamentalist terrorists, they desire to control the religious 
beliefs of a population, which then becomes associated with the structures of 
government to include interpretations of human rights as well as the judicial structure.  
Particularly in the case of fundamentalists, any incursion by someone bringing a 
culture or viewpoint different than that of the fundamentalists could be considered to 
be a polluting influence.  In the case of communities where standards of dress and 
morality are highly regulated, simply the presence of those living a different standard 
could be considered to be threatening. 
Let us consider the example of the GIA’s attacks on non-Algerian ‘polluters’ 
during their campaign to eject all foreign influences from Algeria.  From their 
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perspective as fundamentalist Muslims, all foreigners, whether they be non-
governmental organizations with personnel from the West, or Western press not only 
represented evil, but were evil.  The Westerners, by the fact of who they were, 
brought non-Muslim influences which were antithetical to the GIA.  As a result, the 
GIA then went on to cleanse the rest of the country of those influences: education, 
music, literature and drama.  Westerners listen to popular artists on their stereos; they 
wear Western clothing that does not cover the body the way clothes should; they 
promote ideas like equal rights for women, and separation of church and state that go 
against the fundamentalist interpretations of the Koran.  Foreign personnel, even 
those working for a cause that is nominally acceptable, were polluting their country.   
Often, traditional authorities within a society decry the corrupting influence of 
outsiders.  This is especially true of Western outsiders due to the spread of the 
dominant world culture.  This research chooses to call this “cultural imperialism.”  
Often, NGOs are the vehicle by which Western culture is transmitted.  This is the 
case both overtly, through organizational goals and covertly, by means of 
unconscious messages sent by the personnel themselves.  The replacement of 
traditional food, music, and clothing by those from outside the country are all part of 
what some societies might term cultural imperialism. 
 In the end, anything that goes against the accepted conception of the world 
could pose a threat to groups attempting to authoritatively control the distribution of 
values in a society.  Thus, NGOs that champion human rights may challenge the 
terrorist’ world-view.  Groups trying to empower women in areas where 
fundamentalists wish to limit women’s rights may incur the terrorists’ ire.  There are 
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specific examples of this type of targeting in attacks which were perpetrated on 
Afghani women in late 2002.  In three cases in two months, terrorists targeted 
Afghani women who were working for international NGOs.  Statements left at one 
site warned all women to abandon working for Western Aid groups.236  Women who 
worked for foreign aid groups had subjected themselves to foreign influence and 
polluted themselves.  In those cases, terrorists were willing to take action to halt this 
kind of cultural pollution. 
 Terrorist groups can target non-governmental organizations, especially 
religious non-governmental organizations, if the terrorist groups feel that the NGO is 
supplanting the religious values that the terrorist groups are espousing.  Certainly one 
aspect of the GIA offensive against the French in Algeria was the “polluting” 
influence that was encroaching on the religious as well as cultural world-view of 
Algerians.  This targeting imperative is illustrated by the attack by the GIA attack on 
four Catholic priests killed in their mission in Tizi-Ouzou.  In claiming credit for the 
attack, the GIA stated the attack was part of their campaign of “annihilation and 
physical liquidation of Christian crusaders.”237  The murder of a Catholic nun and 
priest who had run a library inside Algiers was justified by the GIA as part of their 
effort to rid Algeria of “Jews, Christians, and miscreants from the Muslim land of 
Algeria.”238  In 1994 alone, 74 foreigners were killed.  The GIA justified the killings 
by closing the “main coronary artery’ of the colonizing influence of “non-Muslim 
unbelievers.”239 
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 This phenomenon is not unique to Algeria.  The Sudan Peoples Liberation 
Army (SPLA) has attacked Catholic missionaries and nuns charging them with 
“spreading Christianity.”240  Attacks in 1992 in Afghanistan and 1994 in Somalia also 
targeted Christian NGOs on the basis that they either were infidels and were polluting 
holy land or that the NGOs promoted Christianity.241  As will be documented in 
Chapter 4, Mormon missionaries were persecuted because they were the vehicle by 
which many converts were seduced not only away from a religion, but also away 
from a dominant social and cultural world-view. 
 Formal religion aside, terrorist might target anyone challenging their social or 
cultural views.  Indeed, the GIA targeted anyone that deviated from their version of 
proper thought.  Drake documents the murder of feminists, educators, entertainers and 
writers.242  The GIA was especially concerned with the role education played in 
forming the worldview of students in Algeria.  Again, Drake documents “over eighty 
teachers were killed and 600 schools had been attacked…three universities and nine 
training institutes were burned…three heads of Algerian universities and over fifty 
academics were killed.”243  This phenomenon is also evident in recent events in Iraq.  
Nancy A. Youssef documented recent attacks on hair salons, music stores, in short, 
anything that the fundamentalists considered to be inappropriate under their version 
of correct thought and action.244 
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 Beyond traditional values, the prevalence of Northern NGOs engaged in work 
in the global South has led some to question the motives of the Northern NGOs.  
Skjelsbaek describes this phenomenon when third world countries feel pressures to 
adapt to Northern influence.  Indeed, he labels the phenomenon “neo-colonialism.”245  
Certainly, groups in the global South might feel the need to resort to violence to 
protect their way of life.  The NGO database records 73 attacks or 16.5 percent of all 
attacks on NGOs, which can be attributed to attacks on the culture, religion or society 
that the attacked NGOs represent. 
SOFT TARGETS 
 The final reason why terrorist might target non-governmental organizations is 
the reason that Hoffman noted when discussing this topic: it has to do with the 
relative ease of carrying out an attack and the security environment within which the 
NGOs and terrorists reside.246  Drake theorizes that, “where there is a number of 
potential targets, attacking any of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic 
benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, 
as carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists.”247   
Recent anti-terrorism programs have served to “harden” or increase the 
difficulty of successfully carrying out an attack.  Hoffman describes the recent 
security environment as being a much more difficult place for terrorists to target 
indiscriminately.  He notes that while the primary target of terrorists had been 
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government official and installations, as security increased and protective measures 
were engaged, terrorists began to shift targets.  Hoffman stated: 
The main problem that we face in this critical area of protecting 
American citizens and interests abroad from both current and future 
threats rubs up against one of the fundamental axioms of terrorism: 
hardening one set of targets often displaces the threat onto another 
‘softer’ target.  In other words, security measures may successfully 
thwart planned or actual terrorist operations or even deter terrorists 
from attacking: but they do not eliminate the threat entirely, which 
may mutate into other, perhaps even more deadly forms.  Determined 
terrorists, accordingly, will simply identify another range of 
vulnerabilities and hence potential targets; perhaps in turn adjusting or 
modifying their means and method of attack and executing a 
completely different kind of operation that still achieves their goal 
 
As we harden the range of American diplomatic and military targets 
long favored by terrorists—hardening existing embassies and 
consulates world-wide and building stronger, less vulnerable structures 
in particularly dangerous foreign posts while increasing the force 
protection afforded to our military personnel deployed overseas—we 
doubtless will not eliminate the terrorist threat completely, but risk 
displacing it onto ‘softer,’ more vulnerable and accessible, unofficial, 
non-governmental targets—e.g., ordinary American tourists and 
travelers, business people and otherwise ordinary citizens.248 
 
The shifting of targeting from hardened targets to softer targets may be 
abetted by NGOs themselves.  Given the mission of most NGOs, taking measures to 
reduce the exposure to terrorism may be counter-productive to their goals.  Religious 
non-governmental organizations may feel it necessary to welcome all-comers to 
organizations and facilities.  Humanitarian groups may need to be working away from 
cities with the poor and suffering.   
The end result is that many of these organizations find typically prudent 
security measures hard to adopt.  Martin notes that for many NGOs there is, “a 
conspicuous lack of security among many NGO workers combined with a skeptical, 
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if not averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective measures.”249  
Added to this, is the fact that given the nature of the missions for many of these 
groups, they conduct their work in places that are generally more dangerous and thus, 
present more of an opportunity for attack.  Again, Martin notes that in many of these 
locations, there is, “a general absence of rules of war or rules of conduct among the 
belligerents themselves, many of whom are irregular fighters and may also include 
criminals and bandits interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a particular 
political agenda.”250 
CONCLUSION 
 It has been shown that the permutations of target selection carry factors from 
ideology to tactics.  Drake delineated a selection process by which terrorists start at 
all possible attack permutations and then refine and limit the target through 
ideological, strategic, and tactical inputs.  In the end, target selection is a process with 
many inputs, and the final selection may simply be the easiest target to attack out of 
many possible.   
Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon.  As was stated 
previously, there are no innocents to terrorists.  It seems that there is nothing 
apolitical to a terrorist either.  Due to the many selection inputs, non-governmental 
organizations can enter the target selection environment of terrorists.  They can be 
targeted based on a perceived association with a government or intergovernmental 
entity.  NGOs can be targeted due to political activities in which they are engaged.  It 
must be emphasized that any activity, overtly political or not, can have political 
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ramifications, and as such, can provide the political motivation for a terrorist attack.  
Hence humanitarian aid or infrastructure building has the potential of affecting the 
political environment of a given area.  These too, then, could be considered political 
activities.  Terrorists could target NGOs based on a perceived threat to the social, 
cultural or religious environment considered important to the terrorist group.  
Terrorists could target NGOs based on the fundamental scarcity of resources in the 
environment in which the terrorists operate.  NGO activities that put the resources of 
safe haven and an ample recruit pool at risk could put NGOs in danger of terrorist 
attack.  The scarcity of financing to terrorist groups might also lead terrorists to attack 
NGOs as a means of securing money and resources.  Finally, the apparent “softness” 
of NGOs in terms of ease of attack might lead terrorists to attack non-governmental 
groups. 
Certainly the targeting imperatives are not equal in priority.  Neither are they 
considered independently of each other, for an attack will ideally accomplish more 
than one goal at the same time.  They are also not necessarily considered at the same 
point in the target determination process.  Often they are considered as the refinement 
process ensues.  Again, in the targeting process, refinements are continually being 
made.  As such, one or more of the NGO targeting imperatives might move back or 
forth along the timeline. 
 The framework proposed is heuristic and is derived from the data.  However, 
it has not been tested empirically.  The purpose of this research is to introduce a 
specific topic and present a potential theory as to the phenomenon.  However, for a 
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theory to be credible, it must make sense.  In that vein, by using the database inputs, a 
simple test was performed by which the theory can be judged.   
Based on the limited information in the database, variables were created for 
attacks in the database in which a ransom demand was made.  It is theorized that in 
these cases, the terrorist group is engaged in activities designed to obtain scarce 
resources.  An additional variable was created for attacks in which the terrorist group 
left evidence which indicated they were targeting the NGO based on an association 
with another country or governmental entity.  In this case the evidence was usually 
statements in which the groups themselves explained the attacks were against a 
government entity that they associated the targeted NGO with.  Variables were also 
created for attacks on groups engaged in stabilization operations (humanitarian 
aid/infrastructure building) as well as groups engaged in overtly political activities.  
While there may certainly be coder bias as to what indeed meets the criteria for overt 
political activities or any other of the variables, in most cases coding was relatively 
easy.  If an NGO representative was actively protesting a government policy—that 
case was considered political activity.  Some of the cases could have been interpreted 
many ways.   
This research attempted to be conservative and did not attribute motive that 
did not seem clearly evident.  This is especially true for the associative variable.  
Only cases where the terrorist groups left an indication towards motive were cases 
included.  In some cases, the data entry had more than one variable indicating 
influence.  In those cases, a blended category was created.  The theoretic framework 
lent itself to these variables.  However, the targeting imperative dealing with the 
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relative softness of a target could not be accounted for.  Despite this fact and as 
illustrated by Figure 4.3, the framework accounted for 81 percent of all attacks on 
non-governmental groups.  This seems significant especially given the missing 
variables. 
Attacks Accounted for by Framework
Association
9%
Resources
5%
Stability
29%
Politics
4%
Culture
12%
Blended
22%
Unaccounted for
19%
 
Figure 4.3 Attacks Accounted for by Framework 
If this is the targeting rubric used by terrorist groups when refining their targeting 
selections, then perhaps measures can be taken which would lessen the threat to these 
non-governmental groups. 
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CHAPTER 5: TERRORIST ATTACKS/POLITICAL VIOLENCE ON THE 
LDS CHURCH 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LDS CHURCH 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a hierarchical organization 
with a central leadership based in Salt Lake City, Utah.  The church is headed by a 
first presidency, which is made up of the church president and two counselors.  The 
presidency holds all the authority for the church’s administration.  The First 
Presidency is drawn from a second body called the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, 
which works in concert with the First Presidency.  The president of the church is 
typically the most senior apostle.  When a president dies, the First Presidency is 
dissolved and all power and authority for the church devolves on the Quorum of the 
Twelve Apostles until a new First Presidency can be established.   The calling to be 
an apostle is a lifelong calling and release is only granted for reasons of transgression.   
The First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve are assisted in the 
administration of the church by six groups called the Quorums of the Seventy.  The 
Quorums of the Seventy are headed by the seven presidents of the seventy drawn 
from the First Quorum of the Seventy.  Callings to the first two Quorums of the 
Seventy are made indefinitely until the leader’s seventieth birthday, when the leader 
is made an emeritus member of the quorum.  Callings to the Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Quorums of the Seventy are flexible and the service typically lasts for up to six 
years.   
The First Presidency and the Quorum of the Twelve, as well as the First and 
Second Quorums of the Seventy are referred to as General Authorities of the church, 
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meaning they have authority over all of the areas of the church.  General Authorities 
are unique within the church in that they are the only group of ecclesiastical leaders 
who work full time—and are paid by the church.  When a call is made for a leader to 
take a position as a General Authority, that leader is expected to give up their 
employment and serve wherever they are assigned.  Leaders are called and drawn 
from the general membership of the church.  The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Six 
Quorums of the Seventy are referred to as Area Authority Seventies and only have the 
authority to work in their specific area of the church.  Area Authority Seventies 
donate their service to the church and are typically working full time in jobs unrelated 
to the church to provide for themselves and their families.  The Third Quorum of the 
Seventies is made up of Area Authority Seventies in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the 
Pacific.  The Fourth Quorum of the Seventy is made up of Area Authority Seventies 
in Mexico, Central and South America.  The Fifth and Sixth Quorums are made up of 
Area Authority Seventies in Canada and the United States. 
Administration of the church is subdivided into 30 geographic areas 
administered over by an Area Presidency (a president and two counselors) composed 
of General Authorities and Area Authorities.  Area Presidencies are responsible for 
the administration of all the units within that area and are given direction from the 
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles.  In many cases, Area Presidencies reside in the area 
over which they preside. 
MISSION ORGANIZATION 
Within each area there are two distinct types of administrative entities.  One is 
geographically located and focused on the missionary effort of the church.  These are 
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known as missions.  Missions are headed by Mission Presidents who is called from 
the general membership of the church along with their families to serve in the 
capacity where they have been assigned for a three-year period.  During this period, 
they are expected to give up their employment and donate their time.  In some cases, 
mission presidents are granted a stipend and living facilities.  Mission Presidents are 
given a short training session (typically two weeks) before their term of service 
begins.  While many Mission Presidents speak the language native to the areas over 
which they will preside, many do not.  As a result, many Mission Presidents must rely 
on more accomplished missionaries and local leaders for translation and 
interpretation. 
There are often many missions within one area of the church.  For example, 
the Asia North Area covers all of Korea and Japan.  There are 11 missions in Japan 
alone, not considering the rest of the countries in Asia.  Missions are outside the 
regular line of authority of the church and will typically not influence the 
administration of local units.  The only exception to this pattern is where there is no 
local leadership. In that case and under direction of the area presidency in that area, 
the mission president may call district and branch presidents to preside and administer 
over smaller, local units.  In these cases, districts are typically found in areas of the 
world where the church is less established and there is a lack of local leadership able 
to direct the affairs of the church.  Typically, District and Branch Presidencies are 
made up of local members of the church donating their time and supporting 
themselves and their families through unrelated employment.  In few cases, however, 
where there are no local members experienced to lead the church, a missionary 
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serving in the area may be called as a Branch President.  While there is no set tenure 
for District and Branch Presidencies, the leadership will often rotate after six to eight 
years. 
The missionaries are called up from the general body of the church 
membership.  Young men from the age of 19 to 26 make up the largest part of the 
missionary force.  The young men must be at least 19 years of age and be unmarried.  
Young unmarried women of at least 21 years of age may also serve as missionaries.  
Older retired couples may also elect to serve missions.  Young men serve missions 
for a period of two years; young women for 18 months; and older couples may have a 
more flexible term of service.  All missionaries must meet stringent requirements for 
worthiness, health and conduct.  Prospective missionaries that have committed major 
transgressions are not eligible to serve missions.   
Missionaries donate their time while on missions.  They also pay for their 
room and board from their own funds while a missionary.  Missionary assignments 
are extended from the church headquarters and missionaries do not have the 
opportunity to request where or how they would like to serve.  There are many types 
of missions that a missionary can serve.  They can be called to proselytizing, welfare, 
church service or leadership missions.  Missionaries are expected to donate all of their 
time while missionaries and to adhere to stringent rules of conduct.  They are 
expected to get up early and study scriptures and the language of the land if they are 
non-native speakers.  They then spend the rest of the day serving in the capacity they 
were called. They are expected to give up all social life and entertainment while on 
their missions.  For example, missionaries cannot watch television or listen to popular 
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music.  Also, missionaries are forbidden from carrying out any contact with the 
opposite sex in any personal, social context.   
Missionaries are given a two-week training session (eight weeks if a foreign 
language is involved) before being sent to a given mission.  The session includes 
training in language, culture and anything specific to their call (e.g., church doctrines, 
genealogy, etc).  Any additional study relating to language or church doctrine is to be 
conducted personally after arriving in their assigned area.  Missionaries are assigned a 
companion with whom they spend all of their time—living, eating and working 
together.  Typically the most senior companion is responsible for the work in a given 
area.  Occasionally, a companionship may include a third missionary.  Missionaries 
are allowed a period of time during one day a week to take care of personal duties 
(shopping, laundry, etc.). 
Missions are subdivided into smaller zones and districts for the purposes of 
administration.  Missionaries are drawn from those within a given mission to serve as 
assistants to the president, zone leaders and district leaders.  District leaders typically 
administer over two to four sets of missionaries in a geographic location.  
Missionaries take on the leadership responsibilities in addition to the regular 
missionary duties.  This mission organization is described in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Missionary Table of Organization. 
ECCLESIASTICAL ORGANIZATION 
The second administrative entity within an area is the regular means of 
ecclesiastic organization of the church.  Each area is also subdivided into smaller 
geographic entities called stakes.  Stakes are focused on administering to the local 
units of the church and are presided over by local lay church representatives who are 
drawn from the general membership of that location.  Stake Presidents are selected 
and called by a General Authority of the church, and the Stake President will 
generally select two counselors with approval from the General Authority.  Within 
each stake are several smaller geographical units called wards.  A ward is generally 
established around a city, but depending on number of members in a given area, many 
wards can exist in the same city or a number of cities can be contained in one ward.  
A ward will typically have between 250 to 750 members.   
A ward is presided over by a Bishop and two counselors.  The Stake President 
will generally select and call a Bishop who then selects two counselors.  A Bishop 
and counselors will reside within the geographic confines of that ward.  A Bishop’s 
call must be endorsed by the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles or a visiting General 
Authority.  Typically there will be 9 to 11 ward or branch units within a stake.  Like 
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the Stake Presidency, Bishops donate their time and support themselves and their 
families with unrelated outside employment.  Bishops will generally serve for no 
more than five years and Stake Presidents for no more than ten.  Within a stake, Stake 
Presidents may elect to establish a Branch where there are not sufficient numbers for 
a ward.  Figure 5.2 describes the basic administration organization of the church. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  General Organization of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
In all cases with leadership in the church, there are no schooling or other 
requirements aside from worthiness to serve in any position.  Ability and fitness to 
serve is determined by those making the calls (subject to approval from the Quorum 
of the Twelve).  Leaders of the church are trained by other church leaders as they 
perform in their calling. 
There is a uniformity throughout the units of the church that may be 
considered unusual for a worldwide church.  This can be explained through the 
organization of the church and by official church doctrine and policy.  As seen above, 
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there is a specific line of authority through which the directives of the church can be 
disseminated and established.  This line of authority creates an organization wherein 
every leader has a clear superior through which they gain training as well as approval 
for specific programs.  No organizational unit is self-contained.  While local church 
leaders are given authority to conduct the affairs of the church in their area, doctrines 
and policies are established by the General Authorities of the church and dissent 
and/or teaching of doctrines that are not approved by the church is not tolerated.  
Indeed, those that take it upon themselves to change policies or doctrines of the 
church locally are reprimanded and if the dissent is not stopped, expelled from their 
positions and sometimes expelled from the church entirely.  There is also a rigorous 
auditing and reporting mechanism.  Units of the church regularly report on their 
progress and programs.  The result is a church wherein there is doctrinal and policy 
homogeneity. 
JUSTIFICATION OF CASE 
 As has been established, there are thousands of examples of international non-
governmental organizations.  Many have been subjected to terrorist attack.  However, 
given the scope and resources of this research it was impossible to focus on more than 
a few.  While all of the types of NGOs currently in existence could be examined, it 
would be impractical to do so in this type of endeavor.  Similarly, this research was 
unable to focus on specific regions of the world beyond what was done here.  It is the 
hope of the researcher that this study will spur interest in future research which can 
address these permutations. 
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As discussed above, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a 
hierarchical organization with a central leadership based in Salt Lake City, Utah.  
Administration of the church is also subdivided into smaller areas, stakes/districts, 
and wards/branches.  While the church is based in the United States, more than half 
or 6,083,920 of the total membership of 11,394,518 reside outside of the United 
States.  Every year, roughly 35,000 missionaries are sent out to serve two-year 
missions; so at any given time, there are approximately 65,000 missionaries serving 
worldwide in 142 countries.251  In addition to proselytizing missionaries, there are 
137,629 volunteers in non-proselytizing activities such as health, humanitarian and 
other activities donating the equivalent of 15,174 full-time employee hours 
worldwide.252  As of 2004, the church was conducting operations in 160 nations.253  
The church also has extensive humanitarian projects outside the United States which 
provide monetary as well as in-kind aid, infrastructure projects and general welfare 
projects.254  These humanitarian projects rendered aid in cash and in-kind assistance 
in the amount of 351.8 million dollars during the 15-year period from 1985 to 
2000.255   
It may be helpful to compare the LDS Church with other churches and 
organizations engaged in similar work.  The Seventh-Day Adventist Church has a 
similar total membership of 12,894,005 and carries out an extensive mission program 
which includes both proselytizing and humanitarian aid.  In 2002, The Seventh Day 
Adventist Church had 17,140 licensed missionaries and counted their total mission 
                                                 
251 Deseret News, 2003 Church Almanac. 
252 http://www.lds.org/newsroom/filler/0,15856,3899-1-374-,00.html, October 31, 2003. 
253 http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1--30-2-376,00.html, October 31, 2003. 
254 http://www.lds.org/newsroom/displaytopic/0,15343,3898-1-612-42,00.html, October 31, 2003. 
255 http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1--19-2-408,00.html, October 31, 2003. 
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pioneers as close to 30,000 in 229 countries worldwide.256  Their humanitarian 
efforts, including relief and development projects, amount to a total of 
$110,059,120.00.257 
The Baptist International Mission Board, which, similar to the LDS Church, 
cites an overseas membership of 7.04 million, has 25,099 volunteers engaged in 
mission work as well as 5,380 field personnel under appointment.258  Certainly, when 
compared to other religious organizations, the LDS Church is among the largest in 
terms of a religious organization engaged in international missions/welfare work.   
When compared to some of the major humanitarian relief organizations, the 
LDS Church is much smaller in terms of relief work.  In truth, no church compares to 
the major relief NGOs aside from perhaps the Catholic Relief Charities organization.  
In 2002, the International Red Cross had a yearly operating budget of $212.9 million 
dollars.259  In 2003, World Vision, a Christian charitable aid organization, contributes 
$1,014.7 million dollars in cash and in-kind donations towards humanitarian 
programs.260  Doctors Without Borders International donated $341.8 million dollars 
in 2002.261  New York based International Relief Committee donated $136.3 million 
dollars in goods and services in 2003.262  Clearly, these humanitarian aid 
                                                 
256 http://www.adventistarchives.org/docs/ASR/ASR2002.pdf, March 25, 2004, also 
http://www.global-mission.org/htdocs/html/10yrs.html, July 23, 2004.  
257 http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/index.html.en, July 23, 2004.  
258 http://www.imb.org/core/fastfacts.asp, March 25, 2004. 
259 http://www.ifrc.org/where/appeals/index.asp, March 25, 2004. 
260 2003 World Vision Annual Report, http://www.wvi.org/wvi/about_us/annual_reports.htm, July 28, 
2004. 
261 Doctors Without Borders Annual Report 2002, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/i2003/factsandfigures.pdf, August 12, 2004. 
262 International Relief Committee 2003-04 Annual Report, 
http://intranet.theirc.org/docs/IRC2003AR.pdf, August 12, 2004. 
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organizations aid dwarfs the yearly budget of $23.5 million dollars that the LDS 
Church spent on humanitarian aid in 2003.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of all terrorist attacks on 
NGOs or religious organizations in Latin America were on the LDS Church.  This 
fact alone makes the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints an appropriate case.  
It is hoped that by focusing on the specific threat of terrorism and political violence 
on non-government organizations and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints specifically, the targeting priorities of groups who attack non-governmental 
organizations can be determined.  That threat risk, along with the concrete actions 
that are apparent in the case study, should allow for a determination of how the 
general threat of political violence and terrorism to non-governmental organizations 
can be reduced. 
REVIEW OF METHODS OF CASE ANALYSIS 
Face to face interviews with central church leadership was attempted to 
determine the church’s official policy and threat assessment of political violence and 
threats of terrorism.  As this portion of the study deals with the official church 
position, only one interview with a central church official was needed.  While 
cooperative, the church declined to discuss official policy relating to security matters.  
Relevant information was therefore obtained from official church informational 
sources which included official public correspondence, official websites, and official 
publications.   
Questionnaires containing similar questions were sent via mail to church 
administrators at the Area level as well as the Stake/District and Ward/Branch levels 
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(questionnaires attached).  Questionnaires were be sent by mail to Area Presidencies, 
Stake/District Presidents and Bishops/Branch Presidents in areas deemed to be at-risk 
for political violence or terrorist attack.  At-risk is defined as an area which has 
sustained an act of political violence or terrorism in the past.   All of the 
questionnaires were one page, and should have taken less than 30 minutes to fill out.   
Finally, former missionaries of the church who have served in areas of the 
world where there was heightened risk of political violence or acts of terrorism were 
interviewed.  These interviews were face-to-face and last about 30 minutes.  The 
interviews consisted of 16 specific questions which were designed to elicit open-
ended responses.  Former missionaries were recruited through a review of former 
missionary websites that are maintained voluntarily by the former missionaries 
themselves.  A posting was made on the message boards of the websites requesting 
interviewees.  Preference was given to those in locations which would facilitate 
interviewing (proximity to interviewer).  The recruitment posting is enclosed in 
Appendix I.  These sites are in the public domain and participation was voluntary.  
The identities were kept confidential in order to ensure that no deleterious affects 
would accrue to the research subjects.     
In all cases, whether in face to face interviews or by questionnaire, advised 
consent was obtained.  As this topic deals with the security matters and the safety of 
church members or agents, the interviews were not recorded.  Further, in order to 
assure the church of the confidentiality of any such security members, special 
permission was obtained from the dissertation committee that all such security related 
matters be discussed exclusively with the researcher and his chair.  Further, any such 
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matters were also withheld from the printed dissertation.  These security measures 
were disclosed in the initial cover letters to all participants.  Given the timing of this 
study, most of the former missionary respondents were missionaries who served their 
missions in the time period leading up to the September 11 attacks. 
The method used for data gathering in this section is clearly a non-
experimental design. The author understands that an experimental design would be 
the most desirable for establishing causality and generalizability of the findings of 
this research.  However, constraints forced by the subject of the research limit the 
choices of design.  Further, the purpose of this research was to introduce theory, and 
will leave the testing of those theories to later research.   
Collecting primary data from terrorist groups might be a formula in futility as 
well as potentially dangerous.  Difficulties also arise in gaining data from non-
governmental organizations.  As this research deals specifically with the security of 
these groups; and the breach of that security might very well put the organization or 
its agents in danger, non-governmental organizations are understandably hesitant to 
discuss security measures “out of shop”.  Nevertheless, measures have been taken to 
accomplish the research in a manner that provides reliable data leading to 
generalizable findings while being sensitive to its subjects. 
These types of non-experimental designs have many inherent weaknesses. In 
order to ameliorate the design difficulties and strengthen the design by using multiple 
data sources with multiple data types, data was collected from multiple sources within 
the case group.  Specifically, data was collected from not only the official church 
organization, but also from agents of the church at all of the various levels of 
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organization.  This allowed the researcher to determine if the policies of the church 
relating to security threats of terrorism and political violence are executed in a like 
manner throughout the organization.  It also allowed for the researcher to supplement 
the collected data with perceptual or subjective data that will help, it is hoped, 
ameliorate any weaknesses of the design.  This kind of subjective/normative input 
addition will further help to establish the validity of this study.   
INTERVIEW/QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
GENERAL CHURCH RESPONSE/AREA RESPONSE 
While generally cooperative, General Authorities of the church were not 
willing to discuss anything relating to security matters.  This was both the case at 
church headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah as well as area leaderships.  Similarly, 
few local leaders responded.  The church’s general policy is that all inquiries about 
the church be directed to church headquarters.  However, much of church policy is 
publicly available.  Between all sources, an adequate picture of church security 
measures was obtained. 
The LDS Church is highly sensitive to the physical wellbeing of its 
missionaries as well as its general membership.  Certainly serving in some areas of 
the church may bring an increased risk of terrorism and political violence.  The 
church is determined never to have a missionary actually have to weigh whether their 
life or the work they are engaged in is more important.  There are plenty of places in 
the church that missionaries can serve safely.  If it is felt that the danger level is too 
high, missionaries will be removed.  If the church learns of a potentially dangerous 
situation, actions are taken to ensure the security of its people and property.  
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Missionaries, specifically missionaries from North America, have been reassigned to 
different missions when their safety could not be ensured.  In one case, all North 
American missionaries were removed from Columbia due to the threat of terrorist 
attack.  Indeed, one General Authority noted that at one point, he was the only North 
American church official in all of Columbia.  Similar actions were taken in Peru for a 
time due to actions of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).  The mission was then 
staffed with Latin missionaries from other Latin American countries.  One respondent 
was actually called to Columbia for his mission work, but then due to violence his 
orders were changed to Mexico. 
The church has also suspended academic and cultural exchanges based on 
heightened risk of terrorism and violence.  Typically, the Mormon Tabernacle Choir 
as well as Brigham Young University’s many performing groups travel outside the 
United States. There have been occasions where tours have been rerouted and 
sometimes cancelled based on the world security situation and specific treats in some 
countries.  As further example of this policy, the study abroad exchange program at 
the church’s Jerusalem Center has been suspended pending a reestablishment of 
stability in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. 
While church officials admit that there may be an association between the 
church and the United States, they are quick to note that while there are many 
members of the church in North America, the majority of the church’s membership 
resides outside of the United States.  They also note that as soon as is possible, local 
members constitute the leadership of the church in their areas.  Local members are 
encouraged to work and serve their local populations.  As a result, members of the 
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church in established areas quickly become known for their local members rather than 
visiting authorities or North American missionaries.  The LDS Church has General 
Authorities from all around the world.  While it is true that the majority are from 
North America, as the church grows outside the United States, so too will church 
leadership.  The Third and Fourth Quorums of the Seventy are made up of Area 
Authority Seventies from outside of North America.  The church leadership feels 
confident that the church will be associated with its members rather than any one 
country. 
The LDS Church also believes in advance planning.  Each unit of the church, 
including missions, is encouraged to develop an emergency plan.  Those plans are to 
include preparation for any contingency.  They include communication procedures as 
well as means for feeding and caring for populations in an emergency.  The 
responsibility for developing emergency plans lie with each individual unit, thus they 
are able to gauge the most likely scenarios and plan accordingly. 
Certainly the most visible and vulnerable church members are foreign 
missionaries, most notably missionaries from North America.  Great care is taken for 
the welfare and safety of all missionaries.  As noted previously, missionaries are 
always to be in companionships (two or more missionaries at all times).  Obviously, 
danger can strike a companionship as well as individuals, but there is usually safety in 
numbers.  Missionaries are also given specific rules of conduct that help ensure their 
safety.  In all cases, missionaries have a curfew and depending on the area, there are 
places that are off limits.  Again, attacks can happen in broad daylight on a crowded 
street, but as one official put it, “nothing good is going to happen after curfew”.  
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Mission Presidents are encouraged to advise missionaries to avoid public places if 
they feel that there is an increased risk of danger.  
The church is also concerned with the safety and wellbeing of the general 
membership of the church.  Specifically, the church is concerned for the safety of 
converts to the church.  Minors are not allowed to join the church without parental 
permission.  In those areas of the church where conversion may bring about 
hazardous consequences to converts, such as some Islamic areas as well as situations 
of potential abuse (from spouse or family), their teaching and baptisms require special 
permission from Mission Presidents, Area Presidents and sometimes the Quorum of 
the Twelve Apostles. 
There are some places where the church voluntarily limits the scope of its 
operations.  The church has a large educational facility associated with Brigham 
Young University in Jerusalem.  In the case of Israel, the church has agreed with the 
Israeli governments not to proselytize in Israel.  The LDS Church has a policy of 
good citizenship.  Indeed, one of the church’s 13 Articles of Faith written by the 
church’s founder, Joseph Smith stated, “We believe in being subjects to kings, 
presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining the law.”263  
This precept for the membership of the church also applies to the organization itself.  
The LDS Church will not conduct any operations within a country without the official 
permission of its government.  In this way, the church keeps good relations with most 
governments while also limiting repercussions on it and its agents from harassing 
government entities.    
                                                 
263 Joseph Smith, “Articles of Faith of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints”, History of the 
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The church will also not conduct any operations until it feels that the safety of 
its members can be ensured.  For example, the only church presence in Iraq currently 
is the meeting of LDS servicemen currently stationed in Iraq by the militaries of their 
respective countries.  It will not sanction official church work in places that the safety 
of its representatives cannot be ensured.  In the case of humanitarian aid, the church 
uses its own local organization to distribute aid.  Where there is no local organization, 
the church often engages other non-governmental agencies such as the Catholic 
Relief Charities organization or the Red Cross to distribute humanitarian aid and 
supplies. 
While the church is not affiliated with any one government or country, if the 
occasion arises, they are certainly willing to take advantage of any benefits of 
citizenship that any of its members might be entitled to.  This includes help from 
embassies for any of its citizens, as well as input from influential members of 
government that might be inclined to help the church.  There are members of the 
House of Representatives as well as the Senate that are members of the church that 
have interceded on the church’s behalf in cases of kidnapping and ransom.  Influential 
businessmen and women have also been willing to work on the church’s behalf.   
Church officials declined to discuss specifics related to hostage taking and 
ransom policies.  Similarly, they also declined to discuss specifics related to building 
construction and layout.  They declined based on the fact that they relate to security 
issues, specifically, the hardening of buildings and creation of safe zones within 
church buildings in hazardous areas.  Interviews with construction workers employed 
by the church do indicate unusual building practices in all church construction, 
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whether it is for temples, church meetinghouses or other church buildings.  They 
indicated that the church has stringent requirements for building materials as well as 
construction requirements.  One official noted that a church building has six nails for 
every one required by typical construction code.  As such, church buildings are 
exceptionally sturdy.  One church contractor who was not a member of the LDS 
Church noted, “If a tornado hit in this area, I know where I would be.”264  While it is 
unclear whether the church takes extra building precaution due to security policies, it 
is clear that church buildings are sturdier, and therefore safer than typical buildings. 
LOCAL CHURCH RESPONSE 
Responses from former local church leaders were limited but valuable.  Local, 
non-U.S. leaders of the church confirmed that the LDS Church was indeed seen as a 
“United States’ church.”  However, many noted the growth pattern of the church and 
also pointed out the increase in native missionaries serving locally.  Many of the 
responses stated the belief in divine leadership of the church and were not concerned 
with the fact that so many of the leaders are from the United States. 
Both stake/district and branch/ward leaders confirmed that they were required 
to develop response plans for any kind of emergency.  The plans were to be specific 
for their likely threats and tailored to their unique needs.  Respondents stressed that 
the response plans should be for any eventuality and not just for terrorist attacks.  One 
official who had cause to implement a plan commented that the biggest problem was 
“people not following the plan as outlined and instead trying to help any way they 
could.  It was good intentions, but sheer chaos.”265 
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Local church representatives did describe one unusual phenomenon.  Many 
respondents from completely disparate parts of the world described the spreading of 
rumors among the local population that the church’s representatives were attempting 
to “carry off our daughters” as it were.  One such description went on to outline the 
belief that there was an underground tunnel beneath the ocean whereby missionaries 
were able to take their daughters to Salt Lake City.  While local leaders and 
reasonable people knew that this was not the case, some individuals in local 
populations harbored bad feelings against the church for this reason.  This goes a long 
ways to describe the willingness of some groups to attack the church, if not 
physically, then by smear campaign. 
Other local leaders also described the fact that there was often organized 
resistance to the LDS Church by other religious groups.  One Branch President noted, 
“I think they were afraid that we were stealing their members.  I guess in a way we 
were.”266  Another leader documented activities that were meant to stir up trouble.  
“Some churches actually brought in people to address the ‘evils of Mormonism’.  
Some bad things happened after that.”267   
FORMER MISSIONARY RESPONSE 
Interviews among former missionaries were more fruitful.  A slight majority 
of the former missionaries responded that they felt safe as missionaries.  However, 
among former missionaries who felt that there was danger as well as those that felt 
safe most responded that there were occasions and areas that were definitely 
dangerous.  Many former missionaries noted that they felt they were safe as long as 
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they avoided certain areas and “followed the rules.”  Most of the missionaries felt 
similar to one missionary’s sentiments, “It didn’t occur to me to feel scared or in 
danger until afterwards.”268  Most of the missionaries also indicated that they felt 
divine protection due to the fact that they were “doing the Lord’s work.”269 
Many of the missionaries attributed the danger to general criminal activity.  
One former missionary explained, “In many of the areas we stood out because the 
area was so poor.  We were considered rich just because we were Americans.”270  
Many of the missionaries had the experience of being mugged.  Again, many of the 
missionaries responded that there were areas they “knew just not to go into.”271  One 
young lady noted that the local members would warn the missionaries what areas 
were safe.  She said, “There were cases where we were told the guerillas were active 
in a certain area.  We always stayed out of those places.”272 
All of the respondents felt that the local population equated the church with 
the United States. In fact, many former missionaries recalled definite anti-American 
sentiments.   Many times the sentiment carried over into violence.  One missionary 
serving in Chile during 1988 recalled an incident relating to grape imports into the 
United States.  For a period of time during 1988 Chilean grapes were banned in the 
United States due to a contaminated cargo.  The missionary related, “For about a 
month, any time I went outside, people threw grapes at me because they knew I was 
American.  There was an organized effort to get the people riled up.  They would 
drive big trucks full of grapes around town blaring on loudspeakers the ‘injustice of 
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America’.  We knew that if we heard the loudspeakers, we should hide.”273  A 
missionary serving in Russia noted many times when “thugs” would get drunk and 
grab whatever was handy in the way of weapons and go looking for trouble.  “They 
knew we were American, so we made a good target.”274 
Some of the female former missionaries felt that they were targeted by local 
males due to the fact that they were American women.  One missionary stated, “We 
had some people stalking us in my last area.”275  It is impossible to determine from 
the context whether the young women were targeted due to their being American or 
due to the fact that they were Caucasian, with blond hair and blue eyes in an area 
where dark hair and eyes were the rule.  
The responses to questions relating to “Which was more important, the 
mission work or your personal safety?”276 was quite surprising.  In almost all of the 
cases, former missionaries responded that often they had not thought about it in those 
terms, but if they had to choose, their mission work would be more important than 
their personal safety.  Many responded that they had actually ignored mission rules, 
going into forbidden areas or traveling after hours in order to accomplish their work.  
In a few cases, missionaries felt that the fact that they were doing something 
dangerous for a greater cause made them feel like they were actually “doing the right 
thing, like the early saints, putting their lives on the line,”277 a modern day martyr 
complex. 
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When pressed, many of the missionaries responded that presented with a 
specific threat, they would place their safety ahead of the mission work.  However, in 
a few cases, missionaries related incidents where they faced a specific threat and 
continued the mission work anyway.  In one case, a young woman missionary had a 
knife held to her throat and was warned never to come back again.  She stated, “I 
went back the next day.”278   
In every case, the former missionaries stated that there were procedures and 
practices designed to safeguard the missionaries.  The former missionaries noted that 
they were required to carry a “little white handbook” which contained specific rules 
and procedures at all times.  This handbook contained the rules of conduct as well as 
specific practices which the missionaries were supposed to follow.  For example, the 
handbook required all missionaries to travel with a companion at all times.  It 
required missionaries to be back in their dwellings by a certain time.  It also forbade 
‘risky behavior’ such as mingling with the opposite sex in a one-on-one type 
situation, even in the course of their mission work.  The missionaries also noted that 
they had knowledge of missionaries in their area that did not follow all of the rules. 
Beyond the procedures outlined in the white handbook, former missionaries 
related rules and guidelines specific to their missions that they were to follow.  These 
rules included specific times when they were to stay in their dwellings (e.g. New 
Years Eve, etc.).  Some missionaries were told not to wear their nametags as the 
nametags confirmed their identity as missionaries and often as Americans.  Some 
missionaries were abjured from certain kinds of mission work such as knocking on 
doors in order to find new contacts.   
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Some interesting instruction also discovered.  For a time in Argentina, 
missionaries were forbidden to carry backpacks as backpacks were identified with the 
United States.  Some missionaries were also told not to carry cameras or expensive 
personal items as well as large amounts of money in order to reduce the perception 
that the missionaries were “rich”.  Missionaries were also forbidden to carry on 
political conversations.  This included any kind of criticism of the government or type 
of government.  They were also forbidden from attending any kind of political 
gathering, rally or march.  Some missionaries were told not to wear certain types of 
clothing, as certain colors or styles were associated with the CIA or with mobsters.  
One missionary in Venezuela was told to “shift his routes, avoid setting habits” in 
terms of travel or conduct. 
Along with rules and regulations that forbade certain action, there were also 
directions for positive action.  Missionaries were required to perform four hours of 
public service weekly.  When asked why they thought the requirement was there 
many answered that they were in the service of their fellow man, and that the public 
service was just another aspect of that service.  One former missionary who later 
became a U.S. Marine officer stationed in Iraq after the Second Gulf War noted the 
public service was similar to “hearts and mind” work that U.S. servicemen performed 
to win over the general population and create general good will.  He felt that the 
public service was a positive force in the community and helped convince the general 
populace that LDS missionaries were indeed good people and truly concerned about 
the communities in which they served. 
 150
Many of the former missionaries also indicated that they were told to stay in 
their dwelling in response to specific threats or events.  One missionary who served in 
Russia during the coup attempt on President Yeltsin described the event.  “During 
that whole time, we had to stay in our apartments.”279  Similar stories were related by 
missionaries serving in South America and the Philippines during coup attempts in 
the countries in which they were serving.  Others were instructed to stay inside during 
large soccer games or during elections.  One former missionary serving in Bulgaria 
during the U.S. invasion of Iraq was required to stay inside for the first two weeks of 
the invasion.  Similarly, missionaries in Venezuela were required to come home at 
seven instead of nine during the First Gulf War.  
Many of the respondents recalled being the victims of political violence, 
though few experience true terrorist attacks.  More common were threats of bodily 
harm or harassment based on the missionaries being American.  One missionary 
serving in Latin America explained that it seemed to be a game, “People would lean 
out of passing cars, shouting anti-American stuff, and try to hit you as they 
passed.”280  Many missionaries related experiences of being assaulted by gangs 
spouting anti-American epithets and being pelted by rocks.   
Many former missionaries related incidents of political harassment from 
government bureaucrats or police.  One missionary related a government policy in 
Seville, Spain which required the missionaries obtain a ‘work permit’ that they could 
not legally obtain as they were engaged in volunteer service.  In this case, the former 
missionary stated that the bureaucrats deliberately impeded the paperwork in order to 
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harass the missionaries.  One stated, “Half of the missionaries did not have the correct 
paperwork or visas due to stringent requirements and or impossible restrictions.”281  
Other former missionaries related that it was common to be arrested “for no reason 
other than being who we were”282 and spending the night in jail.  In one city, the 
missionaries were “kicked out” by the police. 
Many of the respondents also related that while they were never personally 
victims of political violence or terrorism, many of them recalled that church buildings 
or property in their areas was vandalized or graffiti was left stating “Gringo go 
home!”  One female missionary served in Chile during 1988 through 1989.  She had 
one of the church buildings in the city where she was serving bombed.  Another 
serving in the Philippines recalls an attack on the Temple in Manila.   Both describe 
an environment where they knew and understood there were people hostile to the 
church doing violence against the church, however, there was nothing they could do 
about it. 
 In all of the interviews, the former missionaries indicated that they felt the 
church did “everything it could to reduce the exposure or risk of terrorism and 
political violence.”283  One young woman noted, “They seemed very concerned about 
us—especially us sisters.  Some of the elders (young men) were put in more 
dangerous spots.”284  Another missionary explained that a zone conference meeting 
was dedicated entirely to safety.  A few of the former missionaries indicated that the 
church could do a better job of “fostering a culture where personal safety and cultural 
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sensitivity were more important.”285  While he noted that culture was taught in the 
training period before his arrival in the country, these things were, “not part of the 
missionary mindset.”286 
The emphasis that the church places on the language skill of those serving on 
missions is also important.  Many missionaries commented that local people were 
often impressed that they had taken the time and effort to learn the language, and 
often, learn it well.  One missionary noted that the locals often asked where he was 
from, “I told them I was from the United States.  They did not believe me.  They said 
that Americans only spoke English.”287  This emphasis on language helps to span the 
gulf between missionary and the local populace not only in terms of communication 
but also in terms of respect. 
Many of the former missionaries related that their missions had contingency 
plans in place should emergencies arise.  Some told of instructions to the missionaries 
in their areas to keep a good amount of money and food secreted away but available 
should they need to move quickly.  They also documented informational calling trees 
designed to disperse information quickly.  Others told of instructions complete with 
code phrases which would warn the missionaries of impending problems and if need 
be, send them to assigned meeting places for evacuation.  Routes and schedules were 
pre-planned and updated at general mission meetings.  One respondent outlined the 
contingency plan for Bulgaria.  In that plan, code words informed missionaries of the 
specific routes to take out of the country.  Missionaries in Bulgaria were also told to 
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carry a list with hospital information, the names of church affiliated attorneys, and 
embassy contact information.288   
The former missionaries did indicate that there were policies in place to 
protect converts should joining the church cause problems.  One of the missionaries 
served in Seville, Spain.  While no mission work was being conducted in Morocco 
proper, the Seville mission was responsible for that country.  For the first year of his 
mission, they were allowed to teach Muslims about Christianity, using special lesson 
plans designed to be sensitive to Islamic beliefs.  During the second half of his 
mission, they were forbidden to teach Muslims even if requested due to the danger 
that would put the potential converts into.  They were informed that some Muslims 
became Christian at their personal peril.289  This prohibition seems to have been in 
place in some areas of the world but not others.  Many Latin American countries 
prohibited the teaching of Muslims altogether.  Venezuela also prohibited the 
teaching of certain indigenous tribes.  This was done in an attempt to protect an 
endangered culture.  Some areas only allowed the teaching of Muslims if the Muslims 
approached the missionaries.  Other respondents noted that there were rumors that 
some ethnic or religious groups were off limits (Gypsies and Muslims for example).  
However, because they were not officially notified, they taught those groups 
anyways. 
Many missionaries expressed concern for those that became affiliated with the 
church through their efforts.  Often, in Latin America, those in the dominant religion 
treated people that converted to the LDS Church poorly.  Missionaries serving in 
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Eastern Europe reflected similar sentiments.  One former missionary stated that many 
converts were rejected by family and friends and considered “traitors to their family, 
culture and traditions.”290 
One interview was conducted with an LDS member that had been affiliated 
with the Jerusalem Center in Israel.  He described the great care the church takes with 
Muslims who leave their faith to join the LDS Church and potentially put their lives 
in danger.  An Islamic Spanish citizen who had been investigating the church with his 
wife in Spain moved to the West Bank just prior to joining the LDS Church.  He 
assumed that because the church had the Jerusalem Center and a Branch in Israel he 
would be able to join there.  However, there was a ban on all teaching and baptizing 
in Israel at the time.  The local leader (Branch President) in Jerusalem appealed the no 
conversion policy in place in Israel through the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles and 
finally to the First Presidency.  The Spanish Muslim was finally granted permission to 
join the church.291  Other interviewees that had been affiliated with the Jerusalem 
Center stated that the Jerusalem Center took great pains not to take sides in the 
Palestinian/Israeli question.  “Equal instruction was given to both Arab and Israeli 
culture, language and history.  In fact, the Jerusalem Center’s Christmas Concert was 
one of the few places where the Israeli Mayor of Jerusalem and the Chief Imam in the 
city could be seen sitting next to each other.”292   
Students were instructed to avoid any kind of taking sides in the struggle to 
the point of not buying maps which could show disputed borders.  They were also 
instructed not to discuss the LDS religion even when asked.  The Center boasted 
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equal numbers of Palestinian and Israeli employees and students were encouraged to 
“be good customers to both groups.”293  Students attending the Jerusalem Center were 
actually required to sign a conduct agreement which contained these types of rules 
and regulations.  If students abrogated the agreement they were subject to being sent 
home.294 
Many respondents, both former missionaries and officials of the church 
mentioned the unofficial help embassies played in helping to bolster the security of 
individual members of the church.  Security officials in U.S. embassies would often 
advise members of the church acting for the church of specific security threats.  This 
relationship was especially close when the embassy officials were also members of 
the LDS Church.  One missionary commented that he had “a member embassy 
official’s card in my pocket in case something came up that required ‘official’ 
help.”295  Another respondent noted that, “There seemed to be a member in the 
embassies in whatever country I visited.”296  This unofficial relationship between the 
U.S. embassy and American employees or agents of NGOs is not limited to the LDS 
Church.  Indeed, a security official affiliated with another religious NGO stated, 
“That is one of the advantages that American NGOs have.  We can rely on the U.S. 
embassy to act as our intelligence and security arms.”297  While the help that 
embassies provide may indeed be an advantage, perhaps in light of the associational 
threats outlined in chapter 4, it may be a disadvantage also. 
 
                                                 
293 Interview response. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid. 
 156
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE CASE 
 Chapter 4 created a framework that helps to explain the targeting imperatives 
used by terrorist organizations when selecting targets. It would seem appropriate to 
apply that framework to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints to see if the 
church perceives the threat of terrorism similarly.  Further, the framework can be 
measured in terms of the church’s experience as an NGO that has been targeted by 
terrorist groups. 
 The first targeting imperative of the framework is targeting based on a 
perceived association by the terrorist group between an NGO and another political 
entity.  The case that was used in Chapter 4 to illustrate this principle was the LDS 
Church.  By their own actions and indications left at the scenes of attacks on the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, terrorist groups consider the LDS 
Church to be associated with the United States.  Responses from respondents at all 
levels of the church indicated an acceptance that the LDS Church is perceived to be 
an “American” church.  The church has taken steps to change this perception both 
through the use of media as well as changes in policy, which stress the local nature of 
the church and its leadership.  Attacks on the LDS Church have been reduced 
significantly.  While it would be irresponsible to credit the church’s changes for 
reducing the attacks, the fact remains that currently, attacks occur at a rate of less than 
one a year.298  
 The second targeting imperative in the framework is attacks due to political 
activities.  Again, those activities may not necessarily be overtly political in nature.  
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Simply engaging in humanitarian activities could be construed to be a political act as 
it may change the political environment.  Whether for this reason or others, the LDS 
Church prohibits its personnel to engage in overt political activity while acting in an 
official capacity.  That is not to say that church personnel or members are apolitical.  
In fact, church members are encouraged to be active in the political processes of their 
country, albeit in a private capacity.  However, the fact remains that the LDS church 
refrains from overt political activity.  The motivation for such a policy is not clear.  
However, the ramifications equate to an organization that is much less of a political 
danger to anyone, insurgent or government alike.  The end result may be a reduced 
exposure to terrorist attacks due to overt political conflicts. 
While the LDS Church is engaged in other activities, which include 
humanitarian aid work that might meet the expanded definition of political activities, 
the LDS church has adopted policies that reduce the threat due to this targeting 
imperative.  In cases where the LDS Church does not have a local infrastructure by 
which to carry out the work, it will either use other local NGOs to carry out the 
operations or will refrain from operations in that area.  Again, it is not clear as to the 
reason of these policies, but the net effect is a reduction in the exposure to terrorist 
attack. 
The third targeting parameter relates to the struggle by terrorist groups to 
obtain resources in an environment of scarce resources.  The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints is a resource rich organization.  The budgets of the LDS Church 
are not open to public scrutiny.  The fact remains that it has extensive properties and 
holdings throughout the world as well as controlling interest in various business 
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enterprises.  These facts are shrouded in privacy.  While the church continues to 
conduct an aggressive building strategy, its meetinghouse buildings are modest in 
form.  As such, the financial resources of the church are much less evident.  Given its 
resources, the church might make an attractive target of terrorist groups wishing to 
take advantage of it.  This research did uncover the fact that the LDS Church 
meetinghouses are often targeted for burglary given the equipment that is common in 
most LDS buildings.  The LDS Church will not discuss its security policies, 
especially those regarding payment of ransoms.  However, policies meant to provide 
for individual security help to mitigate against that threat.  Given these circumstances, 
it is difficult to evaluate the LDS Church’s vulnerability to this targeting parameter.   
The LDS Church seems to recognize the damage that can be created by 
personnel not sufficiently sensitive to the culture and social environment of the place 
wherein they are serving.  All prospective missionaries are required to undertake 
training prior to arriving in country.  This training regimen includes language training 
as well as cultural training.  Representatives of the church’s university traveling 
performing groups are also required to complete a semester-long culture course prior 
to the tour.  All church representatives are required to dress conservatively and refrain 
from objectionable behavior.  While the reasoning behind this training and 
restrictions on behavior is unclear, the end result is a personnel force more sensitive 
to the local culture. 
The church may be exposed when it comes to religious conflict as one of the 
three stated missions of the LDS Church is to “proclaim the gospel.”  Certainly 
proselytizing in areas where there is one dominant religion could create conflict with 
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the dominant church.  The LDS Church seems to be aware of the potential for 
problems.  In areas where proselytizing would be dangerous or detrimental, the 
church has committed to the government and local officials that they will not 
proselytize in that specific area.  Such is the case in much of the Arab world as well 
as in Israel and the People’s Republic of China.  In areas where the government has 
sanctioned missionary work and the LDS Church feels it is safe for its people, other 
policies are in place to reduce the possibilities of conflict.  Minors are prohibited from 
joining the church without parental permission.  Members of specific religions are 
limited in joining if it is felt that it will put their lives at risk.  The church also 
attempts to foster good will through media programs and joint programs conducted 
with other faiths.  In this case, the LDS Church seems not only to be aware of the 
threat of cultural, social and religious clashes, but also takes steps to reduce any such 
problems. 
 The final targeting parameter of the framework related to the relative 
‘softness’ of NGOs as targets.  Again, it is difficult to determine the LDS Church’s 
perception of this threat.  However, what is evident is that there are policies in place 
with a result of the church and its personnel being somewhat hardened.  Members of 
the First Presidency of the church travel with an extremely competent security 
detachment.  Such security precautions include the use of chase vehicles and personal 
security vetting.  Travel is done modestly so as not to attract attention.  Church 
personnel always travel in groups.  This is true for missionaries as well as local 
bishoprics depositing tithes and offerings in the bank.  Church personnel are limited 
in where and when they travel.  There are places that are considered off-limits as well 
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as curfews when missionaries must be home.  Church buildings are well constructed.  
They are sturdy and relatively safe.  Certainly, as a church it would be severely 
limiting to harden the LDS Church so as to be immune from attack.  However, many 
precautions have been employed with the effect of moving the LDS Church up on the 
hardness scale. 
 In the end, it seems that the LDS Church bolsters the theoretical framework.  
They seem to have an instinctual understanding of the threats facing them.  This is 
most true for the associational and cultural, social, and religious targeting 
imperatives.  Not only does the LDS Church understand these threats, but they have 
also taken actions to reduce the threats—actions that seem to be fairly effective.  The 
application of the framework to the LDS Church has enabled the researcher to 
identify threats that may not have necessarily been dealt with.  As such, the 
framework seems to be successful in its purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a worldwide organization 
engaged in mission work throughout the globe.  Due to their extensive international 
work, which includes both humanitarian aid and proselytizing, as well as their 
worldwide membership, they are at risk to terrorist attack.  Indeed, in the three 
decades spanning the 1970s through the 1990s, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints was the most targeted religious organization or non-governmental 
organization for attack by terrorists in Latin America.  Despite this fact, the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints only lost four people to fatal attacks.  Clearly, a 
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closer look at the LDS Church may provide insight as to why they were attacked and 
what policies are in place to ameliorate those attacks. 
It is important to note that during the study period, church policy evolved to 
combat the terrorist threat.  Certainly criticism could be directed at the use of the case 
study as a positive example of threat avoidance: if the LDS Church were such a good 
example of target avoidance, then why were they the most attacked religious 
organization in Latin America?  The answer to this question lays in the fatality 
statistics cited previously as well as the fact that attacks against the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints has dropped to almost nothing.  These data could perhaps 
be explained by other factors.  However, the fact does remain that an organization so 
targeted must surely take steps to eliminate the threat of attack against its personnel 
and property.  As such, it is an appropriate case to study the phenomenon of terrorist 
attacks on non-governmental organizations. 
While official responses from the church were limited, this research was able 
to obtain critical information.  The church sees itself as an international church, with 
more members outside of North America than inside.  However, at all levels of the 
church’s organization, there were acknowledgements that it is perceived to be an 
American church.  While the majority of the church’s central leadership is made up of 
U.S. citizens, local leadership is conducted by members of the local communities 
wherever possible.   
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a very hierarchical 
organization which tolerates little dissent in terms of policies or doctrine.  However, 
local leaders are encourages to tailor church programs for their areas in order to best 
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take care of any problems or needs specific to that location.  Local church leaders are 
further drawn from the local population of church membership and serve for a limited 
time before being returned to the general church population.  Church leaders are not 
professional clergymen, but serve as volunteers while carrying on their usual 
employment.  This emphasis on local leadership of local units may help ameliorate 
that “American church” label that seems to be present. 
The LDS Church’s missionary force is a group of volunteers who serve for a 
limited amount of time before returning to their local congregation and employment.  
It is made up primarily of young men and women with a smattering of older, retired 
couples who receive a limited amount of training in language, the subject of their 
missions, and culture.  The missionary force is led by volunteer, lay clergy who serve 
for a limited time with a limited amount of training.  Some of that training, however, 
is training in cultural sensitivity and language.  That sensitivity is reinforced by 
mandatory community service.  Such sensitivity is rewarded by locals as well as other 
government officials. 
The church is sensitive to other religions and cultures and endeavors to 
promote this sensitivity to its leaders and missionaries.  The church limits the 
teaching and conversion of certain ethnic and religious groups.  They are also 
sensitive to governments and restrict all mission work to areas where governments 
have given permission.  The LDS Church teaches that its members should be good 
citizens, supporting and defending their country.  The church is arduous about the fact 
that it takes no political stance aside from moral questions like gambling or abortion 
and regularly reminds its general and local leadership that political activities by 
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church leaders in an official capacity is not tolerated.  This non-political attitude is 
extended to other organizations of the church to include activities by Brigham Young 
University’s many traveling groups and exchange programs. 
The LDS Church is concerned about the welfare of its agents as well as that of 
the general population.  It has an extensive humanitarian aid program that is 
distributed by the local leaders of the church.  In cases of emergency or humanitarian 
crises where the church has no organization to facilitate distribution, they engage 
other well-known organizations like the International Red Cross as well as the 
Catholic Relief Charities organization to distribute the aid.   
The LDS Church will not risk its people.  The mission and humanitarian work 
of the church are closely regulated.  Only those that have followed the church’s 
guidelines are able to conduct work in its name.  As a result, the church is able to 
provide its full support for all sanctioned activities.  Local units are not supposed to 
conduct unofficial aid or mission activities without official church permission.  Since 
the church will not send its people to places where there is a definite risk, the security 
of its personnel is buttressed.  Another implication of the closely regulated mission 
work is that it will only take place in areas that have local government approval and 
adequate organizational infrastructure.  This cuts down on unofficial trips and ensures 
that only well-researched and provisioned excursions are carried out.   
In order to protect the welfare of its agents, the LDS Church and its agents 
plan extensively.  Church buildings are well built and extremely sturdy.  Missionaries 
are often instructed to stockpile food and money necessary to provide for any 
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probable emergency situation.  There are plans formulated to provide for orderly 
evacuation should that be necessary. 
The end result is that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is a 
highly regulated organization with sufficient resources and planning to carry out an 
extended international program.  The control it exerts over its organization coupled 
with an apolitical policy of obtaining its goals helps to insulate it from many political 
acts.  The local leader emphasis and the cultural sensitivity it shows further insulate it 
from potential violence.  Finally, the policies of the church help to harden it as a 
potential target for terrorists.  These conclusions will be further explored in the final 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION 
 At the heart of any good research, there should be the answer to the basic 
question: so what?  This research might be interesting just for the consideration of the 
phenomenon of NGOs being targeted by terrorist groups.  However, in the tradition 
of asking the big questions, the “so what” question is be addressed by this research.   
So what?  This research has looked at the phenomenon of terrorist attack on 
NGOs and developed a framework as to why terrorists might engage in suck attacks.  
So what?  By understanding the terrorists’ target selection imperatives, prescriptions 
by which the threat to NGOs can be reduced were created.  So what?  In a very real 
way, lives can be spared.  Not only the lives of those working for the NGOs but also 
all of the lives that are enriched through the work they do. 
This research is advancing prescriptions toward the reducing of the terrorist 
threat to NGOs.  It is understood that in some cases an NGO is targeted for many of 
the imperatives advanced by this research.  Reducing or eliminating all threats may be 
impractical or impossible.  However, eliminating one of the reasons a terrorist group 
might target an NGO may be the one thing that removes that NGO from the targeting 
equation, or, at the very least, moves them down the target list.  Prescriptions to each 
of the imperatives advanced by this research are offered: association, political 
activity, social/cultural/religious reasons, competition for resources, and soft targets. 
RESULTS OF THE CASE STUDY IN LIGHT OF THE FRAMEWORK 
ASSOCIATION 
The first targeting imperative was the perceived association by the terrorist 
groups between NGOs and a government or intergovernmental entity.  In the example 
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used in Chapter 4, the LDS Church was targeted in Latin America due to the 
perception that the church was associated with the United States.  While the 
implication of this targeting imperative is striking, the prescription is simple.  NGOs 
can reduce their targeting profile by reducing either their association with a 
government or governments or by reducing the perception of that association.   
The LDS Church certainly seems aware of the perception of association.  So, 
in their case, they have taken actions to reduce the perception of “Americanness” of 
the church, due to the fact that there is no official association between the LDS 
Church and the government of the United States.  The LDS Church has stressed the 
worldwide aspect of their organization in press releases and media opportunities.  
Local church members are moved into leadership roles as soon as is possible, making 
the local churches self sufficient in terms of leadership.   
In some cases, these methods are not enough.  An example is what happened 
to the church in Columbia.  Terrorist activities conducted by FARC and the ELN in 
Colombia made operations by North Americans dangerous.  In this case, the church 
removed all North American personnel from Columbia, leaving local Columbians or 
other Latin Americans to direct the affairs of the church in that area.  While the 
perception of association may have continued, the fact that the church in that area is 
totally directed by local leaders helps to lessen that particular perception. 
In some cases, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there is, in actuality, an 
association with governmental or political entities and many NGOs.  Many NGOs 
receive their funding from governments, making them, essentially, clearinghouses for 
governmental resources and policies.  In many of these cases, the simplest 
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prescription would be to eliminate any ties with the government entity(s).  However, 
many non-governmental organizations cannot exist without the patronage of these 
entities.299  As Cooley and Ron demonstrated, there is a scarcity in the market for 
resources for non-governmental organizations.300  Further, as discussed previously, 
many NGOs rely on this association for political leverage on the government where 
they wish to conduct operations or for other associational benefits.  Consequently, it 
is doubtful that NGOs are going to sever ties with their stakeholders.   
What remains, then, is similar to the LDS Church’s tactic: reduce the 
perception.  This may be accomplished by name changes or personnel changes.  
Certainly misdirection could possibly work.  The tactic employed by many traveling 
students who sew Canadian flags to their backpack could be effective.  Perhaps media 
could be employed to reduce any such perceptions.  The fact exists, however, that a 
competing NGO may scarcely be able to spend resources on a media campaign when 
it is struggling to accomplish its central mission.   
Another tactic employed by the LDS Church seems promising.  The 
requirement that its volunteers spend four hours a week on public service may serve 
the purpose of replacing one association with another.  As NGO volunteers spend 
time interacting with the public, the stereotypes and general perceptions fall away to 
be replaced by the direct perceptions of people that make up the general population.  
If the perception of the Mormon Church is associated with “those guys cleaning the 
neighborhood” or “those people that helped teach reading in the library,” any general 
associations with the United States can be minimized. 
                                                 
299 Edwards and Hume, 1996. 
300 Cooley and Ron, 2002, pp. 5-39.   
 168
POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, NGOs seem to be damned if they do and damned if 
they do not with regard to political activity.  If NGOs engage in overt political 
activity, i.e. supporting one side in a political struggle or promoting one political 
point of view, they cross the event horizon and become “legitimate” targets.  
Conversely, if they engage in non-political activities such as humanitarian aid or 
infrastructure building, they become targets due to the changes they are attempting to 
make to the general political environment of the area.   
 Again, the prescription seems simple: stop engaging in these kinds of 
activities.  However simple, stopping all activities is feasible only if the NGO is 
willing to shut down operations and concede defeat.  Certainly, NGOs have taken that 
option when losses exceeded the benefits of their work.  Others, in other locations 
could be helped, and the NGOs simply went to a place where they could accomplish 
their mission without incurring terrorist attack on themselves or those they were 
trying to help. 
 Certainly, NGOs could cease all overtly political activities.  At the heart of 
this option is the very foundation of the mission of the NGO.  According to this 
research, the Catholic Church became the target of both state and insurgent terrorist 
attacks in Latin America while pursuing “liberation theology.”  Central to many of 
these attacks were the positions that individual personnel as well as general Catholic 
policies pursued.  The question remains, could the Catholic Church have continued to 
exist as the dominant spiritual institution of Latin America while ignoring basic 
questions such as fundamental human rights and individual freedoms?  Could 
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Amnesty International continue its agenda if they gave up their pursuit of 
fundamental human rights and ignored the locking up of political prisoners or gave up 
their protests against capital punishment?  Clearly the answer is no.   
Korten argues that NGOs need to actually get more involved in political 
endeavors.  He feels that many NGOs are wasting their time treating symptoms rather 
than trying to cure the disease.  Without actually addressing the development issue, 
simply feeding the hungry is actually counterproductive in terms of long-term welfare 
of the global South.301  This being the case, should NGOs be willing to put personnel 
and volunteers at risk? 
 For some groups, innately political questions are not fundamental to their 
mission.  The LDS Church, while concerned about the freedom of the world and 
human dignity, is more concerned with proselytizing and humanitarian aid.  As a 
result, they can minimize those political questions and focus on their stated goals.  
This, then, is one option.  The prescription is, if possible, for NGOs to minimize any 
overtly political operations in which they are engaged.  As stated previously, this may 
not be an option for groups whose causes are innately political, but for those with 
other goals, it is an option that can be considered. 
 Limiting the scope of an activity that is not overtly political and yet 
fundamental to an organization’s cause is much more complicated.  Any action which 
may affect the political environment, even activities in which such an environmental 
change is not the organization’s goal, could serve to focus the attention of a terrorist 
group.  The goal of many terrorist groups is the creation of instability, which, in turn, 
                                                 
301 David C. Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, (Kumarian 
Press, Inc.: West Hartford, Connecticut, 1990), pg. 188. 
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lessens the legitimacy of government.  Traditional NGO activities, which include 
stabilization efforts and infrastructure building, often bring NGOs into conflict with 
terrorist groups.  The obvious prescription—halting such activities—is often 
antithetical to many NGOs.  Clearly, this is one targeting imperative that cannot be 
ameliorated.  The hope is that sufficient gains can be made on other imperatives so as 
to reduce the threat horizon and move the NGO down on the target list. 
STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES 
 In Chapter 4, it was established that terrorist groups might target NGOs in an 
effort to secure resources.  Those resources could be financial or relate to safe haven 
or recruiting.  In many cases, NGOs are juicy targets due to their financial resources 
and their status as a “softer target”.  The difficulty in creating a prescription that 
limits the ability of NGOs to provide financial resources in the event of a terrorist 
attack is entangled in problems of policy.   
Certainly, NGOs could adopt a policy that prohibits negotiations and 
payments relating to ransom.  While adopting a “no negotiation for ransom” policy 
may deter attacks in the long run, attacks will still occur in the short run.  Further, this 
type of policy can only be successful if all NGOs in an area adopt the same measure.  
Maintaining a “non negotiation” policy is also difficult when people’s lives are 
literally on the line.  Another difficulty in creating an effective prescription meant to 
limit kidnapping and ransom attacks is the fact that this type of attack has proved so 
successful in that past.  As long as the perception that a terrorist group can make 
money through kidnapping exists, these types of attack will also persist. 
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 Similar to the imperative discussed in the last section concerning non-political 
work that changes the political environment, the fact that much of the work that 
NGOs engage in also limits the access to safe haven and recruiting by terrorist 
groups.  This may lead to terrorist attacks on those NGOs.  As stability operations are 
among the most common operations engaged in by NGOs, a prescription on this type 
of activity is impractical.  There only remains work on other targeting imperatives in 
order to reduce the threat to NGOs. 
CULTURE/SOCIAL OR RELIGIOUS REASONS 
 If Easton’s premise that politics is “the authoritative allocation of values for a 
society”302 is accepted, then attacks meant to reinforce a certain set of values or 
eliminate other values that are introduced by NGOs can be reduced.  The prescription 
is simple: either make the values the NGO advances less threatening, or control the 
values that are portrayed. 
 Making the values an NGO advances less threatening may be difficult.  If an 
NGO advances a free market economy or a democratic form of government that is 
opposed by a terrorist group, how can those values be made less threatening?  Again 
perception must be addressed.  What is requisite is an understanding of the terrorist 
group’s aims and objectives.  With understanding comes the ability to present the 
NGO message in a way that is less offensive to the terrorist groups.  Certainly there is 
a limit to the ‘spin’ an NGO can engage in without changing the mission completely.  
However, there may be room for dialogue and communication, which promotes 
mutual understanding.  This research is not advocating the adoption of terrorist views 
                                                 
302 Easton, 1965. 
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or transforming a central mission value.  It is advocating understanding and respect of 
values so as to avoid confrontation. 
 This leads to the next prescription: controlling the values that an NGO 
portrays.  Aside from the dissemination and adoption of values an official mission 
seeks to accomplish, an NGO might be disseminating other values.  A brief 
explication is needed.  A group that seeks to feed the hungry in a famine wracked 
country certainly wishes to spread the values of individual worth and humanitarian 
aid to all in need.  By working to feed the hungry they accomplish their goals.  
However, the volunteers are also disseminating other values as well.  This 
dissemination of other values may not necessarily be conscious or overt.  As peoples 
from different cultural backgrounds come together, inevitably there will be instances 
of cultural clash.  This is especially true when the NGO is made up of Western 
volunteers.  Many non-Western countries are sensitive to “cultural imperialism” or 
the overtaking of traditional culture by popular Western culture.  This cultural 
imperialism can be as innocuous as food selection or dress habits, music selection or 
souvenir collection.  However, many cultures feel that they are in a battle to protect 
their endangered culture. 
 This cultural imperialism imperative can be reduced in ways that are similar to 
those meant to lessen the terrorist threat due to overt value substitution.  Namely: 
education and understanding.  NGO personnel should be thoroughly indoctrinated in 
the dominant culture of the area they are going to be doing their work.  Such training 
will increase the sensitivity of NGO personnel and make them less likely to 
accidentally spread values to which the terrorist group is opposed.  The LDS case is 
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again a good example.  LDS missionaries receive cultural and language training prior 
to arriving in country.  This training is meant to lessen possible clashes that might 
otherwise occur.  Further, NGO personnel who speak the language of the area in 
which they work are going to be more likely to understand and be sensitive to the 
culture of the people around them.   
Restrictions on the LDS missionaries’ activities can also lessen the danger of 
cultural clashes.  LDS missionaries are prohibited from listening to popular music.  
The spread of Western music is often cited as one of the key areas that traditional 
authorities condemn westerners.  LDS missionaries are prohibited from dating or 
otherwise socially engaging anyone.  Often, traditional authorities fear the corruption 
of their youth through social interaction with westerners.  As was documented in 
chapter 5, there is often a fear that their sons or daughters will be seduced away to 
leave the society that they hold so dear.  The prohibition against dating or social 
interaction also combats the feeling that the LDS are out to “carry off their 
daughters.”  Missionaries are required to wear conservative dress.  As such, they are 
less likely to offend those with conservative dress mores.  These types of prohibitions 
can go a long way to stem fears of cultural imperialism that may lead to retaliation by 
groups opposed to Western values and ideals. 
Prescriptions against teaching of values, especially religious values may be 
impossible for groups with the express purpose of “sharing the gospel.”  In these 
cases, local religious officials can only try to spread common understanding and 
esteem.  However, even in these cases, fundamentalist groups that are opposed to the 
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religious values being spread may not be dissuaded from taking violent action.  
Again, in those situations, target hardening may be the only option left. 
Another prescription that may reduce the threat of terrorism due to the 
social/cultural/religious imperative as well as the associational imperative is to take 
advantage of something similar to Keck and Sikkink’s advocacy networks.  If the 
goal of the organization is indeed the accomplishment of a certain mission, then 
working with local groups may be the ideal answer.  This is a strategy that Korten 
emphasizes for reasons of effectiveness and relevancy.303  By utilizing a local NGO 
as the means of carrying out an operation, the dangers due to association as well as 
offending social, cultural or religious traditions can be reduced.  This is similar to 
what the LDS Church does when conducting humanitarian aid in places where there 
are no local operations.  In these cases, the LDS Church utilizes other NGOs that do 
have operations in the area as the means of distribution. 
TARGET HARDENING 
Drake theorized, “Where there is a number of potential targets, attacking any 
of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that 
the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, as carrying out such an attack 
represents the least risk to the terrorists.”304  NGO targets are notoriously soft, 
especially given the recent efforts to harden other traditional targets of terrorist 
groups.305 
 Many of the prior targeting imperatives could explain attacks on NGOs.  The 
difficulty in advancing prescriptions on many of the imperatives stem from the fact 
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305 Hoffman, 2001, pp. 7-8. 
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that following the prescriptions would invalidate the very mission many NGOs seek 
to accomplish.  NGOs engaged in infrastructure building, which are targeted by 
groups seeking to destabilize an area for the purpose of either reducing the legitimacy 
granted the local government or to establish an environment conducive to acquiring 
safe haven and recruits, cannot abandon their missions and continue to be what they 
are.  For these types of groups, there remain two options: find a place where there is a 
need that is safer or harden themselves as targets. 
 Clearly, one of the easiest ways of avoiding terrorist attack is simply to 
abandon the work in the area, removing the target altogether.  This is similar to the 
tactic that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints employed when Columbia 
and Peru got too dangerous.  However, as discussed above, the LDS Church had a 
luxury that many NGOs do not, namely, local leadership and personnel able to carry 
on the work.  In those cases, the work did not suffer; the actors just changed. 
The question remains, what if handing the work off to local leadership and 
personnel is not possible?  What if the organization does not have the local resources 
or training necessary to carry out the mission without international personnel?  Is it 
acceptable to simply stop the work and allow the people in the area to suffer?  The 
answer to this question must be answered by each NGO after carefully weighing their 
goals and objectives.  Perhaps the goals of the organization are so overpowering that 
the organization is willing to sacrifice personnel and supplies in order to carry out 
their mission. 
Responsible consideration must be given to the opposite perspective.  As has 
been pointed out in other sections of this research, the world is a market of scarce 
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resources.  Is subjecting personnel and supplies to potential attack the best use of 
resources?  Certainly many NGOs recognize that they are filling a necessary niche.  
They recognize that they are working in areas that are, by definition, dangerous 
places.306   
The author would submit that in a marketplace of scarce resources the 
responsible allocation of resources would take into account not only the chance that 
personnel and resources may be destroyed, but also that the work itself may prove 
counterproductive to those that the NGO is trying to help.  In that scarce marketplace, 
are there not other people or areas that are in great need?  Perhaps the responsible 
administrator might allocate the work to a less dangerous area in the hope that they 
can be more effective to the people in that area.  Further, does not one who lives to 
run away, live to conduct missions another day?  Certainly the people in the area 
forgone might suffer without the work that NGOs could give.  However, those people 
may be in a better situation without the NGOs attracting terrorist attacks in their 
midst. 
As noted by Randolph Martin of the International Rescue Committee, many 
NGOs simply are not concerned with security, as security is so alien to their 
missions.307  One former missionary put it this way, “How are we supposed to know 
whether the guy walking in the front door is a terrorist or whether he is simply, 
genuinely in need?”  Often, as interviewed former missionaries illustrated, NGO 
workers either are willing to sacrifice themselves to a greater good or rely on divine 
protection.  Perhaps they simply do not wish to entertain the thought of potential 
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terrorist attack.  While this research cannot comment on the efficacy of divine 
intervention into the security of NGOs, simply burying ones head in the sand will not 
eliminate the terrorist threat to non-governmental organizations.  In order to reduce 
the threat of terrorism to NGOs this “ignoring a threat and hoping it will go away” 
can no longer happen.  The security of personnel and supplies must be addressed 
before an NGO commits resources to a mission.  Much of the consideration for 
security would not be a costly endeavor.  The hardening steps may be simply the 
education of the personnel in prudent security measures.  However, it is more likely 
that the NGOs will have to invest some of their resources to security.  Regardless, as 
other potential targets harden, there will certainly be an increase in terrorist attacks on 
NGOs if they do not. 
Again, the LDS case is illustrative.  Perhaps the restrictions placed on the 
volunteers also serve to harden the targets.  Simple rules and regulations that all 
missionaries must follow limit travel and proscribe other potentially dangerous 
activities such as going out late at night or doing anything alone.  These regulations 
allow for operations to continue without limiting the workers or requiring the 
allocation of important financial resources.  This, then, is the final prescription: limit 
the actions of the NGO personnel in a way that serves to harden the target. 
FUTURE RESEARCH   
The need for additional research seems to be one of the mantras common to 
political science research.  So too, this research opens the door to much needed 
further research opportunities.  Given time and resources, the theoretical framework 
advanced in this research should be tested empirically to determine its validity and 
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generalizability across cases.  As this research looked specifically at one NGO case, 
additional NGOs should be considered.   
In Chapter 4 this research discussed the amazingly low rate of death for 
Mormon personnel—less than 1% of all attacks against the church resulted in a 
fatality.  This is especially significant when compared to the general rate of fatal 
attacks of 23.5 percent.  Perhaps attacks using the associational targeting parameter 
need not be fatal to accomplish its objective.  This seems unlikely when the fact is 
considered that 21.25 percent of attacks with an associational marker in the database 
included attempts on a life.  Neither does the low loss of life seem to be due to the 
fact that it is a religious endeavor.  Fatal attacks on personnel of the Catholic Church 
occur at a rate of 28.5 percent. 
Those that have been targeted using the political imperative, however, have a 
much more somber distinction.  Political attacks are often lethal in nature.  While the 
associational type of target is diffuse and general in nature, the political actor type are 
much more discreet and specific.  As such, people engaged in political activities often 
find themselves the victim of fatal attack.  Future research will, hopefully find the 
characteristics of targets and terrorist groups that make for fatal attacks. 
Given the timeliness of this research and the growing role that NGOs play in 
the international community, the value of this research topic cannot be overstated.  
Further, the increased activity of terrorist groups and their search for targets makes 
this research topic one that will not fade away over time.  The hope is that with 
further research, the instances where NGOs come under the crosshairs of terrorist 
groups will be reduced.  The end result of a reduction in the terrorist threat to NGOs 
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would undoubtedly be saving of human lives—both those of the NGO personnel, and 
those that have their lives enriched through the works that NGOs conduct. 
There is another ramification that this research can have on the field of 
terrorism.  Certainly, research that focuses on the targeting strategies of terrorist 
groups are few in number and limited in scope.  This research, however, expands on 
the work of Crenshaw and Drake in that it gives a concrete framework that can be 
applied to other cases.  From a theoretical perspective this is significant in that it is a 
concrete framework with a specific typology.  It treats the phenomenon of terrorism 
as a rational act and attempts to divine the true motivation by studying the selection 
of who is targeted.  From this perspective, this research is potentially groundbreaking 
in terms of attacking the causes of terrorism.  Terrorism as a phenomenon will not be 
eliminated without a greater understanding of the motives of the perpetrators.  This 
study has the potential for at least partially opening the door to this type of 
understanding.
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APPENDIX I:  RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
Interview Questions: Asked in face-to-face interviews. 
 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
    Church Headquarters 
Missionary Committee Representative 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
1. When assigning missionaries to missions world-wide, does 
nationality/citizenship preclude service in some high-risk areas? 
2. Are there missions in the church where only native missionaries may serve? 
3. Have North American missionaries been removed from missions where they 
may have come under increased risk of attack? 
4. Do you feel that local peoples equate the church with the United States? 
5. Do you think that the church is targeted for political violence because it is 
“American”? 
6. Is there a plan in place to ensure the safety of missionaries should they come 
under increased threat of political violence/attack. 
7. Are there activities that missionaries engage in which lessen their 
susceptibility to risk or attack? 
8. Do missionaries do anything to reduce their exposure/visibility when there are 
heightened risks of political violence? 
9. Is the safety of the missionaries or spreading the gospel the paramount goal 
within the missionary program of the church? 
10. Are the missionaries serving throughout the world safe? 
11. Does the Missionary Department have a plan to respond to violence 
perpetrated on missionaries should that violence occur? 
12. Are you concerned with the safety of converts to the church?  
13. Are some populations/ethnicities/religions off-limits? 
14. Is that due to political or safety concerns? 
15. Given that there might be repercussions to conversion; does the church 
actively proselytize to Muslims? 
 
Additional Interview Questions: To be asked in face-to-face interviews. 
 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
    Church Headquarters 
    General Authority Representative 
    Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
1. One of the reasons why the church could be targeted for political violence is a 
link between the church and the United States of America.  Does the church 
do anything to emphasize the international aspect of the church or to de-
emphasize the fact that the church is based in and seen as an American 
church? 
2. Does action by the United States government place the church at heightened 
risk of political violence? 
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3. When attacks against the church occur, does the church enlist U.S. 
government aid in prosecuting perpetrators or recovering church 
assets/people? 
4. Does the church negotiate with terrorists/hostage takers? 
5. In some areas of the world, terrorists have engaged in hostage taking as a 
means of financing their organizations.  Does the church pay ransom? 
6. Has the church closed down operations in some areas of the world due to 
heightened threat of political violence or terror attacks? 
7. Does the structure of the church organization increase/decrease the exposure 
to political violence/terrorist attacks? 
8. Do local members of the church resent “foreign” leadership? 
9. Do you feel safe when visiting areas where there may be a risk of political 
violence/terrorist threats? 
10. At what level are safety concerns decided?  (i.e. missionary population safety, 
local safety, safety of church assets).  
11. Does the church have a central plan to respond to violence should it occur? 
 
Additional Interview Questions: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
    Church Headquarters 
    Physical Facilities/Architecture Representative 
    Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
1. Does the church attempt to “harden” buildings in areas of the world where 
there may be heightened threats of political violence or terrorism? 
2. Are church buildings designed to provide avenues of escape or protected 
enclaves should an attack occur? 
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Questionnaire:  Sent via mail to Area/Regional headquarters. 
 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
   General Authority—Area Presidency Representative 
   Area/Regional Headquarters 
 
The following is a questionnaire relating to the threat of political violence or 
terrorism to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the _______________ 
Area.  Please fill out the questionnaire using the space provided or attach additional 
pages as necessary.  Please feel free to explain or expand your answers.  Your 
cooperation is appreciated. 
 
1. How much latitude are you given to develop responses to increased risks of 
political violence or terrorist threats? 
2. Do you feel safe when administering the church in countries where there is 
increased risks of political violence/terrorist threats? 
3. Do you feel that local members of the church are under increased risk of 
violence due to their affiliation with the church? 
4. Do you have a plan to respond to violence should it occur? 
5. Are any such plans dictated by Salt Lake or developed locally? 
6. Do you feel that the local populations equate the church with the United 
States? 
7. Do you think that the church is targeted for political violence because it is 
“American”? 
8. Have you administered the church when there was an act of violence 
perpetrated against the church in your area of authority?  If yes, please give 
the details. 
9. How did you respond to that act? 
10. Was that response dictated by church headquarters? 
11. Did you feel the church did everything it could to reduce the risk or ameliorate 
the damage of attacks in that case? 
12. Was there anything else the church could have done to reduce the risk? 
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Questionnaire:  Sent via mail to local church headquarters 
  Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
Local Leadership—Bishop/Branch Presidents/District 
Presidents/Stake Presidents 
City/State Areas 
 
The following is a questionnaire relating to the threat of political violence or 
terrorism to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the 
__________________________ Branch/Ward/Stake/District.  Please fill out the 
questionnaire using the space provided or attach additional pages as necessary.  
Please feel free to explain or expand your answers.  Your cooperation is appreciated. 
 
1. Do you feel safe as a leader of the church in this area? 
2. Do you feel that the church is sensitive to heightened threats of political 
violence/terrorism in this area? 
3. Are you given direction to reduce the threat of political violence? 
4. Does your membership in the church increase your risk to political 
violence/terrorism? 
5. Do you have plans in place to deal with violence should it occur? 
6. Are those plans dictated from Salt Lake or developed locally. 
7. Do you feel that local citizens equate the church with the United States? 
8. Do you think that the church is targeted for political violence because it is 
“American”? 
9. Have you witnessed violence against the church or were you serving in an 
area that sustained violence against the church?  If so, what were the 
circumstances? 
10. What did you do to reduce your/the church’s exposure/risk?   
11. Were those actions dictated by the church? 
12. Was there anything the church could have done to reduce the exposure/risk? 
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Interview Questions: To be asked in face to face interviews. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
   Former missionaries who served in high-risk areas. 
 
1. Did you feel safe as a missionary? 
2. Was your safety or was spreading the gospel more important? 
3. Were you aware of any procedures or practices that you were instructed to 
engage in that might reduce the threat of political violence to you or other 
members of the church in that area? 
4. Were you ever instructed not to proselytize due to an increased risk of 
violence? 
5. Were you ever the victim of political violence? 
6. Did you ever witness political violence against the church or were you serving 
in an area that sustained violence against the church?  If so, what were the 
circumstances? 
7. What did you do to reduce your exposure/risk?   
8. Were those actions dictated by the church? 
9. Do you feel that the church did everything it could to reduce the risk? 
10. Was there anything else the church could have done to reduce the risk? 
11. Do you feel that the local population equated the church with the United 
States? 
12. Were you ever instructed not to proselytize to one group/ethnicity/religion? 
13. Why do you think that was the case? 
14. Do you think that locals might increase their risk of political violence by 
joining the church? 
15. Do you think that the church was sensitive to heightened threats of political 
violence/terrorism threats in the area? 
16. Do you think that the church was targeted for political violence because it is 
“American”? 
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INTERNET POSTING 
 
Attention all returned missionaries! 
 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Stephen Sloan in the Department of 
Political Science, a unit of the University of Oklahoma College of Arts and Sciences. I invite 
you to participate in an interview as part of a doctoral dissertation research study being 
conducted under the auspices of the University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus and entitled 
“NGO’s in the Crosshairs: Non-Governmental Organizations and the Terrorist Threat”.  The 
purpose of the study is to determine the potential threat to non-governmental organizations, 
such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, posed by terrorist groups. 
 
Your participation will involve a short interview (in person, if possible) and should only take 
about 30 minutes. Your involvement in the study is voluntary, and you may choose not to 
participate or to stop at any time. The results of the research study may be published, but your 
name will not be used.  Further, in the published form, results that deal with specific security 
matters will be withheld and the findings will be presented in summary only. All information 
you provide that deals with security matters will remain strictly confidential. 
 
The findings from this project will provide information on how the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints deals with the threat of terrorism and political violence with no cost to you 
other than the time it takes for the interview.  
 
The only risks that may result from the participation in the study relate to sensitive security 
protocols that may increase the risk to the participant’s organization, its agents or property 
should that information be released.  However, steps have been taken to ensure that such 
disclosure will not occur.  The dissertation committee has agreed that such sensitive material 
be disclosed and discussed with the committee co-chairs only.  Further, such sensitive 
material will not be made public and disseminated in the final dissertation.  Because your 
identity also will remain anonymous in the dissertation itself, no individual risk, political or 
professional, can accrue. 
 
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact me at (405) 
325-6418 or cjstap@ou.edu or Professor Sloan at (405) 325-5910 or carlos@ou.edu.   
Questions about your rights as a research participant or concerns about the project should be 
directed to the Institutional Review Board at the University of Oklahoma-Norman Campus at 
(405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu. 
 
Thanks for your consideration! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Craig S. Stapley 
Doctoral Candidate, University of Oklahoma 
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